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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY: A THEORETICAL-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
Gökakın, Behice Özlem  
 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
 
 
January 2010 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the Ottoman Empire’s relationship with European 
international society in the nineteenth century through the English School of 
International Relations Theory. By use of primary and secondary sources, this 
dissertation attempts to refine some of the historical arguments of the English School 
in reference to the expansion of European international society and the socialization 
of non-European states. By focusing on the Ottoman perspective, this dissertation 
presents a critical understanding of European international society and its expansion 
from a non-European perspective.  
 
 
Keywords: The English School of International Relations Theory, The Ottoman 
Empire, The non-European States, Socialization 
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ÖZET 
 
OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU VE AVRUPA ULUSLARARASI TOPLUMU: 
KURAMSAL-TARİHSEL BİR ANALİZ 
 
Gökakın, Behice Özlem  
 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
 
Ocak 2010 
 
Bu tez, on dokuzuncu yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Avrupa uluslararası 
toplumu ilişkilerini İngiliz Okulu Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi bakış açısıyla analiz 
etmektedir. Birincil ve ikincil kaynakları kullanarak, İngiliz Okulu teorisinin Avrupa 
uluslararası toplumunun genişlemesi ve Avrupalı olmayan devletlerle ilişkileri 
hakkında bazı tarihsel tezlerini toplumsallaşma açısından ele alarak geliştirmeye 
çalışmıştır. Bu tez Osmanlı bakış açısına odaklanarak Avrupa uluslararası toplumuna 
ve genişlemesine, Avrupa-dışı bir bakış açısından eleştirel bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İngilizce Okulu Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi, Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu, Avrupalı Olmayan Devletler, Toplumsallaşma 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Dissertation Argument  
 
This dissertation analyzes the Ottoman Empire’s socialization into European 
international society using the English School of International Relations Theory 
(ES),1 which answers the question of: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the 
English School approach in analyzing the socialization of the non-European states to 
the international society? The focus of this dissertation will be on the change in 
Ottoman policy against Europe and its view of European standards and institutions.  
 
International society is a socially constructed concept; or rather, an ideal-type2 by 
which English School scholars analyze the historical development of international 
relations. It approaches world politics from a different perspective than Realism; 
                                               
1 In the international relations literature also known as the ‘international society approach’. 
2 Ideal type is a concept developed by Max Weber, to describe a pure case. Ideal-types are constructed 
from comparison of historical and social reality for analysis. See Edward Keene, “International 
Society as an Ideal Type,” in Theorising International Society – English School Methods, ed. Cornelia 
Navari, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009), 104-124.  
  
2 
positing an international society where states cooperate and coexist for their basic 
common goals makes the realist portrayal of international politics as power politics 
(put simply, an arena of rivalry for survival and state interests) inadequate. The 
society of states, on the other hand, enables cooperation for orderly relations; it is 
viewed as an instrument to promote and preserve the international order and security 
among its constitutive members. Members of the international society manage their 
relations through primary institutions such as balance of power, international law, 
diplomacy, war, and the great power directive.3 These institutions not only signal the 
existence of an international society that is established via common rules, but also 
provide a sense of order by regulating interstate relations. As noted by contemporary 
post-classical ES scholars, the school’s major contribution to the international 
relations discipline lies in its concepts, particularly that of “the international 
society”.4 
 
There are three ways to study international society: structural, functional, and 
historical. Structural studies focus on the institutional structure of international 
society, while functional studies analyze how that society functions; historical studies 
examine the evolution, development, and expansion of international society and is 
the main occupation of ES scholars.5 The school’s main argument regarding the 
historical origins of the global international society-based solely on European 
civilization and Christianity-led to claims of one-sidedness. Apart from the European 
international system and society, other regional international systems/societies were 
                                               
3 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Second Edition, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 101-233. 
4 For the ES conceptualization of international system and society see below, Chapter Two, 40-61. 
5 Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations- A 
Contemporary Reassessment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 43-80. 
  
3 
built upon elaborate civilizations and conceptions of the world, such as Islam and 
Asia.6 The relationships between members of different international systems and 
societies were not based on the same moral and legal bases as those between 
members of the same international society.  
 
The post-classical ES scholars Buzan and Little recommend broadening the ES 
analysis to include both pre-modern and modern regional international systems and 
societies. Buzan also argues for a revision of the ES levels of analysis, suggesting 
that the international system be subsumed under the international society..Buzan 
further argues for the inclusion of international economic systems into the framework 
of the ES. The major counter-argument raised against the inclusion of international 
economic systems is that the boundaries of the economic system generally extend 
beyond existing political systems.7 Although this argument has merit, an 
international economic system that ties various political systems within a single 
framework can develop into an international system. The interactions between units 
over a sustained period of time may extend beyond trade and commerce; intense 
economic interactions can have a spill-over effect to the other sectors. Units working 
to regulate economic relations by developing new rules, institutions, and norms may 
engage in diplomatic-military and socio-cultural relations as well. It should be noted 
                                               
6 See Hedley Bull and Adam Watson ed., The Expansion of International Society, 1984; Adam 
Watson, The Evolution of International Society, (London: Routledge, 1992). 
7 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society-English School Theory and the Social Structure 
of Globalisation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 
International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); Richard Little, “The English School and World History,” in The 
International Society and its Critics, ed. A.J. Bellamy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 45-
64; Richard Little, “History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism,” in Theorising International 
Society, ed. Cornelia Navari, 2009, 78-103 
 
  
4 
that an international economic system can move from a system to a societal level, or 
may remain as it is.  
 
This dissertation and its scheme, which are developed using a combination of 
classical and post-classical ES studies, argue that European international society was 
founded on sub-regional thin international systems embedded within an economic 
international system. Conventionally, the Italian city-states were the forerunners of 
the European international system and society, and initially built a thin interstate 
system. The main driving force for the Italian city-states was to balance each other in 
the Mediterranean economic system; they wanted to ease their economic concerns 
and regulate their commercial relations within a framework of agreed rules and 
institutions. This balancing of the economy, along with the addition of political and 
security concerns, particularly after the fall of Byzantium, turned into a political 
equilibrium. From a sub-regional thin international system and a regional economic 
system, a full interstate system extended into a nest of developing sectors. The 
dispersion of this system and its institutions during the Renaissance led to the 
transition of the European state system from a thin (sub-regional) to a thick 
(regional) international system. It was upon this full regional system that the pluralist 
European international society was established.  
 
Economic and commercial considerations also played an important role in the 
expansion of European international society into non-European territories. 
Originally, the European states formed a thin international economic system with the 
non-European states which then developed into a full international system. The non-
European states were included in other sectors, either through reciprocal relations 
  
5 
that were based on equality or through colonization that was based on inequality. As 
the great European powers’ common interests increased in non-European territories, 
the normative rules of conduct, called “the standards of civilization”, were used to 
create unit and value similarity. This led to the development of what is defined as “a 
hybrid international society” that consists of both systemic and societal elements. 
This society was stratified and hierarchical, just like the European one. This 
argument fits empirically and historically well into Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-
Palaez’s argument of the persistence of regional international systems and societies 
in contemporary international society.8 The regions that interacted with the European 
international society-through colonialism or other ways-are, currently a fusion of 
earlier societies and the European society that preserves their distinctiveness under 
the universal hybrid international society. 
 
Conversely, classical ES scholars argue that the globalization of the European 
society of states resulted from both an outward expansion of this society and the 
functionalist socialization of non-European states. First, this depiction rules out the 
role of the European and non-European interactions on the society of states. Second, 
it neglects the importance of economic, imperial, and colonial factors in the 
expansion of international society. Third, it excludes the effects of the socialization 
of the non-European states on the constitutive members of the international society9 
and omits the process through which a distinct (hybrid) international society is 
                                               
8 Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds., International Society and the Middle East-English 
School Theory at the Regional Level (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009). 
9 Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society- Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, “The 
Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society,” Review 
of International Studies, 17 (1991): 26-44; Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire-China and Japan’s 
Encounter with European International Society, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009). 
  
6 
formed between Europe and the rest of the world. Additionally, because the school’s 
major arguments regarding the non-European states are based on biased classical 
European writings in lieu of non-European ones, they inevitably make the ES 
approach appear Eurocentric and ahistorical. 
 
Suzuki, who recently contributed to this debate with his case studies of China and 
Japan, argues that the exclusion of non-European perspectives in the ES accounts of 
the international society’s expansion undermines the school’s interpretive and 
historical claims10: “conventional studies of the expansion of European international 
society are characterized by a myopic and normatively driven conceptualization, 
which is inadequate for understanding the entry of non-European states into 
European international society and threatens to undermine the School’s 
‘interpretivist’ claims.”11  
 
Additionally, Suzuki notes that the ES scholars’ “normative commitments to 
demonstrate international society as a ‘normative good’ resulted in empirically 
impoverished accounts of this complex process”12 of non-European socialization. 
Post-classical ES scholars such as Buzan, Suganami, and Linklater, note the need for 
country-based studies to complement historical accounts of the expansion of the 
international society. In other words, despite comprehensive studies by the leading 
scholars of the school and the growing interest in the ES approach in recent years, 
non-European perceptions are still terra incognita. Additional historical studies from 
                                               
10Shogo Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society,” European 
Journal of International Relations, 11 (2005):137-164. 
11 Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization into Janus-Faced,” 37. 
12 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 12. 
  
7 
non-European perspectives and original primary sources are required in order to 
revise the ES’s historical analysis of the institutionalization of European international 
society over other societies, as well as its structural and functional understanding of 
that institutionalization. 
 
This dissertation is therefore organized as an idiographic historical case study of the 
relations of a non-European state (the Ottoman Empire) with the European 
international society; the Ottoman Empire’s constitutive role in the European 
international system and its transition from an international system to a society is 
presented from the perspective of the Ottoman ruling elite. This dissertation will 
bring a new vision to the ES’s existing arguments regarding non-European states, 
thereby contributing to the historical study of the international society and modifying 
the ES account of European expansion. It also presents a new perspective on the 
study of nineteenth-century Ottoman diplomatic history from an international 
relations theoretical viewpoint. There are currently no comprehensive studies 
combining the ES approach and Ottoman perspective with regard to the Empire’s 
socialization with European international societal institutions. It should be noted that 
this dissertation does not intend to clarify structural or functional academic debates 
within the ES approach, nor is it a chronicle of the history of nineteenth-century 
Ottoman-European relations. Comprehensive studies on the diplomatic history of the 
Ottoman Empire and on the ES remain unresolved debates. It should, however, also 
be noted that it is inevitable to address some of the structural and functional points 
that are essential for this analysis. The uniqueness of this study depends on its ability 
to present the weaknesses and strengths of the ES approach in analyzing the non-
European states’ socialization, and its suggestions for improving on the theoretical 
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and historical bases. The analytical framework and schemes that are built on the 
existing ES literature are used to grasp the multifaceted and contextual nature of 
Ottoman-European relations within the system and society dichotomy. 
 
Bull’s revolutionary study, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics became a classic international relations text ever since it was first published 
in the United Kingdom in 1977. Its title describes Bull's main argument: that the 
present system of states forms a society in which there are certain common rules, 
values, and institutions that provide order in international anarchy. From his writings, 
it becomes clear that his conception of international society is a limited pluralist that 
revolves around the basic rules of coexistence among sovereign states. After the 
Vienna Settlement, nineteenth-century Europe formed a pluralist international 
society in this sense, which was not perfect and harmonious, but was nonetheless 
well-regulated through the primary institutions.  
 
The post-Vienna pluralist international order between members of the European 
international society was maintained as envisioned by Bull. The limitation of 
violence according to a just war tradition, fulfillment of the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, and the preservation of the possession of property through mutual 
recognition of sovereignty were its essential principles. As noted by Jackson, this 
kind of a society of states requires at least a “minimalist international civility”; 
civility being defined as the commonly agreed norms, rules, institutions, and 
practices of courtesy used in all in inter-state relations.13 Additionally, ES scholars 
                                               
13 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant-Human Conduct in a World of States, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 408. 
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posulate that common culture and civilization facilitated the creation and workings of 
the primary institutions of the society. Beginning with the Respublica Christiana, the 
Europeans constructed a society of states based on diplomatic culture and public law. 
European civilization distinguished international society from the broader 
international system at the time and confined it only to the Continent.  
 
Unlike Hobessian realism, where there is no possibility for progress because of the 
static structure of international politics, the Grotian understanding of the ES 
approach makes qualified progress possible through the society of states.14 This 
progressivism enables passage from an international system to an international 
society. In the classical ES texts, the relationship between a system and a society is 
not clear, but functionally, a society presupposes the existence of a system; 
accordingly, the non-European states, through socialization, can become part of the 
international society.15 In order to be protected by the norms and institutions of 
European international society and to be recognized as legally equal, non-European 
states were required to adapt to European “standards of civilization-civility”.16 In 
nineteenth-century Europe, “civilization”, the antonym of barbarity, was the 
foundation of international legitimacy,17 and formed the basis of the international 
unwritten constitution-the so-called “global covenant” of European international 
society.18  
 
                                               
14 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 117. 
15 Jackson, The Global Covenant. 
16 Gerritt W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984). Jackson, The Global Covenant. 
17 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 37. 
18 Jackson, The Global Covenant. 
  
10 
These “standards” played an important role in determining which states would be 
included or excluded within the civilized European international society, and the 
non-European states adjusted and modified their systems according to these 
standards. As Gong noted, “even those countries most intent on pursuing their 
individual interests recognized the need for, and thereby usually complied with some 
degree in, certain collective standards of international conduct.”19 Worldwide 
enforcement of European international standards was referred to as the “civilizing 
mission” of the great powers of Europe. The standards provided a legitimate pretext 
that was, according to Yurdusev, “a normative justification”20 for European 
imperialist expansion, unequal treatment, and interference in the affairs of the states 
that were regarded as uncivilized.21  
 
In the ES literature, the Ottoman Empire is placed within the European international 
system, but not within European international society, until the demise of the Empire, 
the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, and the 1923 abolition of unequal 
treaties (the capitulations). It has been suggested that the Ottomans were uninterested 
in world affairs and constantly contradicted everything for which Europe stood: 
Christianity, culture, and civilization. Only because of its weakening power and 
                                               
19Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization', xi. 
20 A. Nuri Yurdusev, International Relations and the Philosophy of History – A Civilizational 
Approach, (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003), 56-65. For a detailed analysis of the connection 
between culture and Western imperialism see, Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, (London: 
Vintage, 1994). 
21Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Clark, Legitimacy in International Society; Gong, The Standard 
of 'Civilization'. Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral 
Backwardness of International Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Keene, 
Beyond the Anarchical Society; Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations – The Rise and 
Fall of International Law 1870-1960, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Gerry 
Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States – Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
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European imposition did the Empire conform to European diplomacy and 
international law, and reform its system according to European standards. It is 
argued, however, that Ottomans were never able to attain the same level of 
civilization because of their cultural and religious conservatism. These arguments are 
misleading, as they undermine the Ottoman Empire’s extensive interactions and its 
role in the European international system and society. These arguments also simplify 
the motives behind the Ottoman modernization and socialization processes.  
 
Recent research on Ottoman–European relations presents a different perspective: in 
its establishment and expansion stages, the Ottoman Empire did not differ from 
European dynastic states in its view of interstate relations. In one form or another, 
Ottoman statesmen achieved their ambitions in Europe through force,22 aiming to 
strengthen the rule of the House of Osman both within and without the borders of 
first the emirate (beylik), and then the Empire. The Ottoman Empire, with its 
distinctive society, was considered to be a serious challenge and threat to Europe. 
The Ottomans and Europeans both perceived the other to be conflicting in the areas 
of religion, identity, and civilization;23 the Ottoman Empire was depicted “as the 
antithesis of European and Europeanness”.24 However, even in those ages, Ottoman 
relations with Europe were not always adversarial. The Empire had strong political, 
military, and economic relations with major European powers based on European 
                                               
22 Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of Turkey’s Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” 
Journal of International Affairs, 54 (2000): 199–217. 
23 For an in-depth analysis of perceptions in the Ottoman-European relations, see Nancy Bisaha, 
Creating East and West – Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks, (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Aslı Çırakman, From the ‘Terror’ of the World to the ‘Sick Man’ of 
Europe-European Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth 
Century, (New York: P. Lang, 2002); Mustafa Soykut ed., Historical Image of the Turk in Europe: 
15th Century to the Present – Political and Civilisational Aspects, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2003).  
24 Halil İnalcık, Turkey and Europe in History, (Istanbul: Eren Press, 2006). 
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treaty laws, and used diplomacy, international law, and the rules of civility in their 
dealings with European powers. Depending on circumstances, the Ottomans either 
terminated alliances or cooperated with various European powers. For example, the 
Ottomans supported Protestants, France, the Dutch Republic, and Britain against the 
Hapsburg Catholics in Europe, leading to structural changes in the European system 
and order that later shaped the fundamental basis of the European international 
society.  
 
The Ottoman Empire was a part of both the thin and thick European international 
systems. It was also functionally a de facto member of the pluralist European 
international society. Ottomans and Europeans rivaled each other but, beginning with 
their first foray into European territories, and especially after the fall of Byzantium, 
the Ottomans claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the Eastern Roman Empire and 
regarded themselves as a European state; the recognition of this fact on the European 
side came later than that of the Ottoman Empire. During this transitory era, the 
Ottoman Empire contributed both directly and indirectly to the development of the 
European international system and society,25 and to the creation of the hybrid 
international society that existed beyond the borders of Europe. 
 
The political, military, economic, and socio-cultural exchanges between the 
Ottomans and Europeans shaped not only the modern European international system 
                                               
25 Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman eds., The Early Modern Ottomans – Remapping the Empire, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the 
World Around It, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire 
and Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); İnalcık, Turkey and 
Europe; İlber Ortaylı, Avrupa ve Biz [Europe and Us], (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2007); Donald 
Quartaert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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and society, but also the Ottoman Empire. There is ample evidence that the Empire 
and its ruling elite experienced an intellectual and ideational change in order to move 
from the international system to an international society. The evolving Ottoman 
perceptions of Europe towards the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
fundamentally modified the Ottoman understanding of security; the Ottomans moved 
from security through power to security through European international society and 
order. The Ottoman ruling elite realized that careful exploitation of the European 
balance of power, international law, and diplomacy would provide the Empire with 
European allies and safeguard it against its enemies. Ottoman statesmen were 
concerned mainly with Russia, which had been a principal enemy of the Empire 
since the seventeenth century, as well as other European powers’ interests in the 
Ottoman territories. Recognition as an equal member of the European international 
society was seen as a protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Empire.  
 
Although the Empire was capable and equivalent to its enemies until the end of the 
seventeenth century with regard to its military strength,26 Ottoman statesmen 
considered war to be a last resort. Ottoman reforms and their adoption of European 
standards highlight this conspicuous change. The Sublime Porte utilized the primary 
institutions of European international society as a part of its foreign policy, and the 
Empire sought cordial relations with European states by adhering to international 
law, engaging in European-style diplomacy, and reforming the Ottoman 
administrative system on the European model. There were differences between the 
                                               
26 Gábor Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan – Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman 
Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
  
14 
European and Ottoman interpretation of certain norms, values, laws, and institutions 
but the Ottoman administration still preferred to resolve crises through European 
diplomacy and international law, acting in concert with the great powers of Europe, 
sometimes at the expense of its imperial interests. The Ottomans later agreed 
voluntarily to be bound by European international society and its institutions. On the 
side of the Ottomans, despite there being a conscious aspiration to be a part of 
European international society, the Empire’s integration was not a simple European 
imposition.  
 
The Ottoman Empire’s introduction into European international society was non-
linear and gradual: in 1606, the Ottoman Empire accepted its sovereign equality with 
European powers in the Treaty of Sitvatorok. In this treaty, the Austrian Emperor 
was referred to as Padişah, a term reserved for the Ottoman sultans themselves until 
that date; this was a formal recognition of equality. With the Treaty of Carlowitz in 
1699, Ottomans and Europeans expected to be bound by common (European) laws, 
and thereafter, the Empire’s integration into European international society began. 
The treaties of Passarowitz (in 1718) and Belgrade (in 1739) regulated Ottoman-
European trade relations, which reached its final stage with the London Treaty of 
1841. In this treaty, the great powers of Europe declared the indispensability of 
Ottoman sovereignty for the maintenance of European order.  
 
By the early nineteenth century, the European approach to the Ottoman Empire 
changed tactically: the great powers of Europe, concerned with the preservation of 
European international security and order, secured and kept the Empire under control 
throughout their rule. For security reasons, they also sought to integrate the Ottoman 
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Empire into their international society; finally, the Ottoman Empire became a 
beneficiary of European public law and the Concert of Europe with the 1856 Treaty 
of Paris.  
 
However, the Ottoman Empire was still not recognized as a European state, nor was 
it treated equally. According to Reimer, differential treatment of the Ottomans was 
related to the non-convergence of Ottoman and European understandings and values. 
She reinforces her argument further by saying that “being interlocked is one thing, 
but being a full-member in Europe is a rather different case. This nexus is also valid 
for a EU-membership of Turkey.”27 The historical evidence presented in this 
dissertation indicates that the Ottoman Empire respected the rules, values, norms, 
and power-political aspects of the European international system and society. On the 
part of the Ottoman Empire, it was a matter of survival and aspiration to be 
recognized as an equal member of the society of the great European powers; the 
Ottoman elite wanted to regain their lost status as a great power.  
 
After 1856, there was an increase in the level of cooperation between the European 
powers and the Ottoman Empire. They worked out rules governing bilateral 
relations, European and minority rights, and reforms. The Ottoman Empire, in its 
conduct of diplomacy, made additional references to the underlying principles and 
norms of European international society, such as territorial integrity, legitimate 
governments (sovereignty), diplomatic resolution of conflicts, and international law. 
Historical evidence confirms that the Sublime Porte shared Europe’s interests and 
                                               
27 Andrea K. Reimer, “Turkey and Europe at a Cross-Road: Drifting Apart or Approaching Each 
Other,” Milletlerarası Münasebetler Yıllığı [Turkish Yearbook of International Relations], 34 (2003): 
137-166. 
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values for the international order. This, in Bullian’s understanding, makes it a part of 
European international society. For Europeans, however, Ottomans continued to be 
the “other” until the twentieth century.28 European perceptions and policies, vis-à-vis 
non-European states, remained the same on the surface, but. as noted by Linklater 
and Suganami, problems persisted between the founding members of European 
international society and the newly admitted members as “perceptions of cultural or 
racial superiority among the original members of the international society have not 
entirely disappeared with the admission of new members”.29 This often led to friction 
and conflict, but the pluralist international society was preserved, according to Bull’s 
understanding. Between 1856 (Treaty of Paris) and 1876 (Sultan Abdülhamid II’s 
accession to the Ottoman throne), the ineffectiveness of the primary institutions of 
European international society to provide the Empire’s security and its unequal 
treatment led to significant disappointment and the Empire retreated to its old policy: 
the balance of power and war. Under Sultan Abdülhamid, it acquired a more 
introverted outlook and followed Pan-Islamism, Pan-Ottomanism, and Pan-Turkism 
as alternatives to Europeanization. 
 
This contradiction between the established ES arguments and the historical facts is 
related to the dualistic conception of international society, which was omitted in the 
majority of the works by the school. The European international society of the 
nineteenth century was, in the words of Suzuki, “a janus-faced” society for civilized 
European empires.30 As noted by Keene, it had a bifurcated nature with differing 
                                               
28 Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other–“The East” in European Identity Formation, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999). 
29 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 147. 
30 Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization,”. 
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modes of interaction: one that applied to intra-European relations and another that 
applied to those outside of it. Different institutions, laws, norms, and practices 
regulated the relationships between European and non-European powers. Certain 
forms of behavior were accepted and tolerated among European powers, but similar 
ones were not tolerated in non-European state relations.31 This dissertation suggests 
that by developing post-classical ES arguments further, there existed a hybrid 
international society rather than an international system along with European 
international society, one that was characterized by imperialism and the inequality of 
states. The non-European states remained parts of this society, while the European 
society of states moved into semi-solidarism; in the literature, the Treaty of Paris 
(1856) is generally referred to as the Ottoman Empire’s entry into European 
international society. Depending on contemporary studies and conclusions drawn 
from historical documents and cases, this dissertation also suggests that, in 1856, the 
Ottoman Empire, together with the great European powers, became a constitutive 
member of this ‘hybrid international society’.  
 
Studies by leading scholars of the ES relegate a substandard role to imperialism, 
colonialism, and perceptions in the expansion of the European international society. 
Recent case studies reveal the importance of these factors, specifically in the analysis 
of non-European state relations with Europe. In comparison with other non-European 
states, the position of the Ottoman Empire is unique because of its geographical 
proximity and its political, economic, and cultural ties to Europe. The Sublime 
Porte’s perception and interpretation of the “janus-face” of European international 
                                               
31 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society. 
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society requires specific emphasis. Suzuki, applying Long and Hadden’s process-
based socialization model32 to the case studies of China and Japan, presents an agent-
centered analysis.33 In order to move beyond “the conventional thin accounts of the 
non-European socialization” and to present an “agent-centered analysis" as suggested 
by Suzuki, this dissertation develops its analytical model with the intent to reinterpret 
the historical evolution of European international society, and applies the process–
based socialization model. A combination of the ES, historical, and sociological 
approaches provides a better understanding of the non-European states in general, 
and the Ottoman socialization in particular. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
As mentioned above, Ottoman-European relations are generally defined as 
adversarial, based on Realist-Hobbessian arguments; there are few studies that apply 
the English School theoretical framework to the Ottoman-European relations. The 
leading scholars of the English School make references to the Ottoman Empire and 
its role in the European international system and society. According to Bull and 
Watson, despite there being interactions between the Ottoman Empire and European 
powers, both denied that they shared any common interests, values, or institutions. 
Still, Watson notes that the Ottoman case presented a serious challenge: in terms of 
religion and civilization, the Empire was categorically placed within the system, but 
the intensity and variety of interactions between Ottomans and Europeans led to 
                                               
32 Theodore E. Long and Jeffrey K. Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” Sociological Theory, 
3 (1985): 39-49. 
33 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 12. 
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confusion.34 Naff, in his analysis of Ottoman relations with the great powers of 
Europe, argues that Ottoman statesmen altered their policies and initiated reforms 
because of European imposition, and concludes that the goal of the Ottomans was to 
survive, that: 
it would be wrong, to suppose that the synthesis of European and 
Muslim societies was total; it was not. What occurred was an 
integration of systems and the material and technological 
accoutrements of modern societies. Values, outlooks on life, behavior 
patterns, and beliefs remained culturally disparate, and despite the 
revolution in education and communications of the modern era, 
imperfectly matched.35 
 
Likewise, Stivachtis refers to Ottoman relations with European international society 
in his analysis of Greece’s entry into international society, questioning whether states 
create common rules and establish common institutions because they share a 
common culture (the logic of culture), or because they are forced by external and 
internal circumstances (the logic of anarchy). He argues that the entry of the Ottoman 
Empire into international society resulted from the logic of anarchy and noted that 
the Empire’s acceptance into European international society was premature because 
it had not yet attained the standard of “civilization”. Thus, while being admitted into 
the European Concert, the Ottoman Empire did not achieve equal legal status until 
1923, when the Treaty of Lausanne abolished the unequal treaties that the Europeans 
had imposed on the Ottoman Empire.36 
 
                                               
34 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 14; Adam Watson, “Hedley Bull, State Systems and International 
Studies,” Review of International Studies, 13 (1987): 147-153; Adam Watson, Hegemony and History, 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 28. 
35 Thomas Naff, “The Ottoman Empire and the European States System,” in The Expansion of 
International Society, eds. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
169. 
36 Yannis A. Stivachtis, The Enlargement of International Society: Culture versus Anarchy and 
Greece’s Entry into International Society, (London: Macmillan, 1998), 88. 
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Reimer, on the other hand, argues that: 
it was the European international society that arrived in the Ottoman 
Empire and not the other way around. Neither the OE (Ottoman 
Empire) nor Turkey did so far take steps for the sake of her arrival in 
the EIS (European international society). The reason for adopting the 
rules and, finally, playing according to them (sometimes in Ottoman 
interpretations) were pure survival reasons within the international 
system, and less within the international society.37 
 
Neumann, analyzing the role of identity in international society, demonstrates the 
European view of the Ottoman Empire and explains how European standards of 
civilization affected the relations between the two entities, concluding that: 
 
with the shift in representations of the Ottoman Turk from being a 
barbarian to being the sick man of Europe went a toning down of the 
centrality of this other for the European self. References to ‘the 
Eastern Question’ suggested that Turkey was the East, but there were 
also other East’s. There was a certain homogenization of the Ottoman 
Turk as other, and this trend definitely became even stronger as the 
Ottoman Empire gave way to a Turkish nation-state.38 
 
 Göl, and Yurdusev, and Yurdusev, also apply the ES approach to Turkish and 
Ottoman case studies in a number of published and unpublished papers. Göl 
examines admittance of the Ottoman Empire into European international society, in 
terms of the requirements and standards of civilization. She argues that the Ottoman 
Empire was never accepted as equal, and that its modernization, according to 
European standards, led to the emergence of Turkish nationalism.39 Yurdusev and 
Yurdusev focus on the role of the Ottoman/Turkish identity within international 
                                               
37 Andrea K. Reimer, “The Arrival of the International Society to the Ottoman Empire,” submitted to 
ISA Annual Meeting, 2002, 41-42. 
38 Neumann, Uses of the Other, 59. 
39Ayla Göl, “The Requirements of European International Society: Modernity and Nationalism in the 
Ottoman Empire.” Working Paper 2003/4 (Canberra: Department of International Relations RSPAS 
Australian National University, 2003), http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir. Reimer, “Turkey and Europe at a 
Cross-Road,” 2003, 137-166. 
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society and conclude that the Ottoman Empire adhered to the European international 
system long before 1856, but because of its identity, it was not considered to be a 
part of Europe.40 In his recent study, Yurdusev concludes that the Ottomans were 
definitely a member of the international system and pluralistic–coexistence 
international society, but not the solidarist-cooperative society. 41 
 
In general, the so-called otherness or distinctiveness of the Ottomans and their non-
conformity with European culture, civilization, values, and religion has been 
presented as the basis of ES arguments regarding the non-inclusion of the Empire. 
Original studies by Bull, Buzan, Gong, Gonzalez-Pelaez, Göl, Keene, Little, Naff, 
Neumann, Reimer, Stivachtis, Suzuki, Yurdusev and Yurdusev, and Watson have 
inspired the current study. These works were valuable guides in developing and 
organizing the questions and the plan of this research, despite the fact the final 
argument is counter-intuitive to some of the aforementioned studies.  
 
1.3 Epistemology 
 
The English School of International Relations Theory was chosen as the topic of this 
dissertation because of its historical orientation to the study of international relations 
and its methodological pluralism. Historical approaches to the study of international 
                                               
40Nuri Yurdusev and Esin Yurdusev, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Avrupa Devletler Sistemine Girişi 
ve 1856 Paris Konferansı’ [The Question of the Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the European States 
System and the Paris Conference of 1856]” in Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç [The 
Contemporary Turkish Diplomacy in the Process of 200 Years], ed. İsmail Soysal, (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu 1999), 137-148; Nuri Yurdusev, “Re-visiting the European Identity Formation: The 
Turkish Other,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 30 (2007): 62-73. 
41 A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Middle East Encounter with the Expansion of European International 
Society,” in International Society and the Middle East- English School Theory at the Regional Level, 
eds. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009) , 70-91. 
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relations have long led to heated debates between historians and theoreticians; a 
number of dichotomies such as particular and general, explanation and 
understanding, nomothetic and idiographic, narrative-based and theory-based, and 
theoretical and empirical, have been enumerated as the reasons for the non-
convergence of history and international relations as academic disciplines. 42 
 
Nonetheless, the importance of history and historical study in international politics is 
unquestionable. The ES, putting its emphasis on history, was, in fact, trying “to 
warm the coals of an older tradition of historical and political reflection during the 
long, dark winter of the ‘social scientific’ ascendancy”.43 It should, however, be 
noted that the ES understanding of historical study differs from the study of 
historians at the time (1950-1980); British historians were moving toward “new 
history” under the influence of the French Annales historians44 and scientific and 
statistical methods. The ES, on the other hand, preferred a classical and narrative 
study of past political, constitutional, and philosophical events. This preference 
becomes apparent in ES texts and writings. 
 
The Expansion of International Society and The Evolution of International Society 
are narrative studies;45 the leading figures of the British Committee and the ES, 
Wight and Butterfield, were historians who were skeptical about statistical and 
                                               
42 Thomas W. Smith, History and International Relations, (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); 
Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History-A Guide to Method, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006).  
43 Hedley Bull, “The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969,” in The Abersystwyth Papers: 
International Politics, 1919-1969, ed. Brian Porter, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 48. 
Also cited in Edward Keene, “The English School and British Historians,” Millenium- Journal of 
International Studies, 37 (2008): 381-393. 
44 To name a few: Fernand Braudel, Emmanuel Le Roy, and Lucien Febvre.  
45 Keene, “The English School and British Historians,” 381-393. 
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quantitative methods in the study of both history and international relations. 
Nonetheless, the ES created comparative-historical studies that are a blend of 
analytical and narrative history.46 According to Keene, “the school did make an 
important move towards a more analytical approach in its decision to pursue a 
comparative-historical study of the states-systems”.47 The major preoccupation of ES 
scholars, as mentioned earlier, was international society, and if their approach to the 
historical method is taken into account, it is natural, then, that they out-produced a 
narrative history that focuses on the political, legal and diplomatic aspects of the 
international society and its institutions48 of the evolution, origins, development, and 
expansion of that method.  
  
Recent years have witnessed a return to both history and historical study in 
international relations and theory; studies by Fukuyama, Huntington, Gaddis, and the 
ES have influenced this move.49 The ES, putting forth the notion of international 
society as a pre-social condition of world politics, challenged the positivist-scientific 
understanding of Realism, marking the return of the classical-historical approach 
(also called the “old” history) into the study of international relations fifty years 
ago.50 Historians still continue to question the effectiveness of combining history and 
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47 Keene, “The English School and British Historians,” 386. 
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theory. For example, Windschuttle argues that theory and history are separate and 
should not be mixed;51 similarly, Chomsky notes that theories cannot capture the 
complexity and variety of the historical conditions and cases, yet he favors a detailed 
study of historical events and personalities in order to understand the working of the 
world.52  
 
Theories simplify the analytical intelligibility of the outer world, and Burchill 
believes in “intellectual ordering of the subject matter of international relations”. He 
further theorizes that it “enables us to conceptualise and contextualize both past and 
contemporary events”, in addition to providing “a range of ways of interpreting 
complex issues”.53 Indeed, as Smith points out, international theory and history are 
inseparable because both the bottom-up and top-down theories cannot be built 
without history. In the bottom-up theory construction, history provides the building 
blocks; in the top-down version, it assists in the testing and falsifying of theoretical 
concepts.54 
 
Theoretical concepts, such as ideal-types of historians, are the building blocks of 
theory construction; they enable the systematization of facts and analysis. The 
efficacy of a concept depends on its definitive characteristics: “(a) how precisely 
they locate it in time and space, (b) how clearly they demarcate it from related 
                                                                                                                                     
“The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations,” European Journal of 
International Relations, 6 (2000), 395-422.  
51 Keith Windschuttle, The Killing of History – How Literary Critics and Social Theorists are 
Murdering Our Past, (New York: The Free Press, 1997).  
52 Noam Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New, (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 120.  
53 Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations, Second Edition, (London: Palgrave, 2001), 
13. 
54 Smith, History and International Relations, 7. 
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phenomena and (c) how well they specify its nature and distinctive elements.” 55 
Notwithstanding its complexity, Bull’s conceptual distinction is necessary for 
understanding the nature of relations both within the European international society 
and outside of it, within the broader international system that existed beyond 
nineteenth century Europe. Bull’s distinction highlights the differences in these 
relationships over the course of history, and helps in the analysis of the mutual 
influences of the policies of European and non-European states pursuant to 
interaction and socialization processes. The core concepts of the ES allows for 
conceptual explanation and contextual understanding of the specificity of the 
Ottoman Empire’s position and relations in the European international system and 
society. 
 
The ES’s definition of international politics as a society presents an important 
analytical advantage because societies can be studied at different levels. According 
to Stern, it is possible to study a society at a psychological level (individual thinking 
and behavior), a sociological level (group behavior), and a macro or systematic level 
(socio-political unit).56 The ES is the only international relations theory that has the 
potential to bring in various levels of analysis (individual, state, international system, 
international society, and world society) and disciplines (history, international law, 
political philosophy, psychology, and sociology) within the same analytical 
framework.57 It should, however, be noted that the school operates mainly at the 
international level, as it analyzes international society; its ontological focus is on 
                                               
55 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 1985, 41. 
56 Geoffrey Stern, The Structure of International Society, (London: Pinter, 1995), 9. 
57 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations – Theories and 
Approaches, Second Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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states making up that society, and it follows a constructivist epistemology and 
historical methods.58  
 
Furthermore, the ES views international society as a “second-order” political 
construction; it is the individuals acting on behalf of states (statesmen, diplomats, 
and ruling elites), the law makers (legalists and publicists), and philosophers who 
constructed and entertained the idea of a society of states. This creates the necessity 
of state and individual levels of analysis in the study of international society. The ES, 
being interested in meanings that emphasize a human-focused and interpretive 
approach, aimed to get inside the minds of those involved in international relations. 
The interpretation of political thought and actions is the basis of its methodology.59 
In fact, as Smith notes in his historical study of international relations: 
 
The path to understanding foreign policymaking almost certainly 
travels through the minds of foreign policymakers… Diplomatic 
behavior, where motivations are murky and where perceptions about 
security, power, prestige, interests, economics, and norms are so 
important, seems particularly uncongenial to ‘outside’ explanations.60  
 
 
By applying the ES approach, this dissertation focuses mainly on the inside of the 
Ottoman state and statecraft: foreign policy actors and their inter-subjective 
meanings (interests, concerns, intentions, and beliefs) regarding European 
international society and socialization. At the international level, the ES approach is 
involved in the evolution and expansion of European international society and the 
influence of international values, norms, and laws of non-European state (Ottoman) 
                                               
58 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? – English School Theory and the Social 
Structure of Globalisation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7. 
59 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 139-174. 
60 Smith, History and International Relations, 188. 
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socialization.61 The ES method, combined with historical and sociological methods, 
enables the holistic understanding of Ottoman-European relations through the display 
of international societal constraints on the actors’ choices, and provides an agent-
centered analysis. However, clarification of agent-structure debate is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  
 
The intent here is to present the Ottoman perceptions of European international 
society and its institutions, and to evaluate the political, cultural, ideological, and 
structural change in the Ottoman understanding of international relations and 
statecraft between the years of 1789 and 1856. The epistemological approach of this 
dissertation is, therefore, narrative and interpretive, and the analysis and arguments 
are supported historically and empirically by use of primary and secondary sources. 
However, not all documents are accessible and some no longer exist, while others are 
still being archived and collated. To display the ideological and cultural change in 
Ottoman foreign and security policy, therefore, cases are compared and interpreted 
on the basis of past Ottoman behavior in similar events. This dissertation, by 
providing a new conceptual and analytical framework for the understanding of the 
evolution and expansion of European international society and non-European state 
socialization, as in the case studies of Keene, Stivachtis, and Suzuki, aims to 
strengthen the theoretical and conceptual utility of the ES.  
 
 
 
                                               
61 Jackson, The Global Covenant. 
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1.4 Sources 
 
Reinterpretation and reconstruction of this highly complicated era in Ottoman-
European relations confronts important problems, one of which is the 
misrepresentation of the era by some sources. To this end, an extensive literature 
survey is conducted into published and unpublished primary sources (archives, 
official documents, agreements, and personal memoirs) and secondary materials 
(books, articles and published and unpublished theses and reports) that were not used 
in the aforementioned studies. 
 
1.5 Précis of the Chapters  
 
This dissertation is organized in order to analyze the Ottoman Empire’s socialization 
process and its relations with the European great powers within the European 
international system and society. Ottoman policies are analyzed with regard to the 
primary institutions of international society as enumerated by Bull (i.e., the balance 
of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the great powers). The debate over 
the primary institutions remains; Bull’s five post-seventeenth century institutions-
namely, the balance of power, diplomacy, war, international law, and great power-
are taken as the basis of this analysis, therefore. To these, trade is added since it has 
been a major facet of Ottoman-European relations as well as an important factor in 
European expansion. European international society’s rules of conduct-referred to as 
international civility-are pertinent in respective periods and are used to compare 
behavioral patterns.  
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The timeframe of Ottoman-European relations is limited between the French 
Revolution (1789) and the Treaty of Paris (1856). The main argument of this 
dissertation takes 1789 as the beginning of Europe’s transition from an international 
system towards a pluralist international society according to Bull’s understanding. 
This point contradicts the conventional ES arguments that international society began 
as a series of Italian city-states, or with Westphalia; this will be elaborated on further 
in line with the analytical model that was developed. The year 1856 was chosen as 
the concluding point because it is referred to in literature as the date of the official 
entry of the Ottoman Empire into European international society. This argument is 
also challenged with the introduction of a new concept-the hybrid international 
society-to the analysis. It is possible to extend the timeframe of inquiry to later 
periods (until the proclamation of the Turkish Republic), but this limitation is 
necessary so that we focus exclusively on the socialization and transition of the 
Empire from a system to a society. The earlier periods of Ottoman-European 
relations and the Empire’s constitutive role in the European international system are 
also touched upon as a prelude to later stages.  
 
This dissertation is divided into seven main chapters; the first chapter is an 
introduction to the dissertation and its epistemology. The second of which includes a 
brief synopsis of the birth of the ES as a separate school of thought in the 
international relations discipline. The theoretical-conceptual understanding of the 
international society and the structural and functional debates in the ES are reviewed 
in order to introduce the ideal-types and concepts on which the historical case study 
is built. The ES’s theoretical, methodological, and epistemological strengths and 
weaknesses, in comparison with realist understanding of the study of international 
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relations, are also explained in detail. This chapter also provides an overall 
introduction to the classical ES approach as an analytical framework. 
 
The third chapter is devoted to the reinterpretation of the evolution of European 
international society based on studies by post-classical ES scholars. The analytical 
link between system and society is further clarified here, using a scheme developed 
by a combination of Buzan and Little’s pre-modern regional international system 
categorization and Buzan’s spectrum of types of international societies that range 
from pluralist to solidarist; the historical origins and evolution of European 
international society is reinterpreted based on this newly developed scheme. The 
crystallization of European international society as the Concert of Europe, as well as 
its characteristics, is also mentioned in this chapter. The development and progress of 
the primary institutions from the system to society is given particular attention.  
  
The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters present a historical – theoretical analysis of the 
expansion of European international society and the Ottoman Empire’s position 
within the European international system and society. This section consists of a 
detailed analysis of the Ottoman understanding of the primary institutions from the 
fifteenth to nineteenth centuries. The Ottoman perspective and practice of the 
balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, trade, and the role of the great 
powers is presented through original sources and comparative analysis of the 
Ottoman practice across centuries. The Ottoman reading of the changes in the 
European international system and its implications for the Empire are presented, and 
are based on the views and writings of the reformist ruling elite. These chapters also 
address the Empire’s socialization process by use of an agent-centered analytical 
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framework. Here, the European great powers differentiated treatment and 
interactions with the Ottoman Empire according to the Standards of Civilization will 
be briefly examined. In order to achieve a better theoretical understanding of 
European and non-European relations, the concept of a hybrid international society is 
introduced and developed to present the different modes of behavior inherent in the 
dualistic conception of international society.  
 
The concluding seventh chapter summarizes the main argument of the dissertation 
and is based on the empirical evidence presented earlier. It also examines the 
shortcomings of the ES approach in analyzing European and non-European states' 
relations and notes its negligence of their significant roles in the constitution of the 
hybrid international society. This chapter also offers suggestions for the refinement 
of the theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
32 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
 
 
2.1 Historical Evolution of the English School  
 
The English School of International Relations Theory (ES)—in other words, the 
international society (IS) approach—was developed with the establishment of the 
British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. The British Committee, 
led by Butterfield and Wight in the late 1950s, consisted of a group of scholars based 
in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics 
(LSE) investigating the basis of the international theory and international society. 
The link between the committee and the school is a contested one because, apart 
from the international theory and society, the committee dealt with numerous issues 
concerning international relations. Nevertheless, as suggested by Vigezzi, “every 
now and then, the founders of the British Committee are seen as the noble fathers of 
the English School.”62 The historical, social, and political construction of the idea of 
                                               
62Brunello Vigezzi, The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1954-1985)—The 
Rediscovery of History, trans. Ian Harvey, (Milano: Edizioni Unicopli, 2005), 11. For a detailed 
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international society were derived from the writings of Dutch philosopher and jurist 
Hugo Grotius, which date back to the seventeenth century, but the ES perspective 
was brought into existence by the British Committee exclusively in the twentieth 
century.  
 
The idea that scholars researching the origins of international society with a 
collective ontological stance against positivism constituted a distinct school of 
thought called ‘The English School’ was acknowledged in 1981. Jones’ article “The 
English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure,” published in Review 
of International Studies, called for a closure and had a reverse effect. The debate that 
followed the publication of Jones’ article led not only to the dispersion of the ES 
arguments but also its institutionalization as a distinctive school of thought in the 
international relations literature.63  
 
Having noted the controversy over the origins and foundations of the school, 
Linklater and Suganami in their recent assessment of the ES presented the scope of 
                                                                                                                                     
history of the British Committee and its role on the development of the ES, see also Tim Dunne, 
Inventing International Society—A History of the English School, (London: Macmillan, 1998), 89-
135; Tim Dunne, “A British School of International Relations” in The British Study of Politics in the 
Twentieth Century, ed. Jack Hayward, Brian Barry and Archie Brown, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 54-68; Richard Little, “Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, 
Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment,” European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1995): 
9-34. For others who emphasize the role of the LSE, see Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi eds., 
International Relations at LSE——A History of 75 Years, (London: Millennium Publishing, 2003) and 
Hidemi Suganami, “The Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream 
International Relations,” International Relations, 7 (1983): 2363-2381. For those who suggest that 
there is no such school or well-established theory of international society, see Sheila Grader, “The 
English School of International Relations: Evidence and Evaluation,” Review of International Studies, 
14 (1988): 29-44; Dale C. Copeland, “A Realist Critique of the English School,” Review of 
International Studies, 29 (2003): 427-441.  
63 For the debate on the closure of the ES, see R. E. Jones, “The English School of International 
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the ES’s study on the basis of its members and their works.64 The inclusion and 
exclusion of various scholars in the school is essential for establishing the ES’s major 
questions and distinctiveness in comparison with other international relations 
theories.65 In alphabetical order, Bull, Butterfield, James, Northedge, Vincent, 
Watson, and Wight can be enumerated as being among the founding members and 
the inner core of the school, characterizing what Dunne referred to as the classical-
evolutionary phase (1950s-1980s).66 This list is neither exhaustive nor definite.67 For 
example, some argue that Manning68 and even Carr69 should be included in the list 
because of the indisputable influence of their ideas on the British Committee, while 
others disagree on their inclusion.70 The leading members of the committee, who are 
today enumerated as the founders of the ES, were then related to other international 
relations theories such as realism, idealism, neo-realism, institutionalism, and today 
to constructivism, critical theory, and post-modernism based on their conceptual 
                                               
64 Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A 
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frameworks and assumptions.71 Buzan, Hurrell, Jackson, Keene, Linklater, Little, 
Mayall, Suganami, and Wheeler form the post-classical reformation phase from the 
1990s onwards.72 
 
The clear-cut historical periodization of the development of ES is complicated. 
However, as suggested by Buzan (1999) in his proposal to reconvene the ES, 
Wæver’s four-phase sketching of the school’s work to date can be used as a starting 
point.73 The first phase (1959-1966) begins with the foundation of the British 
Committee by Butterfield, then Professor of Modern History at Cambridge 
University, in cooperation with Wight, then Professor of European History at the 
University of Sussex; material support for the committee was provided by the 
Rockefeller Foundation. The committee’s aim was to carry out an inter-disciplinary 
study of diplomacy with the participation of academics (theorists and historians) and 
practitioners and to develop a distinct approach to international relations. It was 
agreed that the appropriate approach to interstate relations could be achieved through 
focusing and theorizing on international society.74 
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72 Dunne, “The English School,” 267-285. 
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The second phase (1966-1977) is marked by two major works by the two leading 
scholars published in 1977: Bull’s The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in 
World Politics and Wight’s Systems of States. Bull focused on the nature and 
development of European international society, while Wight analyzed systems of 
states in a broader historical context. These two works are the most cited and debated 
ones in the history of the ES. Bull’s study has become classic international relations 
text since it was first published in 1977.75 As noted by Williams and Little, the 
growing interest in The Anarchical Society was related to its status as the 
foundational text for the ES approach to international relations.76 Bull’s main thesis 
was that the system of states forms a society founded on certain common rules, 
values, and institutions developed over centuries to provide order and security in 
international anarchy. The methodological distinction of the international system and 
the international society is central to Bull’s and the ES’s account of international 
relations. The critiques and debates on Bull’s conceptualization, in fact, led to the 
establishment and improvement of the ES approach in international relations 
academia over the last 30 years. After the passing of Butterfield and Wight in the 
1970s, Bull, along with Vincent, known for his study Nonintervention and 
International Order (1974), led the school and the committee.77 
 
                                               
75 For analyses on The Anarchical Society, see Dunne, Inventing International Society, 136-160; John 
Williams and Richard Little eds., The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, (New York: Palgrave 
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The third phase was led by a new generation of scholars who developed, criticized, 
and, hence, filled up the loops of the foundational works of the first-generation ES 
scholars. The untimely death of Bull in 1985, followed by that of Vincent in 1989, 
led to the disappearance of the British Committee. Nevertheless, this era was quite 
productive. Bull’s co-edited book with Adam Watson (1984) tracing the historical 
expansion of international society and Watson’s (1992) book on the evolution of 
international society were the most notable studies. These were followed by other 
significant studies by Vincent, Donelan, Mayall, Kingsbury, and Suganami.78 The 
turning point of this phase was Jones’ article and, as noted above, the debate between 
Jones, Grader, and Wilson resulted in the institutionalization of the ES in the 
international relations literature as a separate school of thought and theoretical 
framework.79 
The fourth phase, defined by Dunne as the post-classical ES,80 started in 1992 and 
has continued to the present day. This phase brought newcomers and regular 
contributors to the school.81 The major achievement of this phase is the reconvening 
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of the school at the British International Studies Association (BISA) meeting in 1999 
under the guidance of Buzan and the compilation of the school’s works update. 
There has been a considerable increase in the number of works and contributors, 
particularly since the late 1990s. Wæver sees the increasing attraction to the school a 
direct result of its ability to “combine traditions and theories normally not able to 
relate to each other,”82 while Buzan attributes it to the nice fit of the constructivist, 
historical, and normative turns in international relations into the multi-paradigm, or 
methodologically pluralist approach, of the ES.83 Bellamy, on the other hand, sees 
the growing interest and number of publications on the ES as “the elevation of the 
English School from the margins to the center.”84 The contemporary textbooks 
introducing international relations as a field of study with its theories and approaches 
have separate chapters and detailed analyses of the ES.85 
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The interdisciplinary approach of the school not only helps it to improve and develop 
itself but also confers on it a methodical distinctiveness and advantage in comparison 
to other international relations theories. Suganami defines the ES as “a historically 
constituted and evolving cluster of scholars with a number of plausible and 
interrelated stories to tell.”86 At present, the school as a scholarly research program is 
instituting itself among the major international relations theories. Following Buzan, 
Dunne also states the importance of the school’s provision of a strong account of the 
formation of international society in answering why and how questions, as well as 
clarification of the link between international and world society for its 
repositioning.87 Accordingly, the conceptualization of the international system and 
international society, and their analytical distinction from each other; the institutional 
structure of international society; the definition of the institutions of international 
society; the role of these institutions, as well as norms and values in the maintenance 
of international order; the development of modern international society; and the 
pluralist interdisciplinary methods and the classical approach’s analytical aptness to 
the study of international relations are still of interest for ES scholars. All those 
interested in the study of the international society, in one way or another, are 
reconstructing the basic concepts and refining the major themes of the ES approach 
in line with the changing context of international relations and global world 
politics.88  
 
                                               
86 Hidemi Suganami, “The English School and International Theory,” in The International Society and 
its Critics, ed. Bellamy, 2005, 29. 
87 Tim Dunne, “The English School,” 2008, 267-285. 
88 Emanuel Adler, “Barry Buzan’s Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct the English School: “Not All 
the Way Down,” Forum on Barry Buzan’s “From International to World Society?” Millennium, 34 
(2005): 171-182; for the other articles in the forum, see 186-199. 
  
40 
Some of the ES debates and critiques, particularly those related to the international 
system and society, the historical categorization and conceptualization of 
international systems and societies (Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft or pluralist and 
solidarist understandings of society), and the primary institutions of international 
society will be touched upon briefly in the following sections to elucidate the 
conceptual framework used for the dissertation. The following section presents the 
key concepts of the school and Bull’s conceptualization of international society, 
which is the vital challenge of the ES against Realism and its main contribution to 
the theory of international relations. 
 
2.2 Conceptual and Methodical Synopsis of the English School 
 
2.2.1 International Order through Society of States: The Basis of the “System” 
and “Society” Distinction 
 
The ES’s theoretical distinctiveness is based on its key elements and pluralism.89 The 
conceptual distinction of international system, international society, and world 
society are central to its account of international relations. The school challenged 
Realism and its conception of the international system—particularly its pre-social 
conditioning of the Hobbesian view of international politics as a state of war and 
struggle of all against all—by analyzing the historical development of international 
society and by focusing on its theoretical conceptualization.90  
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Bull developed his conceptualization of international society on the writings of 
sixteenth-century natural law thinkers—predominantly Hugo Grotius—which led to 
the school’s association with the Grotian tradition.91 His understanding of the 
international system, on the other hand, is based on the writings of nineteenth-
century historians—mainly the work of Heeren.92 In his major study, The Anarchical 
Society, Bull defines the international system and international society as: 
A system of states (or international system) is formed when two or 
more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient 
impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave—or at 
least in some measure—as parts of a whole. 
 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of 
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, 
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound 
by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share 
in the working of common institutions.93 
 
In his co-edited work with Watson on the expansion of the international society, Bull 
clarifies further what he means by international society: 
  
A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent 
political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense 
that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of 
the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent 
                                                                                                                                     
A Meeting of Minds or Divided by a Common Language?” Review of International Studies, 29 
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common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and 
recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.94 
 
This sort of distinction does not appear in the earlier works of the ES, and it appears 
for the first time as a central idea in The Anarchical Society. As noted by Hoffmann, 
the originality of Bull’s work lies in his emphasis on society rather than system, and 
that makes him unique among contemporary theorists of international relations.95 
The conceptual distinction of “international society” enables us to approach world 
politics from a different perspective. The argument that there is an international 
society in which states cooperate and coexist for their basic common goals renders 
inadequate the Realist portrayal of international politics as “power politics,” simply 
an arena of conflict between sovereign states for defense of national interests. It 
demonstrates that states’ major concern is not merely a power struggle but, rather, a 
common desire for the preservation of international order.  
International order and international society are linked closely in Bull’s conception, 
since the society of states is viewed as an instrument for the promotion and 
preservation of order and security among its constitutive members. Williams noted 
that, in Bull’s Anarchical Society, “the idea of society is virtually subsumed into the 
notion of order; for where there is order there is society, as the distinguishing feature 
of society is that it generates order.”96 As the title of his book suggests, Bull 
organized his main theme around the concepts of order in international society. 
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96 John Williams, “Order and Society,” in The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, eds. 
Williams and Little, 2006, 25. 
  
43 
These concepts are not only “inextricable” but also “very nearly synonymous” in his 
understanding.97 Bull’s international society provides minimal order without the 
existence of a central authority. 
It also emphasizes that states do not always abide by laws, rules, and norms because 
national interest requires them to do so, as claimed by Realists. Bull’s understanding 
suggests that states act in line with the rules, laws, and norms of the international 
society because they consider themselves to be the moral and legal bearers of rights 
and duties under international law. Despite his Grotian inspiration, Bull’s conception 
of international society is a limited, pluralist one that revolves around the basic rules 
of coexistence. He defined international society as one in which states can agree on 
minimum reciprocal rights such as recognition of sovereignty and non-intervention.98 
The pluralist conception presupposes that states observe common rules and norms 
that limit their conflicts with one another in order to preserve international order. The 
ultimate aim is the preservation of international order through international society.  
Although the Grotian approach forming the basis of the ES is based on the natural 
law tradition, Bull’s pluralist international society is inclined toward legal positivism. 
The positivist understanding of law attributes the making of rules, laws, and norms to 
the actions and experiences of political authorities;99 only those who have political 
authority can make laws and enforce them. On the contrary, in the natural law 
understanding, rules, laws, and norms are accepted as divine and inherent in 
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nature.100 From a positivist perspective, at the international level, sovereign states are 
accepted as the subjects of international law, while other polities are ruled out. Laws, 
rules, and norms are “rooted in the practices of international society” and in the 
diplomatic practices of states. As no sovereign is superior to another, it is simply by 
means of the explicit and tacit consent of states expressed through treaties or customs 
that laws become legally binding. In a pluralist international society, as states are the 
essential members and bearers of legal responsibility, rules, and norms, institutions 
deal with the preservation of states’ sovereignty and international order. 
 
A positivist understanding of Bull is the starting point of his pluralist conception of 
international society, which is based on member states’ recognition of the binding 
nature of common rules and norms in their relations with each other, as well as their 
interest in maintaining these rules and institutions—even if they have different goals 
and values. A solidarist international society, on the contrary, is based on natural law 
thinking, where human beings become the subjects of international law and the 
relationships between constitutive units are regulated by a broader scope of rules, 
values, and norms such as universal human rights.101  
 
Bull’s conception of international society is close to that of Lassa Oppenheim, a 
leading figure of the legal positivists of the nineteenth century. Oppenheim’s 
conceptualization Völkerrechts-gemeninschaft, translated as the “Family of Nations,” 
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in definitional terms, is close to Bull’s international society. If carefully analyzed, 
Oppenheim’s ideas can be traced in Bull’s conceptualization of international society. 
Oppenheim’s conception of international society, to quote Kingsbury, was “narrowly 
statist with regard to the composition of international society and agency within it; 
broadly pluralist with regard to the pursuit of diverging state interests and values; and 
geographically limited but potentially universalizable.”102 Founded upon positivist 
understanding, Bull’s international society, like that of Oppenheim’s, was also statist, 
pluralist, and, hence, until the nineteenth century, geographically confined only to 
Europe but later expanded globally to form the basis of modern international society 
and order.103 Sovereignty was not a new concept in the international law and affairs 
of his time but, as noted by Kingsbury, it was Oppenheim who made it for the first 
time “a foundation for a universal theory of international law that presupposed both 
anarchy and society.”104 Oppenheim found the Grotian idea of a society of 
individuals—“magna communitas humani generis” (a solidarist international society 
in the ES understanding), unsustainable. In his discussion of the Grotian conception 
of international society, Bull defended Oppenheim’s pluralist arguments against the 
Grotian view of Lauterpacht and argued that a solidarist (Grotian) international 
society would be unfeasible and potentially destructive for international society and 
order.105 In the writings of Bull, pluralist thinking on international society prevails. 
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For Bull, the most pre-eminent problem of international politics was the 
identification of the means for strengthening the foundation of order. He stated that 
“order” in social life should be seen as “an arrangement of social life such that it 
promotes certain goals or values.”106 Bull’s conception of order denotes a particular 
kind of social pattern, which is used to achieve certain goals and purposes. These 
goals, which he described as the primary and universal goals of humanity—such as 
security against violence, ensuring agreements and maintenance of promises, and the 
stability of possession—are also the objectives of the social order. Bull differentiated 
three types of order: national, international, and world. His analysis is interested 
mainly in international order since he had a pluralist position rather than a solidarist 
one and was concerned with the society of states.107  
According to Bull, international order meant a pattern or disposition of international 
activity that sustains those goals of the society of states that are elementary, primary, 
or universal.108 The goals of international society are considered to be elementary, as 
they are constitutive of international society. They are defined to be primary since 
other social goals cannot be achieved without them, and they are universal because 
all accept them.109 These goals have both moral and normative aspects, in that they 
do not arise out of pure self-interest but out of the reciprocal and mutual needs of 
states. Order has a dual characteristic in Bull’s study both as value and as fact. Bull 
argued that it is a value of highest interest, which could only be realized through the 
institutions of the international society, but order becomes a fact when it is 
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maintained through the achievement of these ends in social life. Bull has not clearly 
defined this point and created confusion about the priority of order as a value in 
relation to other values.110 
 
For Bull, the goals of international order are: the preservation of the system and 
society of states itself; the maintenance of external sovereignty and sovereign 
jurisdiction of individual states; the limitation of war and violence among states; the 
establishment of peace; and the preservation of the normative foundations of 
international social life.111 At the international level, order is maintained by the 
limitation of violence and wars, by the fulfillment of the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda; and by the preservation of the possession of territory as a result of the 
states’ mutual recognition of sovereign equality.112 Among these, reciprocal 
recognition of independence and sovereignty are the principal aims of states and, 
hence, the major encouraging reason for their full participation in international 
society. Wight notes that “it would be impossible to a have society of sovereign 
states unless each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognized that every 
other state had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well.”113 Similarly, 
Watson argues at length that: 
 
In a system of states where the policy of each affects the others, many 
states recognize that they have joint interests in maintaining their 
independence; and they come to see in the independence of their fellow 
members the means of preserving their own … From the practical and 
vital involvement in the independence of other states, the concept 
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develops that states have a general right to be independent, and that 
those which want to exercise this right have an interest in supporting 
each other in asserting it. So states in systems come to recognize that the 
mutual acceptance of the principle of independence is a necessary 
condition of a society of states.114 
 
Mutual recognition of sovereign and legal equality ensures the validity of 
agreements, norms, and rules and, hence, de-legitimizes threats of intervention, 
annexation, secession, and conflict in an anarchic environment through the reduction 
of security dilemmas.115 In terms of security, it makes a distinction between outsiders 
and insiders and protects the insiders. As international society gets stronger, it 
becomes a pluralist security community and develops an international security 
regime, which protects its members against outsiders. Eventually, with the virtual 
disappearance of security dilemmas, it transforms into a full-fledged security 
community, which is basically a security benefit for insiders.116 It is the recognition 
of each sovereign’s right to survival and independence that is foundational for the 
ES. There is an important relation between sovereignty and society, in that without 
sovereign equality, it would be impossible to ensure order and security through a 
society of states. Bull’s pluralist conception of international society rests on the claim 
that it can deliver interstate order and security in conditions of cultural 
heterogeneity.117 
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There are similarities between Bull’s pluralist international society and Deutsch’s 
conceptualization of a security community. Deutsch described a security community 
as a group in which there is an agreement between its members regarding the 
settlement of disputes by means other than fighting.118 A pluralistic security 
community, in Wæver’s description, is a “non-war community.”119 The difference 
between the two concepts is that Bull’s international society does not necessarily 
indicate the non-existence or obsolescence of conflict and war between states. In 
other words, it is not essentially “a non-war community,” as suggested by Wæver. In 
international society, conflicts and wars occur within a framework of agreed-upon 
rules and social norms and to a certain extent are restricted and controlled. 
Elsewhere, Bull wrote that: 
This society is an imperfect one: its justice is crude and uncertain, as each state 
is judge of its own cause; and it gives rise to recurrent tragedy in the form of 
war; but it produces order, regularity, predictability and long periods of peace, 
without involving the tyranny of a universal state.120 
 
Czaputowicz, in his analysis of the ES, notes that pluralist understanding based on 
positivist international law (Vattel and Oppenheim) is exclusive and emphasizes the 
ontological precedence of states. It is more contractual, functional, and narrow in the 
sense that it aims basically for the maintenance and preservation of order among 
states in anarchy. To quote Czaputowicz, “International society is treated in an 
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instrumentalist way—as a counterbalance for chaos and disorder.”121 As suggested 
by O’Hagan, the pragmatic and instrumentalist approach of the pluralists of the ES, 
though accepting cultural plurality, is more concerned with the management of its 
effects on international order through institutions and procedures such as diplomacy 
and international law.122 The pluralism of the ES is, therefore, closer to 
communitarianism, since states have particular duties and responsibilities in the 
maintenance of constitutive (the ordering principle being sovereignty) and 
coexistence principles (minimum conditions for the society to emerge, such as the 
limitation of violence and pacta sunt servanda) of the international society. 
Collective defense (for example, alliances such as NATO) is regarded as the 
conventional way of providing security among states.123 
 
The solidarist understanding, on the other hand, is more in tune with the natural law 
approach (Grotius and Lauterpacht) and, accordingly, is more universalist, 
inclusivist, and cosmopolitan regarding the subjects and scope of international 
society. The basis and the organizational idea of international society are 
transnational and expansive.124 Cultural and civilizational homogeneity are deemed 
essential in the deepening of the society of states and its institutions because it aims 
to regulate cooperation not only among states but also individuals. International laws 
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reflect the will of international community and transnational-universal standards, 
such as human or minority rights. States are required to observe these in their internal 
and external conduct. Since it has a broader understanding of sovereignty, 
convergence, and integration becomes possible. International security is preserved by 
a universal system of collective security based on the principle of solidarity against 
aggressors.125 
 
Despite arguments for and against the conceptualization of international society in 
the IR literature, there seems to be an agreement regarding its nature and its basic 
elements: power, common interest, and common values. Power and power politics, in 
general, and balance of power and great power management in particular, as 
institutions of the international society, are central to Bull’s argument. He found the 
maintenance of balance of power to be essential, as it enables the functioning of 
other institutions. Other elements of international order, such as international law and 
diplomacy, have a secondary role. 126  
 
States’ wish to maintain and preserve order reflects a common interest because it 
means that states, however different in their structure and values, would cooperate to 
this end. In fact, as Bull noted, most of the rules, laws, and conventions that could be 
defined as international law emerged on the basis of shared interests without the 
existence of a common government above states.127 Bull argued that despite all 
differences and conflicting objectives, states could unite in their view of these 
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common goals’ crucial role in the maintenance of order, and therefore, they would 
pursue common interests.128 Indeed, for Bull, the minimum necessary condition for 
the establishment of an international society is the common desire for order.129 Like 
Bull, Buzan also suggests that states realizing the disadvantages of chaos in 
international relations would search for order and that this desire would lead to 
common interests and objectives, which, naturally, lead to the creation of an 
international society.130 Overall, it is the existence of common interests (elementary 
international goals) that makes cooperation possible in international society.131   
 
Common values and the emphasis on consensus for the establishment of an agreed-
upon framework of rules and institutions is another distinctive feature of 
international society. It is argued that within the framework of dialogue, common 
consent, and shared values, states could easily reach an understanding on rules and 
institutions that are considered to be necessary for mitigating clashes of interests and 
values. 132 
 
Bull did not see the existence of a common culture as a necessary condition for 
cooperation among states in international society. As mentioned above, the common 
interests, international goals, and desire for establishment and preservation of 
international order are the driving forces for international cooperation. In the 
majority of the works of the ES, however, Western-European Christian culture, 
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civilization, and values in the formation of the present international society have 
been emphasized.133  
 
 
The European state system of the nineteenth century (which this dissertation 
classifies as a pluralistic international society) is defined in history books mainly as 
what Raymond Aron calls “the transnational cultural ensemble” of European 
Christian sovereigns.134 It was, indeed, the European culture and civilization that 
differentiated the European international society from the broader international 
system. Though Bull did not consider culture to be a major factor in the evolution of 
international society, he defined some of the earlier international systems as 
international societies because they were based on common culture that is “a basic 
system of values, the premises from which its actions and thought derive.”135 As 
noted by Williams, “Society in The Anarchical Society thus appears to be order plus 
some element of common civilization, even where, as in Bull’s time, this 
commonality was formally rejected.”136 In the classical ES literature and Bull’s 
conceptualization, common culture and civilization are considered to be an important 
factor for deepening the cohesiveness of the society of states, as it makes 
communication easier, reinforces common interests, values, and institutions, and 
underpins effective rules and norms. 
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Table 1: Czaputowicz’s Compilation of International Society137 
 
 Pluralism Solidarism 
 
Leading authors 
 
 
H. Bull 
 
M. Wight 
 
Subjects of 
international 
relations 
 
 
 
States (exclusivism) 
 
 
States and individuals (inclusivism) 
 
Organisational 
idea 
 
 
Particularism 
 
Universalism 
 
Normative 
approach 
 
 
Communitarism 
 
Cosmopolitanism 
 
Concept of 
international 
society 
 
 
 
Contractual, functional 
 
 
Cultural, civilisational 
 
Scope of 
international 
society 
Narrow, maintaining order in 
the anarchic order, non-
intervention into internal 
affairs, instrumentalism 
Broad, common culture and norms in the 
relations state-citizens, human rights, 
transnationalism, expansiveness 
 
Concept of 
sovereignty 
 
 
Cultivation of differences 
 
Allowing convergence (European integration) 
 
International law 
 
 
Exclusively between states 
 
Will of international society 
 
Sources of law 
 
Positive law, custom and 
treaties (E. Vattel, L. 
Oppenheim) 
 
 
Natural law, universal norms (H. Lauterpacht) 
 
Principles of 
international 
society 
 
 
Constitutive and coexistence 
principles (first and second 
level) 
 
Regulating cooperation, promoting a 
particular behaviour (third level) 
 
Humanitarian  
Intervention 
 
 
Inadmissible, illegal 
 
Admissible, legal 
 
Basis of Security 
 
 
Collective defence (alliance) 
 
Collective security 
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Bull’s emphasis on society over system makes a theory of cultural change in 
international relations possible. Cultural change is a product of cooperative and co-
existential behavior of states with common interests.138 Such a theory of change 
challenges the Realist skepticism for progress in international politics. It also 
challenges the claim that Realism should be considered valid at all times because the 
basic facts of world politics (the state of nature) never change. The structure, in the 
ES understanding, is not related to the distribution of power capabilities and polarity 
in the international system, as suggested by Realists, but to the institutional and 
normative framework of it, which makes it a society, not a system.139 The ES 
suggests that states are not inherently aggressive or constantly in search of power in a 
state of nature where conflict and war are endemic, as argued by Realists. States 
desire good relations, coexistence, and order in anarchy. According to the ES 
understanding, they can change and progress to this end, unlike Realism, which 
emphasizes the rise and fall of hegemonic powers or shifts in the distribution of 
power between states as a cause of change in international politics.140 Bull, by 
contrast, sees the possibility of a cultural change through social learning and 
socialization. As change becomes possible, so does the possibility of transition from 
disorder to order in international anarchy. However, as noted above, in Bull’s 
understanding, the existence of an international society did not mean that the 
relations between its constitutive units would be peaceful and harmonious.  
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Bull’s conceptual distinction between an international system and an international 
society raised debates concerning the nature of the distinction, which still continue 
today.141 The main critique raised against Bull was that his distinction was not clear 
because of his synonymous use of the terms “international society” and “states 
system”142 and the notion that it is “a distinction without a difference.”143 In Bull’s 
conception, “the term system connotes the term society.” He argued that international 
society has always been inherent in the modern states system. As he put it: 
Between an international system that is clearly also an international 
society, and a system that is clearly not a society, there exist cases where 
a sense of common interests is tentative and inchoate; where common 
rules perceived are vague and ill-informed, and there is doubt as to 
whether they are worthy of the name of rules; or where common 
institutions are implicit or embryonic.144 
 
Miller argued that international society, in Bull’s terms, is a misleading term since it 
did not correspond to the realities of international politics. According to Miller, even 
before the First World War, when the so-called international society supposedly 
existed in its ideal form, its rules were broken so frequently that the rights and 
interests of the small powers were disregarded in the name of protecting those of the 
great powers. Miller strengthened his argument further by saying that Bull’s 
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conception of international society in support of the rights of the great powers and 
balance of power makes it a power arrangement, which could be called a system or 
an order rather than a society like that of Gilpin.145 James has also argued that rules, 
values, and common interests, which provided the nature of Bull’s distinction, are 
integral in any international system. 146 
Bull’s pluralist conception is not a “disguised form of Realpolitik”; in other words, 
“a power arrangement which could be called a system or order rather than a 
society.”147 The works of Aron and Waltz focused on ensembles of states called 
systems under anarchy, but Bull’s society of states is more than a simple ensemble; it 
emphasizes the role of the common interests, values, rules, laws, norms, and 
institutions in the maintenance of order at the international level. It suggests that 
states can uphold, in Bull’s words, “purposes beyond” pure national interests and can 
voluntarily form a society for orderly coexistence. In this society, states recognize 
each other as equal and thus respect others’ rights. They stand for and act in line with 
the society’s rules, laws, and norms. Above all, they willingly limit their right to use 
force against each other.  
 
On the contrary, Realism suggests a self-help anarchic system in which states fight to 
maximize their national interests and power at the expense of others. Realists are 
interested in the maintenance of the power arrangements of states in the international 
system, while Bull’s focal point is on society over system. His theory of cultural 
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change provides tolerance of differences and enables the cooperation and coexistence 
of states under anarchy. Hence, it makes the emergence of an anarchical society 
possible, as society and anarchy are compatible in Bull’s understanding. Unlike the 
ES, anarchy in Realist understanding disables progress, cooperation, and the 
possibility of inter-states societies. According to Bull, even during the times of crisis 
and wars, the idea of international society present as shared expectations, norms, and 
understandings shaped the behavior of states. Bull tried to expose how new ideas and 
beliefs brought by anarchic events such as revolutions and wars—for example, the 
Thirty Years’ War or the French Revolution—changed and reformed the institutional 
and normative foundations of the international society and how states provided order 
in these turbulent times. He also questioned how, from a system, states transcended 
to a society and then from a regional or, in Hoffman’s wording, narrower, society to 
that of larger, more global one through cultural change.148  
 
The passage from system to society has been one of the fundamental questions of the 
ES, regarding which the debate still continues. The system-society distinction and the 
link between the two concepts set not only the basis for the evolution of European 
international society but also relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. 
Following Bull, Buzan suggested that an understanding of transition from an 
international system to an international society can be clarified if based on Tönnie’s 
distinction between Gemeinschaft149 and Geselleschaft150 societies.151 Buzan 
described how an international society comes into being by use of the Gemeinschaft 
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and Gesellschaft conceptions of society. The Gemeinschaft understanding views 
society as something resulting from common culture, while the Gesellschaft 
conception sees society as being constructed, rather than being a mere product of a 
common culture.152 Buzan concludes his argument by noting the fact that, despite 
some of the historical international systems and societies evolving as a result of 
Gemeischaft understanding, contemporary international society is a product of the 
Gesellschaft understanding. He notes that an international society could evolve from 
the logic of anarchy without the existence of common cultural bonds, religion, or 
identity.153 Like Buzan, Stivachtis also questions whether states create common rules 
and establish common institutions because they share a common culture (logic of 
culture) or because they are forced to do so by external and internal circumstances 
(logic of anarchy). What Stivachtis calls “the logic of anarchy” and “the logic of 
culture” is again based on Tönnie’s model of analysis. According to the logic of 
anarchy, states are forced to interact and cooperate and, hence, create common rules 
and institutions. The logic of culture suggests that states define common rules and 
establish common institutions in the presence of a shared culture.154 As noted above, 
for Bull, the existence of common interests was enough for a pluralist international 
society to flourish, whereas Watson and Wight argued that common cultural bonds, 
religion, or identity are essential for the evolution of an international society.  
Unlike Wight, who differentiated international societies according to their organizing 
principle as imperial based on the principle of political inequality, Westphalian based 
on the principle of political equality, or mediaeval or neo-mediaeval based on the 
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principle of functional differentiation, Bull did not differentiate his conception of 
international society on varying criteria155 and did not focus on the cultural, social, 
and economic dynamics of international society.156 Later, Watson built upon the 
work of Wight, and Bull conducted a comparative study on historical international 
systems/societies, suggesting that the concept of an international system does not 
encompass all “political authorities.” This enabled him to clarify different types of 
international systems and societies across time and space. Watson demonstrated the 
possible international systems/societies on a spectrum formed by five categories of 
relationships: independence, hegemony, suzerainty, dominion, and empire.157 Bull’s 
main emphasis was on the contemporary international society and its functioning in 
the preservation of international order. He focused, therefore, on its conceptual 
distinction from historical evolution and expansion. The distinction and classification 
of the international system and societies, based on their nature and evolution, still 
determines the basis of the ongoing structural, functional, and historical debates 
within the ES.  
 
2.2.2 International Order and the Primary Institutions of International Society  
In the ES perspective and Bull’s study, “institution” is not defined and understood as 
“an organization or establishment founded for a specific purpose” like contemporary 
                                               
155 Wight, Systems of States, 23. 
156 Alderson and Hurrell eds., Hedley Bull on International Society; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 
International Systems in World History—Remaking the Study of International Relations, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); Linklater and Suganami, The English School; Miller and Vincent 
eds., Order and Violence; Roberson ed., International Society. 
157 Watson, The Evolution of International Society. 
  
61 
international organizations.158 It refers, rather, to a broad set of rules, norms, and 
codes of behavior generally accepted by the states to regulate their relations at the 
societal level. The primary institutions not only signal the existence of international 
society by way of the common rules they establish but also provide order by 
regulating interstate relations. These institutions, based on common customs and 
treaties, at the same time constitute the normative foundation of international society 
and form the basis of Bull’s distinction. As noted by Bull in his conceptualizations, 
the international system operates in a mechanical manner and is born out of necessity 
based on power politics, whereas international society exists in a normative manner 
as a result of the conscious efforts of its constitutive units, characterized by the 
existence of common values, rules, norms, and institutions.159  
In Bull’s view, international order is maintained by five distinctive post-seventeenth 
century institutions that he called “primary institutions of international society.” 
These institutions arose long before international organizations were established and 
never ceased to exist. Bull neither clarified what he meant by institutions nor set out 
the criteria for classification and inclusion/exclusion. Despite accepting the 
changeable character of institutions, he did not explain how that would be possible. 
According to Buzan, Bull’s understanding of institutions based on his conception of 
international society developed out of sociological functionalism. Bull’s institutions 
provide order and coexistence among states at a minimum, as his definition of 
society is “highly rational, contractual, and rule-based.” 160 
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Rather than explaining and elaborating on their conception of institutions, the ES 
scholars listed varied institutions according to the nature of the society studied. The 
primary institutions of international society, however, have some common 
characteristics. First, they are durable and recognized practices structured around 
shared values. Second, they play a constitutive role in relation to both the 
pieces/players and the rules of the game. Third, although durable, primary 
institutions are neither permanent nor fixed. They undergo a historical pattern of 
evolution, rise, and decline.161  
 
The ES’s understanding of institutions is close to that of Searle, who also argues that 
institutions arise out of collective intention and notes that human societies contain 
large numbers of institutions.162 In fact, from such a perspective, it is highly difficult 
to make a definitive list of primary institutions that are common for all times and 
places. At this point, Buzan suggests that it might be easier to think of primary 
institutions in relation to a general spectrum of Wendt’s “international social 
orders.”163 The distinction made by Wendt between Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian, 
and Grotian international social orders can explain the evolution, rise, and decline of 
different primary institutions at different times. For example, a Hobbesian 
international social order, based largely on enmity and the possibility of war, 
diplomacy, and alliance-making would be the primary institutions because survival 
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would be the main motive for the states.164 In a Lockean international social order, 
based on the model of a Westphalian balance of power system, the balance of power, 
sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, war, and 
international law are likely to be the core institutions. In a Grotian international 
social order, based on the rule of law and norms, sovereignty, territoriality, 
diplomacy, and international law would likely remain as the primary institutions.165 
On the other hand, a Kantian international social order concerned with the 
development of shared values would likely preserve similar political, legal, and 
economic primary institutions. However, the major primary institutions of this 
international society would depend hugely on its model of political economy—
whether it is a liberal democracy, Islamic theocracy, absolutist hereditary monarchy, 
hierarchical empire, or communist totalitarianism.166  
 
The debate on how to conceptualize the primary institutions of international society 
and the discussions on their respective role and importance in preserving 
international order and on the categorization of different international social orders 
still continue, but for the purposes of this study, the following will be limited to 
Bull’s conception and understanding. For Bull, international institutions have both 
“contractual and regulatory” roles; they ensure the functioning of an international 
society through laws, rules, norms, regulations, customs, and ethics, which in the end 
guarantee order and normative behavior of the member states. Even at the early 
stages of international society, Bull claims, there is an embryonic existence of five 
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distinctive primary institutions of international society: balance of power, 
international law, diplomacy, war, and the great powers.  
 
2.2.2.1 The Balance of Power 
 
Bull defines balance of power “a state of affairs such that no one power is in a 
position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others.”167 Though he 
accepts the fact that no historical balance of power has ever been perfectly simple 
(formed by two equal powers—in Realist terms close to “bipolarity”) or complex 
(formed by more than two powers with no equality parity—in Realist terms close to 
“multipolarity”), he argues that a complex balance of powers is more stable than the 
simple ones.168 Bull also differentiates general/local and fortuitous/contrived or 
objective/subjective balance of power as analytical terms. General balance of power 
covers the whole international system, whereas local balance of power is confined to 
a local or regional area defined with borders and boundaries, such as Europe or the 
Middle East. The fortuitous balance of power is born without any conscious effort on 
the part of either party. On the contrary, a contrived balance of power is constructed 
as a result of conscious political efforts of one or both parties.169 In fact, according to 
Jackson and Sørensen, in his distinctions and argument on the balance of power, Bull 
comes very close to being a moderate Realist in Wight’s terms.170 
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For Bull, the presentation of balance of power fulfills three historic functions in an 
international society and system. It prevents the transformation of the international 
system into a universal empire through the use of force and conquest. Then the 
existence of balance of power, especially at the local level, preserves the 
independence of states and their possible domination by a preponderant 
regional/local power. Balance of power (general and local) also provides the 
necessary conditions for other institutions (diplomacy, international law, great power 
management) of international order to operate. It should be noted that the major 
function of the balance of power is to preserve the system of states—in other words, 
the existing status quo—and not peace.171  
 
It favors great powers at the expense of small ones, and the dominant balance 
(general) takes precedence over subordinate balance (local). Preponderant powers, to 
quote Vattel, “lay down the law to others.” Here, the main concern is the 
preservation and maintenance of order and its requirements. Sometimes, this might 
require the threat and use of force and breaking of international law. Order is 
considered to be above law and peace.172 Against all criticism, Bull argued that there 
is a need for a balance of power if international order is to be preserved, noting the 
fact that states “may and often do behave in such a way as to disregard the 
requirements of a balance of power.”173  
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Bull saw the maintenance of the balance of power a sine qua non of international 
society and order as well as for the operation of international law.174 For him, states 
share a sense and understanding of the balance of power as a well-established 
doctrine, which makes it a continuing practice and an institution of international 
order. Finally, he added that the balance of power comes naturally into being in 
power politics and that there is no need for a contrived one.  
 
2.2.2.2 International Law 
 
Bull regards international law as “a body of rules, which binds states and other 
agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have 
the status of law.”175 These include formal rules and agreements as well as moral 
principles of custom or established norms and practices.176 Bull saw international law 
as an important factor that affected the societal life of states. The degree of 
“efficacy,” that is, resemblance between the behaviors prescribed by international 
rules and norms and the actual behavior of states in international politics, is essential. 
To quote Bull, “States obey international law in part because of habit or inertia: they 
are, as it were, programmed to operate within the framework of established 
principles.”177 However, this does not necessarily mean that the rules of law are not 
violated or disregarded. In fact, in particular cases, they were and are severely 
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violated, but these cases do not rule out “the efficacy of international law” in 
general.178 
 
According to Bull, international law contributes to international order in several 
ways. First, it makes the idea of an international society possible in the normative 
sense. Second, it is the constitutive principle of world politics, to quote Bull, that 
“order in the great society of all mankind has been attained … through general 
acceptance of the principle that men and territory are divided into states, each with its 
own proper sphere of authority, but linked together by a common set of rules.”179 
Third, it lays down the basic rules of coexistence among states and other actors in 
international society and, hence, contributes to compliance to make cooperation 
among states possible. International law secures compliance through the imposition 
of restraints on international behavior, great power coercion, reciprocity, and 
conscious acceptance by states of the ends and values underlying an agreement.180 
Finally, Bull states clearly that order cannot exist in the absence of international law. 
 
2.2.2.3 Diplomacy 
 
Bull cites Nicolson’s definition of diplomacy as “the management of international 
relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted by 
ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist,”181 suggesting that 
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the preferred definition should be the conduct of relations in world politics by 
persons authorized to act in the name of a particular state or other recognized 
political entity.182 
 
In international society, he sees diplomacy as another primary institution of 
international order that facilitates communication among states and other entities as 
well. According to Bull, “without communication there could be no international 
society nor any international system at all.”183 A second function of diplomacy is its 
role in the establishment of international agreements, because without diplomatic 
negotiation, it is not possible to reach to an agreement. A third function is gathering 
information and intelligence about the internal and external politics of foreign 
countries. The fourth and most important function is the minimization of the effects 
of conflict and friction in international politics. Finally, diplomacy, like all other 
institutions, symbolizes the existence of the society of states.184 Indeed, Bull focuses 
on the “diplomatic culture,” which he defines as “the common stock of ideas and 
values possessed by the official representatives of states.”185 He sees “diplomatic 
culture” as a part of the wider political culture that played an important role in the 
evolution of the international society.  
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2.2.2.4 War 
 
Bull defines war as “organized violence carried on by political units against each 
other.” He further clarifies his rationalist conception of war as an institution: 
 
We should distinguish between war in the loose sense of organized 
violence which may be carried out by any political unit (a tribe, an 
ancient empire, a feudal principality, a modern civil faction) and war in 
the strict sense of international or interstate war, organized violence 
waged by sovereign states. Within the modern states system any war in 
the strict sense, international war, has been legitimate; sovereign states 
have sought to preserve for themselves a monopoly of the legitimate use 
of violence … In any actual hostilities to which we can give the name 
‘war’, norms or rules, whether legal or otherwise, invariably play a 
part.186 
 
Elsewhere, he wrote: 
 
War is not simply a clash of forces; it is a clash between the agents of 
political groups who are able to recognize one another as such and to 
direct their force at one another only because of the rules that they 
understand and apply.187 
  
Bull states that though international society needs to restrict and contain war, 
sometimes some kinds of war can be assigned a role for the maintenance of 
international order. The fact that the monopoly to wage war in limited forms (just 
wars) is delegated only to sovereign states is believed to promote international 
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order.188 Preservation of international order depends in particular on the enforcement 
capacity of war as an institution for application of international law, for the 
maintenance of the balance of power, and for bringing about just change.189 At this 
point, Bull notes that this does not necessarily mean that international society lacks 
mechanisms of peaceful change, and it would be wrong to contrast war with peace 
since the alternative condition would be “more ubiquitous violence.”  
 
2.2.2.5 The Great Powers 
 
For Bull, “great powers are powers recognized by others to have, and conceived by 
their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties, simply by the 
nature of inequality of power between states.”190 The role of the great powers is not 
just defined in terms of their superior power and capacities but, rather, in their 
perceived legitimacy to act on behalf of others.191 It can be argued, therefore, that the 
idea of great powers, on its own, presupposes the idea of international society since it 
represents a body of independent political communities linked by special rules, 
institutions, contact, and interaction.192 
 
The chief responsibility for the maintenance of international order belongs to great 
power management. This is a normative statement on the specific duty of great 
powers resulting from inequality of power in international relations. This inequality 
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of power between states is assumed to have simplified the outline of international 
relations because the wishes and interests of some states will prevail, while those of 
others will fail. It is argued that this could work for the promotion of international 
order.193 Great powers could improve society and order through policies that support 
them, such as the management of their relations and interests with each other. This 
includes: the preservation of general balance of power; avoidance of crisis among 
themselves; limitation and containment of wars among themselves; unilateral 
exercise of local preponderance; division of spheres of influence; and possibly 
through the establishment of a great power concert or condominium.194 Such great 
power arrangements are believed to promote order and manage international society. 
However, Bull also accepts the fact that “great powers, like small powers, frequently 
behave in such a way as to promote disorder rather than order.”195 
 
2.2.3 Methodological Pluralism and the Epistemological Distinctiveness 
 
The methodological distinctiveness of the ES as an approach to the study of 
international relations depends on its explicitly pluralist and multi-paradigmatic 
nature, which also generates its key concepts. Manning, in his studies, defines the 
“society of states” (where a plurality of independent sovereign states coexist), alias 
“the social cosmos,” just like humanity, arguing that the definition of international 
relations, as an international society on its own, requires the approach to be 
pluralistic. To quote Manning:  
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And no-one can adequately understand that co-existence of sovereign 
statehoods who does not sufficiently appreciate: (a) the structure of 
international society as such; (b) the social psychology relevant thereto; 
(c) the economics; (d) the legalistics; (e) the geographics and strategics; 
and (g) the semantics relevant thereto.196 
 
The ES’s theoretical framework is divided into three levels of analysis. The 
international system, international society, and world society reflect Wight’s “three 
traditions” of IR theory: Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism.197 To clarify the 
usage of these terms: 
 
International system (Hobbes/Machiavelli/Realism) is about power 
politics among states and puts the structure and process of 
international anarchy at the center of IR theory.  
International society (Grotius/Rationalism) is about the 
institutionalization of shared interest and identity among states and 
puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules, and 
institutions at the center of IR theory. 
World society (Kant/Revolutionism) takes individuals, non-state 
organizations, and, ultimately, the global population as a whole as 
the focus of global societal identities and arrangements and puts the 
transcendence of the state system at the center of IR theory.198 
 
All three of these elements are accepted to be in continuous coexistence and 
interplay, and they are different ways of looking at international relations. Realism 
views “states as power agencies that pursue their own interests,” and from this 
perspective, international relations become solely instrumental; that is, the Realist 
view of Hobbes and Machiavelli. It is concerned with the actual, not what ought to 
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be. Power is considered to be a necessary condition of both international politics and 
international order.199 Classical Realists argue that only the use of force can control 
international order.  
 
Unlike Realism, Rationalism views states as legal organizations that operate in 
accordance with international law and diplomatic practice. This conception of 
international relations as rule-governed activities based on the mutually recognized 
authority of sovereign states is the Rationalist view of Grotius. Rationalism views 
humans as reasonable and progressive and, hence, capable of creating a perfect world 
of mutual respect and cooperation.200 The Rationalist belief in reason makes sociable 
behavior and “harmony of interests”201 possible in a “society of states.” From this 
perspective, the existence of international law (a body of binding common rules and 
norms); diplomatic practices and institutional diplomacy; international trade (based 
on regular practices and understandings); moral obligations and international justice; 
international conferences and meetings (on issues of common concern); balance of 
power and its constraining power; and communication and international intercourse 
in times of war, conflict, and disputes is evidence of the existence of an international 
society.202 
 
Revolutionism, on the other hand, downplays the importance of states and places the 
emphasis on human beings. The so-called primordial “world community” of humans 
is more fundamental than the “society of states,” which is the Revolutionist view of 
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Kant. It has a missionary aim, as it wishes to change the world for the better.203 In the 
words of Roberson, “the long-term aim of international society theorizing is to 
produce a new and better international order and possibly a world order based on 
societal values.”204 Revolutionists of the ES perceive the possibility of a global or 
cosmopolitan community where perpetual peace and justice in the Kantian sense 
would be established despite all cultural, religious, ideological, civilizational, and 
identity differences among human beings. According to Roberson, it is the element 
that brings the ethic of tolerance and difference to the approach. 205  
 
According to Wight, international relations cannot be understood adequately through 
any one of these conceptualizations alone.206 The adoption of only one of these 
approaches would result in a one-dimensional, and thus partial and incomplete, 
analysis. In fact, the continuous dialogue between the leading ideas, values, and 
beliefs that come into play in the conduct of foreign policy and international relations 
makes a proper academic understanding by adoption of only Realist, Rationalist, or 
Revolutionist approaches inadequate. One-dimensional approaches distort our 
understanding of international relations. Thus, Grotian, Hobbesian, and Kantian 
streams were considered to be present in the evolution of the international system 
and international society, and as Buzan puts it, they are accepted to be “in continuous 
coexistence and interplay.” Indeed, the main strength of the ES comes from its 
methodology, which is based on a tripartite distinction among the international 
system, international society, and world society and its in-depth focus on the inter-
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subjective meanings, primary institutions, and values such as international order and 
justice. The complexities of historical and international reality can be understood 
better through a careful combination of various levels of analysis and methods.  
 
Bull and the theorists of international society share the importance of system-level 
theorizing. However, unlike neo-realists, they do not view the system only in 
material terms. They define the system normatively as a historically constructed and 
evolving structure formed of common values, rules, norms, and understandings. 
They argue, therefore, that international relations cannot be analyzed separately from 
its historical and human origins. The system is seen as a historical process of change 
and development that could be understood in terms of laws and practices and is a 
realm of human experience with its own distinctive characteristics. Indeed, the 
school’s concern about understanding inter-subjective meanings behind foreign 
policy and getting an insight into the world of the practitioners of international 
relations requires a distinctive methodology.207 The approach presupposes 
international relations as a value-laden academic field of study. Accordingly, 
international relations scholars, in order to understand and to grasp the dilemmas 
faced by decision-makers and to evaluate their decisions in line with the context and 
values at stake, should rely on judgment. In this sense, ES scholars are 
traditionalists.208 Bull said that, “above all, explicit reliance upon the existence of 
judgment summarizes [the] traditional international society approach” and argued 
that “if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is little 
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of significance that can be said about international relations.”209 This makes it 
profoundly interpretive.  
 
The ontological departure of the ES is that states are interrelated through ideas and 
shared meanings.210 The ES argument that society is an intentional and conscious 
construction rules out causal propositions, which are defined scientifically as “things 
that happen irrespective of intentions.”211 The school’s focus on the role and 
importance of “national and cultural traditions of thought on international relations” 
is, in fact, a result of its concern about the historical evolution of “system” and 
“society,” which requires an interpretive analysis of the historically created common 
rules, norms, practices, and understandings between states (codes of conduct and 
collective meanings).212 Apart from tacit declarations of understandings in treaties 
and various forms such as interstate contracts, understandings, as argued by Bull, can 
be found in reciprocal declarations of policy and in the conformal acts of states with 
rules (recognized or not).213 Bull’s conception of international society highlights the 
role of common norms and understandings against the material forces and structures 
in international politics. According to Bull, the state system becomes more 
understandable when the relationships between material forces and non-material 
forces are clarified in line with their respective roles in shaping how states define 
their interests and organize their external relations. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that norms control the behavior of states directly; rather, it means 
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that norms and understandings form the game of power politics, the character and 
characteristics of the actors, and the ways in which the use of force and policies are 
legitimized and justified by the actors.214  
 
Material (mechanical) factors and hard causes are also included in the ES analysis, 
but the main interest is in achieving an understanding (Verstehen) of ideological and 
societal factors; in other words, the ES emphasized a hermeneutic approach over 
causality. The analysis of the historical evolution of systems and societies inevitably 
led them into causal theorizing about the causes and conditions that were put into 
general propositions in line with historical and empirical evidence. The historical 
dimension of international relations is also considered to be very important and seen 
as an inseparable aspect of analytical thinking in the ES. Indeed, as Navari notes, 
“what they disdained was a-historical causal theorizing—identifying causes that did 
not respect time and place.”215  
 
The comparative study of the emergence and evolution of an international system 
and international society requires not only historical depth but also sociological depth 
in methodology. As Hoffman puts it:  
Many different readings of the same reality are possible. Even if all 
historians agreed on the facts, they would still disagree on the 
respective weight of those facts. In the act of “imaginative 
reconstruction” that any casual analysis performs, assessments of 
motivation and causal efficiency vary considerably.”216  
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The intellectual terrain of the school depends not just on its tradition of empirical 
enquiry but also on its interpretive approach to the study of international relations 
and on its explicit concern with the normative dimension of international relations 
theory.217  
 
The ES approach focuses on the use of language, inter-subjective meanings in 
diplomacy, and historical dimension of events and concepts, leading to critics calling 
it “historicist, interpretivist, hermeneutic and constructivist” and sometimes 
“unscientific” by other theorists. However, an increasing focus on the societal 
dimension of international relations, such as norms, regimes, institutions, and inter-
subjective meanings, as well as greater openness in world history, an essential 
component in understanding international relations, led to a substantial backlash 
against neo-realism in recent years.218 This brought the ES back from the periphery 
of international theory to the center. The ES’s view of international relations as 
basically a human activity, its distinction between an international system and 
society, its concern about fundamental values (order and justice), and its willingness 
to embrace history are distinctive features of the school when compared with most 
other mainstream international relations theories. The ES provides an ideal stand for 
interdisciplinary studies in international relations.  
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This, however, does not necessarily mean that the approach of the school is without 
problems, and it has been challenged greatly in the international relations literature. 
Criticisms are still raised against its basic analytical concepts, hypothesis, and 
arguments. As noted, the aim of this dissertation is to stress the weaknesses of the 
approach in relation to the socialization process of non-European states through 
analysis of the Ottoman Empire. The ES’s historical study of international society 
cannot be separated from its structural and functional study. The problem arises 
partly because of its exclusion of non-European perspectives and sources in the 
analysis of the historical expansion of the international society. The major difficulty, 
however, is related to the vagueness of the system and society distinction and the 
connection between the two concepts. Further elaboration of these points and a 
reinterpretation of the overall origins, development, and expansion of the 
international society definitely will present a new picture. Post-classical ES 
scholarship, to a certain extent, clarifies the structural and functional points of 
contention. The following chapter reviews the structural and functional critiques and 
reinterprets the evolution of the European international society through a scheme 
developed based on studies by post-classical ES scholars. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
REINTERPRETATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
 
 
3.1 International System and Society in Recent ES Scholarship 
 
As noted in Chapter One, system and society distinction establishes the basis of the 
ES approach to international relations, but the connection between system and 
society for has long led to confusion and to critique of the school’s analytical 
distinction. Recent studies on the nature and expansion of European international 
society carried out by fourth-generation (post-classical) ES scholars have attempted 
to refine the international system and society, as well as the European and non-
European distinctions of earlier generations (classical ES).219  
 
Refinement of the conceptualization of the international system – a concept that has 
been underdeveloped compared to international society in ES – is essential in 
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determining the boundaries of the two concepts. Sometimes both concepts are used 
interchangeably in the literature, including with respect to the Ottoman Empire. 
Heeren’s study is an example of this. Heeren’s nineteenth-century conception of a 
states system led to his placement of the Ottoman Empire within the European state 
system, though he argued that it was not a part of the European system.220 Heeren 
defined an international system as “the union of several contiguous states, 
resembling each other in their manners, religion and degree of social improvement, 
and cemented together by a reciprocity of interests.”221 In fact, what Heeren seems to 
describe was an international society, that is, a state system plus common interests 
and values based upon a common culture and civilization. Similarly, R.B. Mowat 
also failed to give a detailed account of the relations among the European powers and 
the nature of relations between Europe and those states outside of it.222  
 
Similarly, Wight’s confusing use of the term “systems of states” instead of 
“international society” complicates explanation and understanding of the relations 
between European powers and non-European states. Ian Hall, in his detailed study of 
Wight, notes that achieving a clear-cut understanding of Wight’s conception of a 
society of states is a challenging and difficult task.223 Hall is cautious about reading 
Wight using Bull’s interpretation. The major difference between Wight and Bull, as 
noted by Hall, is their basic premise of international relations, that is, anarchy.224 
Wight accepted anarchy as a condition but did not see it as a determinant factor in 
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state relations. For him, the sovereign state, its interests, and its doctrines were more 
effective in the periodical changes of the international system. Bull, on the other 
hand, defined anarchy as “the central fact of international life and the starting-point 
of theorizing about it.”225 It is because of anarchy’s negative effects that states 
searched for new ways and institutions to provide order. As noted in Bullian’s 
understanding, states are seen as rational actors, acting and cooperating under 
anarchy for a common interest – order through society. The notion of international 
society is both systematized and improved in The Anarchical Society. 
 
Bull, building on classical nineteenth-century European texts such as that of Heeren 
and his predecessors’ works, sought to provide a clear explanation for the difference 
between homogenous relations among the European society of states and the 
heterogeneous relations of this society with other political entities. When the two 
terms are used synonymously, it is not viable in making such analytical distinctions. 
This distinction was thought to be a convenient analytical method to understand the 
difference.226  
 
When Bull’s conceptual distinction is applied, one reaches the conclusion that the 
Ottoman Empire was a part of the European international system. However, it was 
not a part of European international society until the Treaty of Paris (1856), when the 
Empire was declared a benefiter of European public law and diplomacy. Some have 
suggested that 1856 does not set the admission date of the Ottoman Empire into 
European international society but, rather, its recognition as a member of the 
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European states system. From this perspective, the Turks became a part of 
international society only after 1923 with the revocation of capitulations (unequal 
treaties) and the recognition of the newly established the Republic of Turkey’s 
sovereign and legal equality.227  
 
The intense and extensive nature of relations starting with the Ottoman arrival into 
Europe in the fourteenth century challenges these arguments. The Ottomans’ 
geographical proximity puts them into a different category. Other geographically 
distant non-European states (China and Japan) were not in direct contact with the 
European international system and society until their imperial and colonial 
expansion, particularly during the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire, on the 
other hand, had been directly and indirectly involved in European affairs. They had 
been interlocked with European powers in various sectors and levels, ranging from 
political-military and economic to socio-cultural. The vagueness of the position of 
the Ottoman Empire within Europe in ES works is a major challenge to the 
theoretical and historical assumptions of the school. Watson admitted that, together 
with Bull, in their study of the expansion of international society, they realized that 
the most confusing and contradictory case was that of the Ottoman Empire. They 
were pretty sure that it should be placed within the system, and both were confused 
about the intensity of relations between the Ottomans and the Europeans. Watson 
noted that the case of the Ottoman Empire “illustrates the problem in the European 
states system.”228 Before in-depth analysis and elaboration of this point, it is essential 
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to review recent studies by ES scholars illuminating the ES distinction forming the 
main argument of this dissertation. 
 
The state system, as noted by Jackson, “is not ordained by God or determined by 
Nature. It has been fashioned by certain people at a certain time: it is a social 
organization.”229 Bull’s conception of system brought forward the question of “how 
to determine whether a system between units is formed or not.” According to Buzan 
and Little, “since the idea of system is an analytical concept, analysts have the right 
to set the criteria for it with greater or lesser degrees of stringency,” adding that the 
choice of the constitutive characteristics of systems determine the understanding and 
interpretation of the historical record.230 Bull’s definition of system becomes clearer 
when analyzed in connection with society.  
 
Bull, following Waltz, gave primacy to the sovereign state in his conceptualizations. 
This led to critiques of his work for being state-centric. Sovereignty and legal 
equality are foundational in the theoretical conceptions of international systems and 
societies. According to Phillpott, “The type of polity that makes up an international 
society is indeed one way in which societies vary. The fact that polities are separated 
is essential; it is what makes the societies international, rather than unified, like a 
city, a state, or an empire.”231 He further adds that “a system of sovereign states in its 
purest form is one that holds that the sovereign state is the sole legitimate form of 
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polity within a society.”232 Buzan and Little, on the other hand, suggest that a longer 
historical approach requires pragmatism and that the unit of analysis needs to be 
broadened to include all polities, whether they are city-states, empires, or states.233 
The unit of analysis in both of Bull’s definitions is “a group of states (or, more 
generally, a group of independent political communities),” leaving a possibility to 
extend the analysis to include all political polities. In their study, Buzan and Little, 
therefore, focus on units that are cohesive, sufficiently independent, and superior to 
others. These units can be tribes, clans, bands, chiefdoms, city-states, empires, 
sovereigns, and nation-states depending on the typology of the international system 
and the historical era to be focused on.  
 
The other determinant of the existence of a system is interactions such that these 
would become essential factors in the behavior and calculations with respect to each 
other. These interactions include the embryonic form of primary institutions of Bull’s 
international society such as diplomacy, balance of power, and war, as well as other 
foundational and derivative institutions such as trade.  
 
The other problem related to Bull’s distinction was the connection between the two 
concepts. Although Bull argued that societies are preceded by systems, later he 
contradicted himself and suggested that they coexist,234 making the line between 
system and system-plus-society unclear.235 The distinctions of “an international 
society” from “an international system” are: units have a sense of common interest 
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and/or values; units are conscious of the fact that they are bound by common values, 
rules, norms, practices (standards of conduct), and institutions in their relations with 
each other; units understand that these provide international order and, therefore, 
must be preserved and hence cooperate in making and preserving these common 
rules and institutions. 
 
In the classical ES literature, Wight, contrary to what Bull later argued, emphasized 
the importance of “cultural unity” among the entities of a society as a necessary 
condition of its being.236 The major clarification on the issue was made by Buzan 
through the use of Tonnie’s Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft sociological distinction 
of societies. He argued that a society of states can be both born out of cultural unity 
or contractually and functionally from the interactions of the units of an international 
system based on “the logic of anarchy.”237 In definitional terms, systems and 
societies are established distinctively; though functionally an international system 
exists without a society, a society cannot exist without a system.238 Watson, 
questioning the connection of a states system to international societies, also 
concludes that, despite their differences, states that are interconnected within a 
systemic framework and are interacting regularly develop rules, norms, and 
institutions to manage their relations and eventually end up sharing some common 
interests and values.239 As argued by Watson, “a strong case can be made out, on the 
evidence of past systems as well as the present one, that regulatory rules and 
institutions of a system usually, and perhaps inexorably, develop to the point where 
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the members become conscious of common values and the system becomes an 
international society.”240 It can be said that the transition from system to society 
results from multifaceted interactions of units over a sustained period of time, 
resulting in social learning and socialization as well as the development of a common 
consciousness of belonging. This is valid both for the establishment of European 
international society as well as for non-European states moving from system to 
society. It should, however, be noted that non-European states were not regarded as 
full equals by the members of European international society and did not directly 
move into the core of it. They were relegated to a different status. This point will be 
elaborated further in the following chapters.  
 
Bull’s synonymous use of international society and order was another complication. 
Order, in fact, has a dual characteristic in Bull’s study as value and fact. Bull argued 
that it is a value of highest interest that could be realized only through the institutions 
of international society, but order becomes a fact when it is maintained through the 
achievement of these ends in social life.241 According to Buzan, Bull’s usage of 
international society and order stretches the idea of international society along an 
enormous spectrum, dating back to the time of the establishment of the norms of the 
inviolability of the emissaries to the present. 242 This highlights the need not only to 
set boundaries between the international system and society but also to classify their 
types and phases of development.  
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Building on Watson’s study by arguing that the earlier (pre-modern) international 
systems were not only precursors but also foundations of the global international 
system, Buzan and Little traced the historical origins of states systems back to 3500 
BC. Starting their analysis with pre-modern international systems such as the 
Sumerian city-states, they reached the conclusion that the international systems 
should be differentiated on the basis of sectors (military, political, economic, socio-
cultural, and environmental) and categorized as “thin” and “thick.”243 A thin 
international system develops out of political-military interactions of units. A thick 
international system, on the other hand, is a full-fledged system formed out of 
continuous and regular interactions of units (states or other polities)244 in various 
sectors ranging from political, military, economic, and societal or socio-cultural to 
environmental over a considerable period of time.245 Buzan and Little categorized 
general types of systems from more comprehensive to less, as follows:  
 
Full international systems: these normally contain the full range of 
nested sectors, though in principle one might envisage (as in some 
science fiction space-war scenarios) military-political interaction 
without economic or socio-cultural exchange; 
Economic international systems: these lack military-political 
interaction, but would normally embody both economic and socio-
cultural exchange; 
Pre-international systems: these comprise mainly socio-cultural 
interactions, though they may also contain elements of non-commercial 
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trade. They are the main type of large-scale system found amongst non-
urban, pre-civilisational peoples.246 
 
 
Buzan and Little’s differentiation based on sectors also enables the separation and 
analysis of various regional international systems – societies and their interactions. 
Different regional and sub-regional full international systems can be embedded 
within an economic international system. 247 
 
Figure 1: An Economic International System248 
 
 
 
Additionally, by refining the classical ES and Alexander Wendt’s study of interstate 
societies, Buzan developed a spectrum of types of international societies from 
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pluralist to solidarist: power-political, coexistence, cooperative, and convergence.249 
This spectrum also clarifies the phase-by-phase evolution of international societies 
and their transition from system to society. A power-political interstate society is 
equated with Hobbesian thinking and is similar to ES’s classical conception of an 
international system based on enmity and war. In this type of society, value or 
cultural convergence is not necessary, though there is diplomacy, balance-of-power 
politics, and trade at a minimum level. The rules of this society (also stated by Bull) 
are constitutive of the system and limited to war, diplomacy, and recognition.250 A 
coexistence interstate society, based on Lockean understanding, is Bull’s pluralist 
international society, exemplified by the existence of sovereign states and the 
primary institutions of balance of power, diplomacy, international law, great-power 
management, and war. A cooperative international society is a society in which there 
is ideational-, value-, and unit-likeness based on a Grotian understanding of the 
ES.251 It is a society that is developed beyond coexistence toward solidarism (and can 
also be called semi-solidarist). A convergence interstate society is one in which there 
is a high level of value-sharing and common understandings. States have common 
types of administrations; for example, all are liberal democracies, sharing liberal 
political and economic principles as well as values such as human rights and 
democratic peace.252 Recent studies elaborating both conceptual and analytical 
framework of the ES have made the theoretical analysis of European international 
society’s origins, development, and expansion beyond its borders easier.  
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3.2 From the European International System to International Society 
 
Founded on classical and post-classical ES literature, this dissertation argues that 
European international society is constructed on the European regional international 
system, which was divided into sub-regions based on levels and sectors of 
interaction. These European sub-regional international systems all together 
constituted a thin regional international system, characterized mainly by political and 
military interactions. As is widely agreed in traditional international relations 
scholarship, this regional international system was a multi-ordinate one in which 
units acted on a two-dimensional level, becoming essential factors in one another’s 
calculations.253 
 
Increasing trade connections and/or socio-cultural exchanges gradually turned these 
sub-regions into a full-fledged (thick) international system in which interactions 
broadened over a number of sectors. This transition was completed starting from the 
Respublica Christiana to the Congress of Vienna. By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, this thick international system transformed into a pluralist (coexistence) 
international society as a result of the further development and institutionalization of 
the primary institutions, common interests, and values.  
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Figure 2: Multi-ordinate International System254 
 
 
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, it became a semi-solidarist (cooperation) 
international society as it developed a common civilizational identity – of being 
European vis-à-vis the colonized others. Throughout the twentieth century, European 
international society continued to become more solidarist (despite the two world 
wars). After the end of the Second World War, with the division of Europe into two 
ideological spheres, once again it divided into two sub-regions, and still the basic 
coexistence international society was preserved. Meanwhile, Western Europe moved 
toward becoming a sub-regional solidarist international society; the establishment of 
the European Economic Community was a decisive step towards Buzan’s 
“confederative international society.”  
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Figure 3: The Transition from the European International System to Society 
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Table 2: Transformation of the European International Society to the European 
Union 
 
Society/System Period/Region Ordering 
Principle 
 
Ordering 
Logic 
Ordering 
Characteristic 
Type of 
Society 
Power-Political 
International 
Society/ 
(Thin – Thick 
International 
System) 
 
1500-1815/ 
Europe 
Anarchy Gesellschaft Hobbesian  Regional 
Coexistence 
International 
Society 
1815-1856/ 
Europe 
Hierarchy/Anarchy Gesellschaft Lockean and 
Realist Grotian 
Pluralist/ 
Regional 
Cooperative 
International 
Society 
1856-1945/ 
Europe 
Hierarchy/Anarchy Gemeinschaft Grotian Semi-
Solidarist/ 
Regional 
Convergence 
International 
Society 
 
1957–1992/ 
Western 
Europe 
Constitutional—
Institutional 
Hierarchy 
Gemeinschaft Kantian Solidarist/ 
Sub-
Regional 
Confederative 
International 
Society 
 
1992  
to present-day 
Europe 
Constitutional—
Institutional 
Hierarchy 
Gemeinschaft Kantian Solidarist/ 
Regional 
 
 
The ES argument that European international society’s expansion beyond the 
boundaries of Europe led to the international society of present times is not 
acceptable. As suggested by Edward Keene and Shogo Suzuki, the international 
society was inherently dualistic, a characteristic which is neglected in the majority of 
the works by the ES. Keene noted that the international society had a bifurcated 
nature with differing modes of interaction: one applied to intra-European relations 
and the other to those outside it. The relations between European Great Powers and 
non-European powers were regulated by different institutions, laws, norms and 
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practices. Certain forms of behavior were accepted and tolerated among European 
powers, but similar ones were not tolerated in European and non-European state 
relations.255  
 
European international society of the nineteenth century, in the words of Suzuki, was 
“a ‘Janus-faced’ society for ‘civilized’ European Empires.”256 Ever since its 
inception, European international society was stratified in nature, with secondary 
European powers (ones that are definitely not categorized as Great Powers), non-
European nations, and colonies (and, as at present, former Warsaw Pact members) 
treated differently according to the “Standards of Civilization” – the nineteenth 
century acquis communautaire. As noted above, in its transformation from a pluralist 
society to a solidarist one, starting from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
European international society was based on a civilizational ground. Its ‘European’ 
identity was emphasized as envisioned in the writings of the nineteenth-century 
Victorian political thinkers and international lawyers, from John Stuart Mill to 
Herbert Spencer.257 The Great Powers of Europe justified their imperialist policies 
and acts as upholding the moral duty of civilizers.258 Gradually, in its move towards 
solidarism, the constitutive members of this society included only the European 
                                               
255 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society. 
256Suzuki, Civilization and Empire. 
257Duncan S.A. Bell, “Empire and International Relations in Victorian Political Thought,” The 
Historical Journal 49 (2006): 281–298: Duncan Bell, Victorian Visions of Global Order – Empire and 
International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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colonialist expansion of the European international society. For details, see Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits 
of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations; Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy 
– German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 2009). 
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states, while another society that could be described as a ‘hybrid-international 
society’ – a combination of system and society with similar and distinct institutions 
and understandings – developed out of the relations with non-European states (this 
point will be elaborated in the following chapters). The contemporary European 
Union, in ES literature, is described as the final stage of the development of the 
European regional international society that was unique to Europe. Debates and 
discussions continue over this point.259  
 
The society of European states, as envisioned by Bull and other ES scholars, 
gradually developed out of the interstate political order. The rules of coexistence, 
principles of civility and codes of behavior based on interactions among European 
states, over centuries, became established and crystallized in a number of treaties, 
which are today enumerated as the foundations of Europe and defined as its 
constitution – or, in the wording of Jackson, as its covenant.260 
 
Contrary to the arguments of ES scholars, European international society was not 
politically, economically and socially constructed until the end of the hegemonic rule 
of Napoleonic France over the rest of the Continent. Napoleonic rule dispersed the 
                                               
259Mohammed Ayoob, “From Regional International System to Regional Society: Exploring Key 
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ideas and values of revolutionary France across Europe. Change from within 
European states inevitably led to changes in the understanding and practice of inter-
state relations. In fact, post-Vienna international society and order was created to 
oppose everything that France stood for. Changes in the administrative and socio-
economic structures of the European states gradually led to a unit-likeness, as states 
moved from being state-nations to nation-states.261  
 
The common interests and values of the European Great Powers in the nineteenth 
century were enshrined in the Final Declaration of Vienna and institutionalized in the 
Concert of Europe – a great power management institution – to preserve the Vienna 
international order on the Continent. Until that time, there was no common 
understanding that Great Powers should be responsible for international order and 
stability and thus should act together to uphold this duty. This was complemented by 
an ideational and societal convergence. The preservation of the status 
quo/equilibrium among European Great Powers, the prevention of the rise of 
hegemonic and revolutionary aspirations, the resolution of differences through 
Congress diplomacy and European international (public) law, the limitation of wars 
and the consented use of force were the foundations of post-Vienna international 
society, order and legitimacy.  
 
This society was “a second-order political construction,” since it was the European 
state elites and their diplomatic representatives who created the international society 
of the kind theorized by Bull. As R. J. Barry Jones notes, “‘International Society’ 
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98 
thus constitutes a politically constructed ‘social’ facet of a wider, politically 
constructed international political order.”262 Though the Congress of Vienna, which 
all the European powers attended, was one of the most important international 
congresses in European history, the post-Vienna international order was established 
by a small circle of diplomatic and political elites of the four Great Powers, namely 
Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. These powers carried out the negotiations 
and transacted the Congress with the agreement of the small powers.263 Despite the 
brilliant diplomatic maneuvers of the French Foreign Minister, Talleyrand, the end 
result reflected the conservative wishes and interests of these four powers on behalf 
of all European states; furthermore, had it not been a shared concern for international 
order and security, France would have been excluded.  
 
The nineteenth-century European ruling and diplomatic elite established and 
promoted European common values, shared understandings, and values. The 
common value at the time was international order, and its preservation was deemed 
the traditional duty of the five major powers: the United Kingdom, France, Austria, 
Prussia and Russia. These shared interests and values led to the political and social 
construction of a hierarchical and pluralist European international society. 
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The major result of the Congress was the institutionalization of the Great Power 
collective–cooperative hegemony under the Concert of Europe. As noted by 
Schroeder, although the Concert of Europe was presented as being exemplary of a 
refined version of the classical balance of power system, “any balance of power 
interpretation of the Vienna settlement is misleading and wrong.”264 This is related to 
the fact that, indeed, “its essential power relations were hegemonic, not balanced, 
and a hegemonic distribution of power, along with other factors, made the system 
work.”265 He added, “The Vienna Era’s equilibrist rules and practices promoted 
benign, stabilizing kinds of hegemony.”266 Wolf D. Gruner, on the other hand, 
suggests that the definition of the post-Vienna international order as a Great Power 
hegemony would be a simplification, and it should be characterized instead “as a 
reformed, multipolar, and intertwined balance of power system with built-in 
checks.”267 He adds that the fact that the Great Powers played a significant role in 
constructing a coexistent and cooperative international system/society does not mean 
that it was simply Great Power hegemony.268  
 
A careful analysis of the Concert, on the contrary, suggests that it worked as a 
cooperative and collective hegemony of the Great Powers of Europe. As argued by 
Watson, conflicts and wars were limited, and thus the collective use of force/military 
                                               
264Paul W. Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?” American Historical 
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intervention was institutionalized on the basis of a number of agreed principles.269 
Watson, however, excludes conflicts between European powers arising from the 
clash over the Ottoman Empire, which was considered outside of Voltaire’s “grande 
république”270 or Edmund Burke’s “Commonwealth of Europe.”271 Watson defines 
nineteenth-century collective hegemonial practice in terms of three characteristics: 
prudence, moral obligation and the Standards of Civilization. Prudence is described 
as the powers’ ability “to put expediency above abstract principles,” while moral 
obligation is expressed in the Concert powers’ willingness ‘to assume collective 
responsibility, especially for human rights.” The final point was the powers’ 
imposition of European standards of civilization upon those regarded as non-
European and hence uncivilized.272  
 
Hegemony seems contradictory to the very idea of international society, as the 
existence of international society is commonly justified on the basis of its being anti-
hegemonial.273 The basic constitutive norms of international society like “non-
intervention” are designed to protect sovereignty of political communities against 
hegemonic aspirations of their politically and militarily powerful neighbors. As noted 
above, sovereign statehood, although not listed among the five primary institutions of 
Bull, is accepted in ES theory as the foundational basis and institution of 
international society. In terms of security, it is thought to be a security provider for 
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its members. The general view, therefore, was that hegemony as an expression of 
hierarchy should be incompatible with international society, the organizing principle 
of which is anarchy. To quote Dunne, “As far as the moral purpose of international 
society is concerned, it is worth underlying the fact that, from its inception, it was 
‘not just a society of sovereign states but a society for sovereign states.’” 274 Its major 
aim was to provide “a just equilibrium of power.”275  
 
Still, as Clark puts it, “international society can function as a form of ‘hierarchy 
under anarchy’, within which hegemony could play its part.”276 Clark furthers his 
argument on the basis of the Concert of Europe, suggesting that it was “a practical 
demonstration of how hierarchy and anarchy can be reconciled.” The European Great 
Power Concert was dependent on two types of legitimacy. First was legitimacy 
between the Great Powers (horizontal axis), and then the legitimacy between them 
and the remainder of the states (vertical axis).277 The Great Powers, by agreeing to be 
responsible for the preservation of international order and society, also agreed to act 
in line with the legitimized standards of compliance.278 This prevented the collective 
hegemony from becoming a system working solely in favor of the strong.  
 
Moreover, if hegemony is regarded as an institution of international society, then a 
distinction between hegemony and primacy becomes feasible. In ES, indeed, 
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hegemony is understood “in a cognate way, as one potential institution of 
international society, applicable to material conditions of primacy.”279 In Bull’s 
understanding, the managerial role of the great powers is seen as a simplification of 
the direction of international politics. The concentration of power and the checks and 
balances make an achievement of the collective good – security through order – 
possible. This, however, requires a society of states sharing certain common values 
and recognizing the specific status of great powers. To quote Hurrell, “Membership 
of the club of great powers is a social category that depends on recognition by 
others.”280 Within this framework, hegemony becomes compatible with anarchical 
society. 
 
Member states were stratified on the basis of the level of prestige and influence they 
exerted within the society of states. Common perceptions and international 
legitimacy played an important role in the accordance of special status, rights and 
obligations to particular states.281 Some states were accepted as politically and 
legally more equal than others. Indeed, as the main thesis of this dissertation 
suggests, nineteenth-century European international society and the hybrid 
international society that existed beyond it were hierarchically organized within 
anarchy. 
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It should, however, be noted that in the understanding of ES and Bull, international 
society, its units and institutions are viewed as “evolving.” Neither would they claim 
that contemporary international society and its units and institutions are the same as 
the Westphalian or post-Vienna ones. The values, basic norms and principles 
embodying the normative structure of international order and society do change or 
develop over time.282  
 
Before analyzing the defining features of nineteenth-century European international 
society and its relations with non-European states, specifically with the Ottoman 
Empire, the next section overviews its gradual development from system to society 
based on the scheme presented above. The analysis of the evolutionary phases of 
European international society is limited in line with the time frame of the 
dissertation. The progress of Europe from a regional, thin international system to a 
pluralist (coexistent) international society is presented. Its twentieth-century progress 
and present form are not included. 
 
3.2.1 The Evolution of the Thin European International System: Respublica 
Christiana to Westphalia 
 
The majority of the ES scholars argue from a Gemeinschaft understanding that the 
modern European international society is formed on the cultural, religious and 
civilizational basis of the Respublica Christiana (the Christian Republic). 
Theoretically, the European medieval order was a Christian order based on the age-
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old idea of a Christian Empire kept alive by the Church and missionaries against 
Islam. Randall Lesaffer’s analysis of the peace treaties from 1454 Lodi to 1648 
Westphalia shows that the signatories considered themselves belonging to 
Christianity, referred to as Orbis Christiana, Christianitas or Regni et Principes 
Christiani.283 In those days, these terms were used to connote Respublica Christiana, 
which as a term did not exist. Richard Tuck notes that Respublica Christiana was 
formulated by the Renaissance humanists to construct a separate identity for 
Christian Europe. After the fall of Constantinople, the term was used for 
propaganda.284 Walter Bense, similarly, argues that “a Christendom united under 
cross and the papacy, ideally at peace within and at war only with the infidel” was in 
reality a dream.285  
 
The medieval Christian world was divided into two imperial cores: the Catholic 
Latin Christendom represented by the Pope in Rome, and the Orthodox Christendom 
headed by the Byzantine Empire at Constantinople. Latin Christians of west and 
central Europe and those in lands beyond the borders of the continent identified as 
the Populus Christiannus (the Christian people). The Orthodox Christians of the east 
were deemed to be outside of the Populus Christiannus.  
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According to Wight, the origins of the international society lie in this age.286 Others 
like Bull and F.S. Northedge prefer to base the (European) international society a 
century later, when sovereign equality and territorial integrity were introduced. All 
identified with Christianity, its shared values and culture, and yet the diversity of 
polities, sub-layering of political authority (empires, kingdoms, dukedoms, vassals, 
papacy or bishoprics), the turbulent political and religious relations between 
European powers and the nominal existence of the primary institutions of the 
international society suggest that there was not yet a society of European states. As 
noted above, the existence of a common culture is not enough for  the formation of 
international societies. It is, therefore, more proper to define medieval Europe as 
making up a thin society of European states, divided into sub-regions interacting on 
developing diplomacy, balance of power politics and trade.  
 
3.2.1.1 Diplomacy  
 
Politics, economy, interstate relations and legitimacy were characterized by the 
principles of dynasticism and religion.287 The survival and strengthening of the 
internal rule of the dynastic states was dependent on their exertion of power in the 
affairs of the continent.288 Medieval Christendom was “a society of diverse and 
competitive princes.”289 Diplomacy of this era was also based on dynastic and 
religious principles. What came to be known as “marriage diplomacy,” that is, the 
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conclusion of marriage agreements among the European dynastic houses to 
strengthen their control over their territories, to extend their rule and to gain allies, 
was an accepted and common practice.290 Territories were transferred and borders 
were enlarged as the royal brides’ trousseaus.291  
 
Foreign interference in the internal affairs of rival powers was an accepted practice, 
as sovereign states were not formed, and the principles of legal equality and non-
interference were not established in inter-state relations. This encouraged support of 
rivals, rebels and co-religionists through bribery, espionage, conspiracy, intrigue, 
assassination, religious conversion, indoctrination and lying.292 As Nicollò 
Machiavelli puts it with his most quoted sentence from The Prince (1513), “the end 
justifies the means,” meaning that anything from deceit to murder was acceptable for 
the sake of the continuation of the monarchies and dynastic rule. Machiavellian 
thinking dominated the inter-European relations.293   
 
The Italian city-states in the south were independent and secular republican states 
that flourished because of their control of the Mediterranean and Levant trade. The 
Stato, independent from the medieval religious authority, strengthened rule of the 
princes.294 These states formed an economic international system with non-
Europeans and became major sources of goods from the East. Safe from the control 
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of hegemonic powers, Florence, Milan, Venice, the Papal States and the Kingdom of 
Naples (also known as the Kingdom of Two Sicilies), enjoyed great freedom and 
thus economically highly developed compared to other European states. The most 
devastating event of this age except for the Thirty Years War was the fall of 
Constantinople to the Turkish House of Osman, in 1453. As noted by Thomas 
Madden, “News of the fall of Constantinople shook the west in a way that is hard to 
understand today.”295 The fall of Constantinople had important political 
consequences for the Italian city-states. The shattering of the walls of the Byzantium 
believed to be invincible led to an anxiety about the future security of the Italian 
peninsula.  
 
The princes moved from being princes without defined territories to princely states. 
Power was gathered in the hands of the rulers and the boundaries of the city-states 
were secured through the State. This and the Renaissance led to a revolution in 
loyalties. There was a transfer of faithfulness from religious to secular authorities and 
from local to central governments.296 Still, as noted by Bobbitt: 
 
Medieval Christendom was not yet a society of politically distinct 
states. But at first in Italy, and then throughout the area, the complex 
horizontal structure of feudal society crystallized into a vertical pattern 
of territorial states each with increasing authority inside defined 
geographic borders.297 
 
 
New mechanisms – like resident diplomacy, balance of power, and professional 
armed forces called condottiere (mercenaries; i.e., hired armies) – were employed. 
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The structure of inter-state relations also changed, following the changes in the 
polities. Hendrik Spyrut, in his analysis of the historical international systems, noted 
that “A change in the constitutive elements of the system means a change in the 
structure of the system.”298 The burgeoning commercial interests of the Italian city-
states necessitated resident envoys to regulate inter-state relations within and outside 
Italy. Deployment of diplomatic envoys on temporary bases was not an efficient way 
of gathering information required for protecting complex commercial and political-
military interests. This gradually led to a new type of diplomacy – a network of 
permanent embassies. 299 
 
Permanent diplomacy is rooted in the Venetian bailos, who were sent for permanent 
tasks to Byzantium and then to the Ottoman Empire for setting commercial contracts, 
treaties and protecting Venetian interests. As David J. Hill noted, “the system long in 
use by Venice was now applied by every Italian state … and Venice continued to be 
‘the school and touchstone of ambassadors.’”300 Genoa and Venice had established 
trading colonies or posts all over the Mediterranean and their bailos not only 
protected the rights of their states but also their people in the host countries. Buzan 
and Little call these ‘trade diasporas’; that is, “an institution helping to overcome the 
cultural barriers to long-distance trade, easing the creation of networks of trust, 
credit, and security.”301 They also note that much of the political diplomacy, which 
developed out the trading practices of these merchant enclaves and colonies, required 
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new tools for dealing with foreigners.302 This practice led to the development of 
consular and diplomatic methods.303 The Venetians refined and codified their 
diplomatic methods through laws and decrees enacted successively in the years 1268, 
1288, 1480, and 1481 for diplomatic service and duties.304 According to the Venetian 
Code, for example, the diplomats were neither allowed to take their wives abroad for 
purposes of safety and secrecy nor to accept presents.305 
 
The Papacy and the Catholic Church also had representatives in major cities and 
kingly courts called curia or nuncias. In majority of the conflicts of the age, the 
Papacy acted as an arbitrator – that is, a third party in modern understanding. Despite 
its decreasing prestige because of the Great Schism in the Catholic Church (1378–
1415)306 and the rise of Protestantism, the Catholic Church was still respected.307 As 
the interactions among states became more diverse and extended to broader sectors, 
permanent missions replaced ad hoc diplomacy.308 Machiavelli, writing in Legations 
(also known as the ‘Missions’) favored permanent and continuous diplomacy rather 
than ad hoc and periodic diplomacy. He argued that keeping resident representatives 
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to provide information and to represent state interests in the courts of the major states 
of the day was one of the virtues of a prince.309 For Machiavelli, diplomacy was a 
tool of deception used to increase the power of the state. Therefore, in his successive 
works, Machiavelli emphasized the importance of the information-gathering role of 
resident diplomats and the secure and expedited transmission of information acquired 
information to the diplomats’ native countries.310 Francesco Guicciardini, on the 
other hand, argued that to achieve the ragione di stato (the reason of state) and to 
secure agreements, negotiations must be carried out step by step on the basis of 
confidence and at the right moment. 311 
 
Over time, Italian-style diplomacy spread to other parts of Europe. An important 
problem of the Renaissance diplomacy was the slow evolution of a professional 
diplomatic corps. The development of a complete diplomatic system and diplomatic 
culture lasted into the seventeenth century. Still, even then, well-organized foreign 
ministries and policies were lacking.312 It took time for host states to reciprocate the 
resident ambassadors. For example, the French under Charles VIII’s reign did not 
send resident ambassadors abroad until the rise of rivalry and conflict with the 
Habsburgs.313 The other problem was that there were few experts on foreign 
languages, countries, cultures, and traditions. This meant that the same person had to 
remain accredited for many years. As a majority of these belonged to the nobility, the 
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new diplomacy led to favoritism. Moreover, the diplomatic career was a difficult 
profession because of the physical and financial inconveniences of these eras. 
Diplomatic immunities and were not fully developed, established, or understood. 
Diplomats were regarded as spies and, at times, were met with suspicion and ill-
treatment.314 Moreover, medieval diplomacy was not developed enough to have the 
sophisticated diplomatic corps or diplomatic culture necessary to be an institution of 
international society. It was still an institution in the making.  
 
3.2.1.2 War 
 
Medieval Europe was close to Thomas Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’ in which conflict, 
war, and bloodshed were endemic. The period from 1300 to 1648 was a combination 
of progress and violence. Medieval wars were fought for dynastic claims and 
religious reasons. Among the dynastic wars of this age the most important one was 
the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453), fought mostly between France and England 
as a result of the English claim to the throne of France and of the Duchy of Aquitaine 
after the death of King Charles IV. The French victory not only freed French 
territories from English control (except Calais) but also led to modernization in the 
state apparatus of England and France.315 Meanwhile, England entered a political 
turmoil and civil war known as the War of the Roses (1455–1458). Two noble 
families, the House of York and the House of Lancaster, fought for the crown. The 
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Yorks’ victory led to the Tudor dynasty that ruled until 1603. The French, on the 
other hand, had dynastic claims over the Italian peninsula along with Spain and the 
Holy Roman Empire.316 
 
In 1494 the Duchy of Milan, acting contrary to the Peace of Lodi, called in the 
French King Charles VIII against the threat of Naples. Things did not turn out as 
expected; Charles VIII used the opportunity to invade Italy and thus started the 
Italian Wars, which lasted from 1494 to 1559. Charles VIII’s goal was to drive out 
the Italian states allied with Spain and Holy Roman Empire and altogether bring an 
end to the Italian system of states. This was the beginning of a series of Habsburg-
Valois wars that lasted until Spanish supremacy was guaranteed at the Treaty of 
Cambria of 1529.317 The marriage of the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I of the 
Habsburg dynasty of Austria to Mary of Burgundy made the Empire the most 
powerful state on the continent. Its rule stretched from central Europe to Spain and to 
the near abroad of France. The threat posed by the Habsburg desire to establish a 
universal empire instigated the Habsburg-Valois Wars (five successive wars fought 
from 1521 to 1555).318  
 
The religious wars of Europe, on the other hand, can be divided into three: the wars 
of Christian states against Muslim states known as the Crusades,319 the civil wars of 
religion within states, and the inter-state religious wars developing out of the struggle 
                                               
316Davies, Europe – A History, 383–468; Palmer, Colton, and Kramer, A History of Modern World, 
49–98; Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe, 233–242. 
317Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 80–87; Heeren, A Manual of the History, 23–34.  
318Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 80–87. 
319 Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 1-120; Norman Housley, The Later Crusades 
– From Lyons to Alcazar 1274–1580 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 49-150. 
  
113 
between the Catholics and Protestants – the rising reformist sect of Christianity in the 
North (the German states and Scandinavia).  
 
Throughout the medieval age, the defense of religion and Latin Catholicism were 
used to legitimize the wars against the Muslims and the Protestants, who were seen 
as heretics. It was also the basis of the dynastic marriages and alliances. Despite Just 
War principles, the wars among the sects of Christianity; i.e., Catholics and various 
versions of Protestantism (Lutheran, Calvinist, Anabaptist, and Huguenot) were 
devastatingly bloody and tragic. The Swabian Peasant Uprising (1524–1525), the 
Tragedy of Münster (1534) and St. Bartholomew Day Massacre (1572) are examples 
of the political and religious turmoil in Europe. The Peace of Augsburg of 1555 not 
only ended the long-lasting Habsburg-Valois Wars but also, with its less-valued 
principle ‘cuius region region eius religio’ (translated as ‘he who rules, his is the 
religion’), eased the tension for a while. According to Bobbitt, it also “set the 
constitutional terms of a new society of states” as it confirmed the Holy Roman 
Emperor Charles V’s dream of a universal empire a failure by establishing the 
sovereigns’ dominance over religious affairs of their states.320 This was an initial but 
an important step toward institutionalization of sovereignty in the European 
international system.  
 
Two philosophers influenced the war thinking of the time: St. Augustine of Hippo 
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and St. Thomas Aquinas.321 The Just War doctrine required wars among Christians to 
be limited and legitimized based on three principles as suggested by St. Augustine: 
just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention.322 The aim was to limit war, 
which was believed to be a type of ‘evil’-doing. Over the centuries, this doctrine 
developed in line with the changing requirements of European warfare and thus led 
to the refinement of war as an institution of international society. Aquinas, 
combining Augustine and Aristotle in his seminal works, Summa Theologica and 
Summa Contra Gentiles, further developed Just War while the Crusades were at their 
height. The Just War became equated with the Crusades, although these principles 
were not applicable to wars with non-Christians.323 It should be noted, however, that 
the Crusades were waged not only against Muslims but also against those deemed to 
be the enemies of Catholicism in Europe. Other groups seen as enemies included the 
Wends of Germany; the Albigensians (Cathars) of southern France; the Cumans of 
Transylvania; the Livonians, Latgallians, Estonians, Curonians, Semigallains, 
Prussians, and Luthanians of the North; and Protestants all over Europe.324 
 
Just War is divided into two categories: Jus ad Bellum (criteria for engaging) and Jus 
in Bello (criteria for waging). Jus ad bellum principles comprise just cause – right 
intention, legitimate authority, last resort, proportionality, and probability of success 
– while Jus in Bello consists of just authority, non-combatant immunity, 
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proportionality, prohibited targets, and weaponry.325 Just cause and right intention 
meant that war could only be waged for permissible motives like self-defense or 
redressing a wrong, such as injustice by a legitimate authority (in medieval ages this 
was the Papacy; without its sanctioning, Emperors, Princes, or Kings could not go to 
war). For example, all wars of expansion – from the reconquista of the Iberian 
Peninsula to the Crusades in Palestine – were sanctioned by the Pope.326 Wars had to 
be of last resort (ultima ratio); first, other means of peaceful resolution had to be 
tried. The result of the war should match the destruction (proportionality in ad bello) 
and wars could only be fought if there was a reasonable prospect of success; 
otherwise, they were to be avoided. Wars must be carried out by just authority; that 
is, by standing armies not by mercenaries – condottiere could act beyond the rules of 
Christian ethics as suggested by Machiavelli327 and be ended before they turned into 
a massacre (proportionality in bello). During war, moreover, non-combatant and 
civilian immunity were to be protected. The prisoners of war were treated well. 
Prohibited targets like religious places and civilians were protected from attack and 
weaponry like the crossbow was forbidden by the Second Lateran Council of 1139, 
which also stated that wars among Christians were to be avoided.328  
 
The Reformation and Counter Reformation led to another bloody transitory phase in 
European history, known as the Thirty Years’ War, which was fought over religion. 
Though the Peace of Augsburg eased the tension among European states for some 
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time, the problem resurfaced in 1618 and 1619 with the Defenestration of Prague and 
the Bohemian Protestant aristocracy’s rebellion against the new Holy Roman 
Emperor, Ferdinand II (successor of Matthias) by electing Frederick V – the 
Calvinist Elector of Palatine. The Thirty Years’ War, which lasted from 1618 to 
1648, was one of the most epochal, complex, and devastating wars in the history of 
Europe. It was a civil war born out of administrative and constitutional issues 
regarding the election of the Holy Roman Emperor but also a religious civil war that 
later turned into an interstate war that involved the French, Dutch, and Swedish. The 
war was made up of a series of interconnected wars and battles that are 
conventionally divided into four phases: Bohemian, Danish, Swedish, and French.329  
The Thirty Years’ War challenged the Just War doctrine and led to a military 
revolution by transforming limited wars into total war. Throughout thirty years of 
fighting, the war strategy moved from defensive to offensive with the introduction of 
new weaponry like firearms and caracole. The costs of war and the size of the armies 
expanded. The rise in military professionalism led to the transition from princely 
states to kingly states. These kingly states later became the basis of the territorial 
modern states of Westphalia.330 McNeill and Black note that innovations and 
changes in technology and warfare also led to changes in state structure as they 
required larger, centralized states and powerful monarchs.331 Indeed, the centuries 
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following the signing of the Peace of Westphalia were dominated by monarchs 
believing in absolute divine rule. These absolutist monarchs established the basis of 
the Great Powers of nineteenth-century Europe. After Westphalia, the sovereign state 
became the sole legitimate authority for the declaration of war. 
 
3.2.1.3 The Balance of Power 
 
The other institution that developed out of the rivalry among the Italian city-states is 
the balance of power. From time to time, five states rivaled and balanced each other. 
The natural result of centralization of political power in city-states was the belief that 
“it could easily be fortified and perpetuated by compacts and alliances without.” 332 
The preservation of equilibrium among the Italian city-states was born out of a need 
for defense.333 The Peace of Lodi, which was signed in 1454 by the Duchy of Milan 
(who had expansionist claims vis-à-vis Lombardy) and the anti-Milanese alliance, 
which was led by Florence and Venice, was exemplary of the Italian balance-of-
power system. Italian states, forming a league, agreed to resolve their problems 
through peaceful means – consultation and diplomacy – rather than fighting or 
calling in foreign intervention (just like the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe).334 
The Italian equilibrium, in ES and Realist approaches, is typical of a mechanical 
arrangement that is a “constellation of forces that pushes and shoves states to act in 
                                                                                                                                     
State in Early Modern Europe – Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States 
1500–1660, (London – New York: Routledge, 2006). 
332Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 361. 
333Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 361. 
334 Murphy, Tillbrook, and Walsh-Atkins, Europe 1450–1661, 155. 
  
118 
particular ways from outside”335 that is, according to Bull’s definition, a fortuitous 
balance of power. 
 
Though Jackson defined them to be ‘a small regional international society,’ rather 
than being a society of states, what the Italian states constituted was a full regional 
international system based on a developed economic international system, evolving 
institutions of diplomacy, and balance of power.336 If Bull’s concept of primary 
institutions of international society is analyzed, a fortuitous balance of power is 
associated with international systems. The contrived balance of power reached 
through management of Great Power relations is, on the other hand, assumed to exist 
in international society. The emergent Renaissance state (princely state) was not yet 
an independent, cohesive, and dominant force in interstate relations, like the Great 
Powers of the nineteenth century that were the foundational forces and guards of 
Bullian international society.  
 
A similar economic and balance-of-power system to that of the Italian states, known 
as the Hanseatic League, was formed in the North of Europe in the twelfth 
century.337 It was a commercial and mercantile union of North German and Baltic 
cities, first founded between Hamburg and Luebeck. The Hanseatic League, defined 
in accordance with Buzan and Little’s concept, is a regional economic system born 
out of the logic of anarchy. In medieval Europe trade was a dangerous business; the 
physical and security problems required cooperation and regulation to secure rights 
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and business. Its Diet, a loose type of parliament, regulated commercial markets and 
common policies in the region. The Hanseatic League nations did not have maritime 
or armed forces like the Italians, but they nevertheless grew to be economically and 
politically influential. The Danish King, Valdemar Atterdag, was not pleased with 
the growing power of the League and wanted to curb it by attacking and invading its 
primary trading cities. In the ensuing war, however, the Danes were defeated and 
forced to recognize the Hanseatic League’s supremacy with the Treaty of Stralsund 
(1370). The League gained a trade monopoly in Scandinavia and extended its control 
from Holland to Poland as well as parts of Russia. Hansa cities were independent 
from the control of hegemonic powers and thus guarded their autonomy fiercely. The 
Hanseatic League lasted until the sixteenth century and had been highly effective in 
the makeup of the socio-economic structure of North Europe.338 These sub-regions 
gradually developed a network of interactions starting with commerce and then 
developing into diplomatic and military interactions. The League had diplomatic and 
commercial ties with other European states. For example, King Louis XI of France, 
while strengthening and modernizing his state, formed strong commercial relations 
with the Hanseatic League. England also continued to send permanent diplomatic 
representatives accredited to the League and stationed in Hamburg or Saxony until 
the unification of Germany.339  
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The growing power of the new principalities340 in Scandinavia and other parts of 
Europe that followed the Italian model led to a shift of power from the unions and 
leagues to the states. Moreover, new monarchies centralized their rule by reducing 
the power of the vassals, nobility, and clergy. The need for more centralized and 
efficient bureaucracies, armies, and diplomatic corps led to institutionalization of the 
state. King Louis XI and Francis I of France, King Henry VII, his son Henry VIII 
and granddaughter Elizabeth I of England, and the Spanish King Ferdinand II of 
Aragon and his queen Isabella of Castile strengthened their rule through political, 
social and economic modernization of their states. In Eastern Europe, though it was 
not as successful as the western states, Hungary under King Matthias Cornivus and 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania united with Poland after the Battle of Tannenberg and 
followed a similar path to modernization.341  
 
The dynastic struggle among the powerful houses of Europe was considered to be 
dangerous for the peace of Europe. It was agreed that a balance or – rather –
equilibrium had to be kept. In the mid-sixteenth century, English historian William 
Camden wrote that “… and true it is, which one hath written, that France and Spain 
are as it were the scales in the balance of Europe and England the tongue or the 
holder of the balance.”342 This view was expressed by the royal houses and diplomats 
of the time. Gradually the balance of power used in reference to the Italian city-states 
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broadened to mean a general balance – equilibrium – among the leading princely and 
kingly states of Europe.343  
 
3.2.1.4 International Law 
 
The supremacy of the Catholic Church over continental affairs also influenced the 
nature of the medieval law. The ecclesiastical understanding and the canon law (the 
law of the Church) became dominant. As Europe was united in religion, the 
ecclesiastical law was applicable to all. The church did not only have a strong place 
and religious authority in the daily lives of medieval Christians through the 
sacraments and religious ceremonies. It also had political authority. The Church and 
the Papacy acted as a unifying force. All Christians from peasants to kings and 
emperors were subject to canon law. Those who violated the canon law faced 
excommunication and interdict. Throughout this era the Holy Roman emperors 
rivaled religious authorities. The papacy had the power to dispose and banish the 
kings from the Church. Wilhelm G. Grewe defined this power division and struggle 
as “the diarchy of emperor and pope.”344 The evolution of sovereignty and the idea 
that the sovereign states of Europe formed a separate international system indeed 
marks the beginning of international thinking.345 
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3.2.1.5 The Great Powers  
 
In this age, the dominant hegemonic power was the Holy Roman Empire; its only 
rival in terms of political and religious authority was the Papacy. It would be 
ahistorical to depict a group of great powers roughly equal in capabilities and acting 
as the chief guarantors of the international system as well as society through 
balancing each other and managing interstate affairs. As Grewe well noted, “the 
medieval world has neither States nor a State system in the modern sense of these 
terms.”346 The majority of the European nations and territories were under imperial 
control of the Holy Roman Emperors claimed to be a universal Empire. The Thirty 
Years’ War ended the Holy Roman Empire and Habsburgs’ bid for hegemony; only 
after this development did the establishment of sovereignty, statehood, state system, 
and international law start to develop. 347 
 
3.2.2 From the Thin to the Thick European International System: From 
Westphalia to Vienna 
 
There is no doubt that the Peace Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 were turning points 
in the history of Europe.348 Westphalia brought an epochal change in the practice and 
understanding of interstate relations with sovereignty as the principal institution and 
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foundational basis of the European international legitimacy and order.349 Historians, 
jurists, and political philosophers claim these treaties concluded one of the bloodiest 
phases in the history of Europe; these treaties were “the very birth certificates of the 
modern European states system and the modern law of nations.”350 According to the 
English School (ES) scholars like Bull and Northedge, Westphalian order stressing 
basics of modern international relations like state sovereignty, territoriality, legal 
equality, non-intervention, diplomacy and international law, also makes up the 
foundations of the modern international society.351 David Armstrong, along the lines 
of the classical ES scholars, also argues that it was a decisive turn toward a European 
society of states.352 Jackson, in his analysis of the evolution of international society, 
similarly notes that, indeed, Westphalia was “the first completely explicit 
international society with its own diplomatic institutions, formal body of law, and 
enunciated practices of prudential statecraft, including the balance of power”.353  
 
The Congress of Westphalia was a comprehensive European event. The major 
participants were the Holy Roman Empire, France and Sweden and their allies. 
Britain (because of the civil war), Poland, and Russia were absent. The two major 
powers (Britain and Russia)—policies of which shaped the international order and 
politics on the continent in the following centuries were not signatories of this 
constitutive treaty—presented as the foundation of the European international 
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society. Negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück resulted with the signing of peace 
treaties between the Empire and Sweden, and the Empire and France in 1648. These 
were complemented by a separate peace treaty signed between the Dutch Republic 
and Spain in 1659 (the Peace of the Pyrenees).354   
 
The major result of Westphalia was that the move toward territorial states as the 
sovereign territorial rights of rulers was accepted to be most important. It stressed the 
separateness of European states and rejected a hegemonic universal authority above 
states. Westphalia also granted religious tolerance to states. Individual states were to 
have exclusive control over their internal affairs and to be externally sovereign. The 
religious settlement reached on the foundation of the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, the 
principle of “cuius region eius religio,” included the territorial superiority in all 
matters ecclesiastical and political.355 The delegates agreed that the major reason 
prolonging the Thirty Years’ War was the conviction that each side was fighting for 
its basic rights. The new treaties corrected the inadequacies of the earlier treaty by 
recognizing the absolute rights of states to avoid future wars.356 Westphalia 
renovated the Augsburg Peace; Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism became 
politically accepted faiths. In the words of Palmer, Colton and Kramer with 
Westphalia “plurality of sovereign states and religions was taken for granted within 
Europe as a whole.”357 
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The Dutch Republic, the Republic of Helvetica and the German states became 
independent from Habsburg rule. These sovereign states had the right to conclude 
and ratify treaties, to declare wars and to enter in diplomatic relations with other 
sovereigns. The Westphalia state system also recognized the Pope and the Emperor 
as legally equal.358 The Pope no longer had the right to intervene in the affairs of the 
states in line with the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.   
 
Starting from the times of the Greek city-states to this age, internal and external order 
was the most debated topic in the writings of pre-modern and modern thinkers. The 
problem of internal order to some extent resolved with the sovereign states. Internal 
order is regulated within a legal framework, but beyond the borders of the sovereign 
states the problem remained. In the period after Westphalia to Vienna, political 
philosophers and jurists were still preoccupied with the question: “What could 
achieve ‘order’ in the absence of the legitimacy conferred by sovereignty?”359  
 
After Westphalia, the institutionalization of the primary institutions of the 
international society and sovereignty increased. However, states in the sense known 
today were not fully developed until the nineteenth century. As noted above, the 
“state” in Bull’s writing appears as a fundamental feature. Moreover, according to 
Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, it appears as one of the foundational 
institutions of the international society.360 Despite Westphalian sovereignty, smaller 
powers were still played against each other by the stronger states; at times, their 
                                               
358 Stern, The Structure of International Society, 75–76. 
359 Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order, 6.  
360 Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, “Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations” 
in Hugo Grotius, eds. Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts, 26. See also, Alan James, Sovereign Statehood – 
The Basis of International Society, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 
  
126 
sovereign rights were violated. The other determinant institution of an international 
society is the balance of power; the foundation of such balance is a rough balance of 
capabilities of several states (specifically among Great Powers) in anarchy. However, 
it was not well established either. After Westphalia, the winner of the Thirty Years’ 
War, France, became the dominant power on the continent. France replaced the 
Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs while other new sovereigns more or less equal in 
capacity rose in various parts of Europe. 
 
The presence of powers with semi-hegemonic aspirations and non-existence of 
roughly equal modern states and Great Powers, however, rules out the possibility of 
an international society. Besides these powers, the primary institutions—specifically 
diplomacy, international law, and balance of power—were at the stage of 
development. For that reason, it will be more convenient to define Europe from 
Westphalia to Vienna as composing a thick international system, but not yet an 
international society.  
 
3.2.2.1 Diplomacy 
 
European diplomacy became a trusted instrument for controlling international 
friction and disorder. It became a permanent body in the administrative sense and 
institutionalized with establishment of foreign ministries. The congresses of 
Westphalia and Utrecht led to the emergence of professional diplomats and a 
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European diplomatic corps. The dominance of France and its culture also affected the 
diplomatic culture of Europe and made French the lingua franca of diplomacy.361  
 
Secret Agreements were the new tools of the Westphalian society. Under the 
absolute authority of princes, agreements for specific political and economic 
purposes were easily kept secret. For example, France agreed not to support the 
Dutch against England on condition that the English did not prevent the French 
invasion of the Spanish Netherlands (1667). The political and military power 
increasingly depended on economic power. Accordingly, economic threats, alliances 
and blockades were added to the means of statecraft.362 International law and Great 
Powers also started to establish themselves as constitutive elements of the European 
international system.363 From the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to the Congress of 
Vienna (1815), the European-based political order led to the construction of a thick 
international system. The impact of the French Revolution on the European 
international system led to its transition from system to society. 
 
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic France with “liberté, égalité et fraternité” broke 
to pieces the balance of power system in Europe.364 Revolutionary France had 
achieved political, military and diplomatic supremacy over continental Europe 
during the years between 1792 and 1812.365 Napoleonic France became an empire, 
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extending its rule through conquests and alliances in the greater part of Europe.366 
The Austrian foreign minister, Prince Metternich, on one occasion pointedly 
described the role of France in European affairs in those years with his famous 
words, “When France sneezes Europe catches cold.”367 In other words, the French 
Revolution ended the Westphalia order based on sovereign equality of states against 
hegemonic domination.  
 
3.2.2.2 War   
 
The major aim of the kingly states was to strengthen the power of the state. 
Mercenary troops of princely states were replaced by professionalized standing 
armies of kingly states while Richelieu’s conception of raison d’état started to 
dominate all European states.368 War was regarded as a legitimate instrument; yet 
warfare was limited in purpose and style to avoid catastrophes like the Thirty Years’ 
War. Until the French Revolutionary wars, wars were limited. The majority of the 
wars of this age were succession wars: Spanish, Swedish (The Great Northern War), 
French, Austrian and Polish.369  
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The dominating position of France under Louis XIV stirred a counter-alliance led by 
the Dutch Prince William of Orange and brought in the classical balance of power 
politics with the successive wars of the anti-Louis coalition. The French King Louis 
XIV’s claim to the throne of Spain after death of King Carlos II on behalf of his 
grandson heightened the fear of French hegemony. All rival European powers under 
the leadership of William the Orange formed an alliance (Britain, the Dutch 
Republic, Austria and Germanies). Despite the efforts of European powers to limit 
wars, it extended beyond the borders of Europe to the colonies. Each power had 
varying interests for being involved; however, the common cause was to prevent the 
rise of hegemonic powers and their universal aspirations.370  
 
The Russian, Polish and Danish alliance against the dominance of Sweden in the 
Baltic led to the Great Northern War (1700–1721), the end result of which changed 
the local balance in favor of Russia. Russia came to be regarded as a Great Power 
with the Treaty of Nystadt (1721). The principal powers of the previous century, 
Sweden, Denmark and Poland–Lithuania, lost prestige. Towards the end of the 
eighteenth century the Poland–Lithuanian commonwealth totally disappeared from 
the map of Europe as a result of the policies of Russia, Prussia and Austria.371 
 
The Austrian Succession War (1740–1748), on the other hand, resulted from the 
Prussian violation of the Pragmatic Sanction of the Hapsburg Emperor Charles VI on 
the succession of his daughter Maria Theresa; like the Spanish War of Succession, it 
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expanded to European colonies world wide. The Seven Years’ War (also known as 
the French and Indian War) lasting from 1756 to 1763, was pioneered as a result of 
the Austrian diplomatic revolution that brought European powers into war—a result 
of tangled alliances.  
 
Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780–1831) understanding of war influenced the strategic 
thinking of this era. Clausewitz, a Prussian officer, wrote an unfinished work on the 
theory of war titled On War. According to Bernard Brodie, Clausewitz wrote “not 
simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war.”372 In this treatise 
Clausewitz’s pragmatic thinking of war prevailed. He defined war as a political 
activity by violent means and argued that war is the result of the relations between 
enmity and passion; chance and creativity; and policy reason. He saw war was a part 
of man’s social existence and thus embedded in society and history.373 Frederick II’s 
Prussia with its well-trained and modernized army was the major military force of 
the continent.  
 
Armies of this age were the most important machines of the state but war and 
warfare had limits. During the Napoleonic wars, the theory and practice of European 
warfare enormously changed. Limited wars between sovereigns were transformed to 
unlimited total wars between state–nations and their people in arms.374 The change in 
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the nature of warfare made the political relations and balance of power so perceptive 
that as noted by Clausewitz, “no cannon could be fired in Europe without every 
government feeling its interests affected.”375 
 
2.2.2.3 The Balance of Power 
 
The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) concluded the war of Spanish Succession. It consisted 
of eleven bilateral treaties such as the Treaty of Rastatt (1714) between the French 
and Habsburgs; it was the most important treaty after Westphalia. The Congress was 
divided into two categories: the individual interests of states and the interests of the 
states of Europe as a whole. Specific reference made to European balance of power 
as a value to be institutionalized and preserved led to its becoming an essential 
collective security device rather than being a procedural rule.376 As religious 
alliances were replaced by those determined on the basis of raison d’état, their 
stability and durability increased. This was a very important step toward a pluralistic 
international society of Europe. The Spanish succession was resolved with a French 
promise of no unification of the two thrones. The French power was balanced 
although it continued to be a dominant power along with Britain.  
 
The Peace Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) concluded at the end of the War of 
Austrian Succession led to Prussian territorial aggrandizement at the expense of 
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Austria setting the basis for future conflict though making Prussia one of the Great 
Powers. The Treaties of Paris (1763) and Hubertusburg ending the Seven Years’ War 
was the most important treaty after Westphalia along with Utrecht shaping the 
European states system. At the end of this treaty, the Great Powers established 
themselves as a ruling pentarchy until the end of the nineteenth century. 377 
 
3.2.2.4 International Law 
 
Westphalia was an important step taken to codify European public law. This was a 
consequence of growing complexity of the interstate peace negotiations and 
interactions. Progress in the field of European international law is linked to 
diplomatic professionalization. As Kings and Monarchs started to rely on their 
advisors and representatives to deal with negotiations on their behalf, diplomats 
needed what can be defined as “standard operating procedures” to negotiate and to 
conclude treaties.378  
 
The natural law thinking of Hugo Grotius (Hugo de Groot), a Dutch legal scholar and 
diplomat, dominated the era after Westphalia. Basically, he argued that kingly states 
are bound by the natural law inherent in human nature. Unlike his contemporaries, 
Grotius brought the idea of an emergent international society forward in conjunction 
with his understanding of the natural law of states. Later legal theoreticians like 
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Samuel von Pufendorf developed Grotian ideas in support of natural law thinking of 
the age. To quote G. Mattingly: 
 
…he was the first person to see, or to make clear that he saw, that, to be 
persuasive, the argument must be couched in the terms not of the 
interests of a single unitary commonwealth of which the princes and 
republics of Christendom were subordinate members, but in terms of 
the interest in their own self-preservation of the independent, ego-
centered, absolutely sovereign states whose aggregate composed the 
heterogeneous, pluralistic international society of western Europe. That 
was what the future was going to be like.379 
 
The Grotian view includes five major features: natural law is the source of rules 
regulating inter-state relations; international society is universal; international society 
is composed of states as well as individuals and non-state groups; solidarism 
facilitates enforcement of rules and gives rise to justice; and there is no place for 
institutions in international society.380 Bull writing on Grotius concluded that the 
“idea of international society which Grotius propounded was given concrete 
expression in the Peace of Westphalia, and Grotius may be considered the 
intellectual father of this first general peace settlement of modern times”.381 Hill 
noted that Grotius sought the basic principles of interstate relations in human reason 
and rationality in an era motivated by “dynastic interest, national aggrandizement, 
and religious bigotry”.382 In his famous treatise, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the 
Rights of War and Peace), published in 1625, he systematically assembled the 
European practice in relation to war and peace rooted in natural law starting from 
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antiquity to his age. This set the basis of European international law.383 According to 
the ES scholars, occupying “the middle ground between the Naturalists and the 
Positivists,”384 Grotius was not only the father of the idea of a society of states but 
also the post-Westphalia international order. 
 
3.2.2.5 The Great Powers 
 
During this era, the belief in the divine right of the monarchs emphasized by political 
philosophers like Jean Bodin and Bishop Jacques-Benigne Bossuet changed the 
nature of the princely states to that of absolutist kingly (queenly) states. Bodin’s 
major work, The Six Books of the Commonwealth (Les Six Livres de la République, 
1576), represents a synopsis of his absolutist legal and political thought. Writing at 
the time of the French civil wars, Bodin purported the idea of absolute monarchs 
whose authority is unquestionable and above their subjects. This, he thought, would 
force obedience to the state and thus prevent disorder.385 The idea of divinely kings 
whose authority could not be surrogated was dominant.386  
 
Monarchs of this era established absolutist states where raison d’état (the reason of 
state) determined inter-state relations. Sovereignty and raison d’état became the 
basis of international legitimacy. The raison d’état acquired a slightly different 
meaning in the new French version. In its Italian usage it was equated with self-
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aggrandizement of princely state. In French understanding it meant the king 
embodying the state had responsibilities for preservation of general peace and 
stability.387 Wars, diplomatic contracts, alliances and balance of power politics were 
all justified on this basis. This transition from princely states where dynastic family 
interests of princes were secured, to that of kingly states, which “took the Italian 
constitutional innovation—fundamentally, the objectification of the state—and 
united this with dynastic legitimacy,” set the basis of territorial states.388 The new 
European international order was established and organized by the absolutist 
monarchs, and their leading advisors.   
 
After the devastation of the Thirty Years’ War, France under King Louis XIV 
became the rising European power; its politics determined the spirit of the era. Louis 
XIV inherited the crown from King Louis XIII; he also inherited a politically, 
military and economically well-structured kingly state under the guidance of 
prominent advisors like the Duke of Sully, Cardinal Richelieu and Cardinal Mazarin. 
Louis XIV, determined to make his kingdom the most powerful one in Europe, 
personified the idea of sovereignty with his famous statement ‘L’état, C’est moi’. He 
continued his reforms aimed to strengthen his power and rule within France. Not 
only the French ruling system and economy were reorganized but also its army was 
centralized, equipped with new weapons and professionalized.  
 
The Dutch Republic was recognized as an independent state in Westphalia and 
became the financial and commercial center of the continent. The Dutch extended 
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their trading post to overseas from Asia to America. However, the wars with Britain 
during the rule of Oliver Cromwell led to the loss of Dutch power. Another 
victorious power rising from the Thirty Years’ War was Sweden.389 Poland–
Lithuanian Commonwealth, on the other hand, lost power under the threat of 
Muscovy—the rising power of the East. The electorate of Brandenburg unified with 
the Duchy of Prussia under the Hohenzollern dynasty not only broadened its borders; 
it also became the leading military power of Europe. It was recognized as a Great 
Power under the reign of King Frederick II.390 Britain during and after the Thirty 
Years’ War passed through difficult times because of the Puritan revolution and the 
ensuing civil war. Out of this bloody turmoil, Britain emerged as a liberal power that 
became a world empire extending its naval and commercial power overseas. The 
defeated powers of the war, Austria and Spain, lost not only their territories but also 
their prestige in the new inter-state relations. Austria now directed its interest from 
being a universal empire to the Balkans rivaled the Ottoman dominance in the 
region. Under the rule of Maria Theresa with diplomatic maneuvers designed by her 
advisor Count Kaunitz, Austria regained its Great Power status.391 Throughout this 
era, the idea of “great power” was institutionalized; one by one states from west 
(France and England) and Central-Eastern Europe (Austria, Prussia and Russia) came 
to be regarded as having specific status in comparison to other powers. Equilibrium 
between these powers was deemed to be essential for the international order and 
system of Europe. The hegemonic establishment of Great Powers started with the 
Treaties of Paris (1763) and Hubertusburg ending the Seven Years’ War and 
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officially institutionalized and legalized with the Congress of Vienna and the 
Concert. 392 
 
3.2.3 The Evolution of the European Pluralist International Society on the Basis 
of International System 
 
It took the whole of the nineteenth century for the consequences to work themselves 
out; the long-term effects of the Napoleonic era were immense. The changes initiated 
on the map and structure of Europe shaped the politics of Europe thereafter. The 
wartime alliances and the formation of the anti-French coalition not only brought the 
defeat of Napoleon, but also laid the foundations of the postwar European state 
system. European statesmen and diplomats gathered in Vienna (1815) tried to thwart 
its effects by redrawing European frontiers and reestablishing international order. 
This was a highly complex task achieved throughout the nineteenth century starting 
with the Vienna Congress. Definitely, the Napoleonic era had a significant impact on 
the rise of conservatism among the leaders of Europe, which continued until the 
Bismarkian era. The Vienna Congress is defined as the most extraordinary European 
congress that brought an extensive change in the structure of the European continent 
since Westphalia. 
 
The Vienna Congress based on a system-wide consensus, marks the beginning of the 
era of another change in the international relations of Europe. The states agreed that 
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the new Europe should be based on principles that would maintain public order and 
security of every throne. Apart from their differences on certain points about the 
peace with France, the Great Powers established the importance of the preservation 
of the existing status quo by forming an international system that would limit 
conflicts, prevent wars and regulate the relations among them based on agreed rules, 
norms and diplomatic practices. This new system called The Concert of Europe was 
formed by Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia.393 
 
The first issue on their agenda was the settlement to be reached with France. The 
allies were divided into two camps as the advocates of a harsh peace (Holland, 
Prussia and the German states) and the advocates of a moderate peace (Austria, 
Britain and Russia). The states that were exposed to direct aggression by France 
wanted to render France totally incapable of waging wars. Britain, Russia and 
Austria, on the other hand, were aware of the fact that France could not ever be 
permanently weakened; therefore, they supported re-incorporation of France into the 
post-Vienna international order for the guarantee of the security and peace.394 The 
Vienna Congress enabled the establishment of an international order based on 
collective hegemony; rules of coexistence crystallized in the Concert as the European 
Great Powers, contrary to earlier centuries, were determined to uphold the 
responsibility of the new order.  
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Powers preferred international order and stability on the Continent for different 
reasons. On its way to be a global power, Britain needed peace and stability in 
Europe. Likewise, Russia favored a calm Europe. It desired to expand its sphere of 
influence to the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, , their 
agreement that in the long term, it would be impossible to achieve stability without 
France, Britain and Russia meant that for a stable Europe, Austria ought to regain its 
old power vis-à-vis France. Prussia, on the other hand, shared and supported these 
views. Nevertheless, the European powers shared the view that they had to devise 
international rules of conduct in order to prevent future hegemonic aspirations. The 
key principles of new Europe such as balance of power, legitimacy, and anti-
revolutionist great power management, according to Bobbitt, set the constitutional 
convention of the European society of states.395 So, under the management of Great 
Powers, Europe moved from an international system to a pluralistic (coexistence) 
international society with shared interests, values, rules and norms.  
 
The rising nationalism and egalitarianism threatened all major powers. For that 
reason, they decided to work out a cooperative agreement with France. The allies 
were convinced that the restoration of the Bourbon Dynasty in France according to 
the principle of legitimacy would not only be acceptable to the French people, but 
also be beneficial to the allies. A Bourbon France would be durable, legitimate and 
cooperative. It was decided that the brother of the former Bourbon King should be 
proclaimed as the King of France under the title “Louise XVIII.” The signing of the 
First Treaty of Paris (1814) led to the withdrawal of the occupation forces beyond the 
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boundaries of 1792. The Allies did not demand a war reparation and France retained 
its territories of 1792. France’s overseas colonies were also restored with the 
exception of the islands of Tobago, Santa Lucia, Mauritius, Rodriguez and the 
Seychelles, which were kept by Britain as strategic bases.396  
 
Though the first issue on the agenda of Europe was resolved, the allies still had to 
deal with the complicated task of reorganization of Europe. In the Final Act of the 
Congress of Vienna, they agreed to the European arrangements made in the earlier 
negotiations and as envisaged in the first Treaty of Paris. The restructuring of 
governments of Europe was based on the principle of legitimacy, and the restoration 
of all the ruling dynasties before 1789 was agreed. Small states like Holland and 
Piedmont-Sardinia were strengthened by way of enlargement. Sovereignty and 
independence of the states contiguous to France like Spain, German Confederation, 
Confederation of Helvetia and the states of Italy were secured through international 
guarantees—treaties.397 Meanwhile the escape of Napoleon from exile, and the 
ensuing period of Hundred Days, once again increased the voices of the advocates of 
a harsh peace with France arguing that unless France was totally rendered incapable, 
the peace of Europe would be under continuous threat. Under Austrian leadership, 
the Allies were able to draw another treaty of moderation. However, this time the 
treaty was a bit harsher than the first one. The Second Treaty of Paris, signed in 
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1815, forced France to give up some additional territories and to pay an indemnity of 
700 million francs.398  
 
The European international politics was transformed in the years 1813 to 1815 in 
such a way that there was an essential change in the governing rules, norms and 
practices of international politics.399 According to Paul Schroeder, European leaders 
learned from their past experiences of wars, conflicts and defeats how to conduct 
politics effectively. Schroeder’s understanding of systemic change is close to Bull’s 
formulation of cultural change—a change in the understandings, rules and norms 
through shared practice and learning. John Ikenberry also argued that there was “a 
linear systemic institutional change,” which resulted through learning.400 Indeed, 
there was an ideational change of mindset of the leaders of Europe. 
 
3.2.3.1 Diplomacy 
 
The major contribution of the Concert to European diplomacy is that it prevented 
unilateralism on issues of common concern. Great Powers of Europe were aware of 
the fact that they no longer had the liberty to enact individual decisions as it would 
affect others. As noted by Andreas Osiander, the Vienna peacemakers knew that the 
destiny of each sovereign rested on the destiny of the others.401 For that reason, they 
assumed the responsibility to preserve the Vienna settlement to themselves and 
agreed to resolve crises through consultation and negotiation. This led to transition 
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from unilateralism and bilateralism to multilateralism in European affairs as the 
Concert officially affirmed the managerial role of the Great Powers. According to R. 
B. Elrod, “concert diplomacy actively cultivated the conception of Great Powers as a 
unique and special peer group.”402 The belief that order of Europe depended on 
“those possessed of power” was widely shared.403 Congress and the structure of the 
Concert formalized the “hierarchy of states” by according a special role to the five 
major powers—Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria and France—in determining the 
conditions and the future of the order in Europe. This very special role of the Great 
Powers was further reinforced in the Treaty of Chaumont of 1814. Other European 
states were delegated a secondary role and status within this Great Power 
international society. In the case of contradiction of the societal rules with their 
interests, the Great Powers did not hesitate to violate and act at the expense of 
smaller states and/or choose among different rules. In Stephen Krasner’s words, this 
was a typical example of an “organized hypocrisy.”404 Towards the end of the 
century, the division between these two classes became more evident as the Great 
Powers turned into world powers with the advent of imperialism and expansion into 
foreign lands outside the boundaries of Europe, while the others remained within the 
confines of European.405  
 
                                               
402 R. B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System,” World Politics, 28 
(1976):167. 
403 Abrecht- Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe, 3-64. 
404 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
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The era following Vienna is characterized by the “congress diplomacy.”406 Until 
1884, twenty-five meetings were held among the major powers of Europe. During 
these meetings unilateral changes that would upset the balance were not permitted. 
Changes were initiated upon consent and consensus among the Great Powers. 
However, these did not necessarily mean that the relations between powers were 
peaceful and harmonious. Conservative-autocratic powers (Russia, Prussia and 
Austria) and Liberal-constitutional powers (Britain and France) disagreed over 
sources of threats to international order. For example, the Austrian Chancellor, 
Metternich, demanded joint action against internal threats posing serious danger to 
the European international order/security while Britain believed there should be a 
strict distinction of internal and external threats. The differences became more 
apparent in the congresses of Troppau, Laibach and Verona.407 However, the clear-
cut division of spheres of influence between Great Powers prevented confrontation 
among them.  
 
3.2.3.2 War  
The revolutionary and Napoleonic military campaigns changed the nature of 
European warfare.  The French revolutionary wars of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries led to a re-conceptualization of war, which became a revolting 
nation’s full–force fight against its enemies. The National Convention on August 23, 
1793, officially declared levée en masse: 
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From this moment until such time as its enemies shall have been 
driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent 
requisition for the services of the armies. The young men shall fight; 
the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women 
shall make tents and clothes and shall serve in the hospitals; the 
children shall turn old lint into linen; the old men shall betake 
themselves to the public squares in order to arouse the courage of the 
warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.408 
 
 
From that time, wars extended beyond the battlefields to the cities and peoples. The 
heroic commander of the revolutionary army, Napoleon, gathered a whole political 
and military power and then initiated a number of organizational and tactical 
innovations in the French armed forces. Most notably, he restructured the French 
military into an army corps (the corps d’avant-garde or corps d’armeé) containing a 
number of divisions, each under a single command (e.g., the cavalry, the artillery, the 
infantry, and logistics). Each corps was an exemplary small army, able to fight 
against the enemy until the arrival of supplementary forces. These corps, consisting 
of approximately 20,000 to 40,000 troops, were able to fight for at least for a day and 
sometimes longer. Unlike the armies of the ancien régime, which were formed of 
nobility, Napoleon’s military comprised conscripts, veterans, and citizens who were 
promoted based on their merit and talent.409  
 
Napoleon’s army was grand, well-organized, and highly professionalized (Grand 
Armeé). The division of command and control was an essential feature of the 
modernized nineteenth century French army. The army was commanded by the 
Emperor Napoleon, but it also had an executive general staff, Marshall Alexandre 
Berthier. The army corps system enabled the French to place well-trained and 
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combined combat arms on the battlefield. The other tactical innovation introduced by 
Napoleon was the effective use of offensive warfare, aimed at the destruction of 
enemy forces through a decisive and climatic battle. Napoleon continued to use the 
military tactics of the revolutionary period, but in a more organized manner. The 
strategic combination of battle and maneuver in the field made the French army more 
flexible and mobile. Napoleonic warfare’s center of gravity was the opponent’s field 
army. The quick and decisive defeat of the enemy’s field army—through use of 
offensive action and maneuvers like la maneuver sur les derrieres (indirect 
approach), central position, and strategic penetration—enabled success on the 
battlefield.410 La maneuver sur les derrieres included not only attacking the enemy’s 
rear and flanks by concealed forces but also cutting its lines of communications, as in 
the Battle of Jena of 1806 (Auerstädt). The central position was used against a 
number of allied enemy armies. The French forces concentrated on enemy forces 
separately; once one of the enemy’s armies was decisively defeated, the French 
would turn to the other army. The military’s strategic penetration included the 
seizure of cities after the defeat of the enemy’s defense, used as bases of operations 
to pierce deep into the enemy lines.411 In addition to these changes, the army’s 
morale and its belief in Napoleon as the hero of the French (both officer corps and 
citizens) also played important roles in the successes of the Grand Armeé.412   
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All those factors enabled the French victories against the allied forces at Austerlitz 
(1805), Jena, and Friedland (1807). The quick and decisive French victories, 
achieved by short campaigns, changed the nature of warfare.413 The French army 
corps system became “the building block of modern military operations.”414  
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the major concern of the great European powers 
was to limit wars and military interventions. While the disastrous effects of the 
Napoleonic wars were still fresh, European powers agreed in concerted action 
against conflicts of common interest. Unilateral military interventions were agreed to 
be prevented; if a requirement for intervention arose, it was to be carried out by all 
powers.415 In spite of the careful plans of the Congress of Vienna, the early 
nineteenth century was characterized by a series of revolts inspired by nationalism or 
liberalism in countries like Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, some German states and 
Poland. These revolts began to spread to Austria, the German states and France. 
Borrowing their ideas from the Enlightenment, the liberal thinkers of the 1820s and 
1830s, many of whom represented the middle class, wanted a government based on a 
written constitution that guaranteed the natural rights of the people. In 1830, 
revolutions swept across Europe, beginning with the abdication of Charles X in 
France. Another revolutionary tide followed in 1848. But conservative powers 
(Austria and Russia) once again crushed most of the revolutions. Between 1815 and 
                                               
413Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity in the Nineteenth Century Warfare,” 375–388; Owen 
Connelly, Blundering to Glory: Napoleon’s Military Campaigns (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2006), 91–117. For more on the campaigns of Napoleonic France and its military strategies, see David 
Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London: Macmillan Publishing, 1965) and David Chandler, 
On the Napoleonic Wars (London: Stackpole Books, 1994).  
414 Robert M. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity in the Nineteenth Century Warfare,” The 
Journal of Military History 56 (1992): 377.  
415 Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989, (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 139–174.  
  
147 
1914 apart from revolutionaries the concert powers were faced with wars generated 
by new issues: “national liberation/state creation, maintain integrity of the 
sates/empire, national unification/consolidation, ethnic unification/irredenta, protect 
ethnic and religious confreres, government composition, and national/crown 
honor.”416 However, the nationalist revolutionary uprisings in the Ottoman territories 
led to serious disagreements and conflicts among the Great power concert. 
 
3.2.3.3 The Balance of Power 
 
As great powers were linked to each other in the management of European affairs 
through the Concert, alliance politics was rendered ineffective.417 Although the 
Vienna settlement is assumed to rest on the old balance of power, in practice it was a 
political equilibrium, which required “mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect 
for law and an overall balance among the various actors in terms of rights, security, 
status, claims, duties, and satisfactions rather than power.”418 According to Edward 
Vose Gulick, this political equilibrium was a coalition equilibrium rather than 
alliance equilibrium of the eighteenth century.419 The growing acceptance of balance 
of power as a creation of human contrivance at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century led to its doctrinal modification. The progressive disintegration of the 
political equilibrium between and of powers started with the rise of nationalism 
within and outside of Europe. The deepening ideological divide between the Concert 
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powers and the decreasing level of transparency made the Concert almost obsolete 
on paper and in practice though it lasted until the construction of Bismarkian alliance 
politics as of the 1870s. 
 
As noted by Bull, the relations in the international society did not necessarily mean 
that they were harmonious. In fact, the differences between liberal and conservative 
European great powers of the nineteenth century post-Vienna international society 
led to the creation of Entente Cordiale between France and Britain vis-à-vis the Holy 
Alliance of Austria, Prussia and Russia. In 1815, the Tsar proposed a new alliance to 
be formed among the four allied powers based on religious principles. They agreed 
to apply the main precepts of the Christian religion like justice, charity and peace 
both in the internal and external affairs of their states. This alliance was called the 
Holy Alliance; only Austria, Prussia and Russia adhered to this alliance.420 Britain 
refused to join because the essence of the alliance was contradictory to the basic 
premises of the British constitution. It was even argued that the Holy Alliance was 
another step of the conservative tyrannical governments of Europe to preserve their 
rule and suppress liberty. Therefore the Quadruple Alliance played a more significant 
role than the Holy Alliance in the years following the Congress. The Quadruple 
Alliance or the Concert of five great powers took joint action to deal with the 
international crises.421 The major cause of friction between the great powers was not 
only the establishment and preservation of European (international) order but also the 
divergences between liberal and conservative powers on the operation of the Concert 
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of Europe (the Great Power condominium) and European (international) society.  
The increasing distrust and differences of opinion between these powers led each 
power to opt for its own interests particularly in relation to the Eastern Question.422 
 
3.2.3.4 International Law 
 
Positivist international law replaced the natural law theory of the earlier periods. As 
the positivist understanding attributed law-making authority to the states important 
steps were taken in the codification of the law of nations starting with the Treaty of 
Paris, 1856. The European states became conscious of forming a geographically and 
culturally bounded community of nations; accordingly, they defined themselves on 
the basis of common civilization. Under the supervision of the great powers of 
Europe, the London Conference of 1871, the Brussels Conference of 1874, the West 
Arcane Conference of 1884 to 1885 and finally The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 
1904 led to the institutionalization of norms and principles of international law. 423 
 
3.2.3.5 The Great Powers 
 
Post-Vienna European international society (and order) was instituted on a number of 
ideas. The Great Powers of Europe agreed that they had to work on a system-based 
consciousness that was defined as the shared awareness that the future of Europe was 
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a common responsibility and a matter of consensus.424 In Bull’s wording, “a group of 
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values” and “conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, 
and share in the working of common institutions” formally came into existence. 
Prince Klemens von Metternich (Austria), Viscount Robert Castlereagh of (Britain), 
Czar Alexander  I of Russia and Count Karl Nesselrode, Baron von Hardenberg 
(Prussia) and Maurice de Talleyrand (France) were the architects of the nineteenth-
century European international society that reflected their mindset and the specifics 
of this age. 
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Figure 4:  Power Exertion of Nineteenth Century International Society  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A HYBRID INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND 
EUROPE 
 
 
4.1 The Analytical and Historical Shortcomings of the ES regarding the 
Expansion of European International Society  
 
Buzan and Little suggest that the ES “avoids Eurocentrism, ahistoricism, presentism 
anarchophilia and statecentrism,”425 prevalent in the study of international systems 
and societies. The use of predominantly Western sources in the ES conception of 
system and society, as well as the development of the school’s major arguments 
regarding non-European states based on classical and partial European writings, on 
the contrary, makes the ES approach both Eurocentric and ahistorical.  
                                               
425 Eurocentrism, in the study of international systems and societies, refers to international relations 
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Ahistoricism refers to the scholars’ preoccupation with finding general laws applicable from the past 
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or politicophilia is the prioritization of the military-political sector and relations over other sectors in 
international systems. For more, see Buzan and Little, “International Systems in World History,” 204-
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In the classical ES studies, Bull was influenced greatly by the ideas of Wight, while 
Watson, following Wight and Bull, was inspired and predisposed by both. The result, 
as noted by Jacinta O’Hagan, “is distinct, but intertwined” studies given that they are 
derived from “a similar historical and intellectual framework.”426 There is, therefore, 
a need to analyze not only Bull but also other members of the school and the roots of 
their theory-building to grasp the ES’s understanding of international society.  
 
O’Hagan emphasizes the role of Arnold J. Toynbee’s conception of civilization in ES 
thinking. The personal and intellectual relationship between Wight and Toynbee 
influenced ES theorizing.427 Wight, like Toynbee, shared the view that a historical 
approach requires high levels of interpretation and intuition and favored a holistic 
study of the universe.428 Wight was influenced greatly by Toynbee’s understanding 
of civilization in his much-debated work, Study of History.429 In some of his studies, 
he employed not only Toynbean thinking but also his “schematization” as his 
analytical framework.430  
 
Toynbee used “society” synonymously with “civilization.”431 Similarly, Wight’s 
conception of a system of states (society) emphasizes the importance of civilization 
such that it becomes almost identical in usage with civilization. Toynbee was 
interested in all civilizations: Western Christian, Orthodox Christian (divided into 
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sub-categories such as Byzantine and Russian), Islamic, Far Eastern (divided into 
sub-categories such as Chinese and Korean-Japanese), and Hindu, as well as ancient 
and extinct ones.432 Scott M. Thomas notes that, indeed, “the approach of the English 
School was from the beginning concerned about the role of different religions, 
cultures, and civilizations in international society.”433 Despite this, Wight was 
concerned predominantly with the Western Christian civilization and the society 
(system) of states born out of it. He adopted the view of the priority of Western 
civilization and Christian culture and values in the formation of the international 
society.  
 
According to Wight, the Respublica Christiana, with its sense of belonging and 
differentiation and universalism and fragmentation, has opened the possibility for a 
secular states-system. Wight assumed that “a states-system will not come into being 
without a degree of cultural unity among its members,”434 and his understanding led 
to the conceptualization of an excessively Western society of states rather than an 
inter-civilizational one.435 As Roger Morgan puts it, “this emphasis on ideas, on 
culture and on values … was quite fundamental to Wight’s interpretation of the 
academic discipline to which most of his writings was devoted, that of International 
Relations (IR).”436 Accordingly, Wight defined international society as: 
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Habitual intercourse of independent communities, beginning in the 
Christendom of Western Europe and gradually extending throughout the 
world. It is manifest in the diplomatic system; in the conscious 
maintenance of a balance of power to preserve the independence of the 
member communities; in the regular operations of international law, 
whose binding force is accepted over a wide though politically 
unimportant range of subjects; in economic, social and technical 
interdependence and the functional international institutions established 
latterly to regulate it. All these presuppose an international social 
consciousness, a worldwide community sentiment. 437 
 
 
Successive ES scholars, though agreeing that the global international society is a 
combination of various civilizations and cultures, still prioritized the European—
Western—civilization over others.438 Watson, building on Wight’s and Bull’s 
studies, carried out in-depth research into pre-modern international systems and 
societies. Based on eleven case studies, he also noted the role played by shared 
culture and civilization in the development of international societies. In the majority 
of Watson’s case studies, naturally shared or imperially enforced culture appeared to 
be the stimulating and homogenizing factor among units.439 Hall noted that Bull’s 
addition of “common values” to his definition of international society points 
intrinsically to an underlying “common culture or civilization.”440 Despite having an 
instrumentalist, functional, and pluralist (Gesellschaft) view of international society 
as a “practical association,” Bull’s emphasis reiterates the role of culture. Cultural 
and civilizational homogeneity appears to be an important factor in the constitution 
of international society. It should, however, be noted that, again, the functional 
character of culture and civilization has been essential in Bull’s theorizing. For Bull, 
common culture and civilization are important because they enhance the normative 
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cohesion of international society through the facilitation of communication and 
consensus among member states.441  
 
Culture has three meanings for Bull. First, it is “a society’s basic system of values, 
the premises from which its thoughts and actions derive,” suggesting, as usually 
understood in the ES literature, the common codes of behavior, norms, values and 
understandings.”442 Second, he refers to a broader culture—intellectual and moral 
values that are shared across societies as a result of common religious and 
civilizational progress.443 Bull’s third meaning entails a “diplomatic culture,”444 
defined as “the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official 
representatives of states.”445 As noted by James Der Derian and O’Hagan, 
international political culture is separate from the diplomatic culture.446  
 
International political culture is a synthesis of a common intellectual and moral 
culture. According to Bull, “common intellectual culture such as a common 
language, a common philosophical or epistemological outlook, a common literary or 
artistic tradition” facilitates communication and interaction between the member 
states. The common moral culture based on “common values—such as a common 
religion or a common code”—reinforces the sense of common interests, which unites 
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states by a sense of shared responsibility and obligation.447 Diplomatic culture, on the 
other hand, as fashioned in Bull’s and later in R. J. Vincent’s writings, is simply an 
“elitist manifestation of this international political culture.”448 These three meanings 
of culture are formulated concentrically. The diplomatic culture lies at the inner core, 
the mid-circle comprises the international political culture, and the outer circle 
represents the broader cosmopolitan culture shared by all individuals within the 
world society.449 Further evolution and development of a cosmopolitan culture and 
consensus between Western and non-Western states is deemed to be essential for the 
cohesion and continuity of the international society. Otherwise, the threat of 
decadence and dissolution looms over the international society.450  
 
O’Hagan argues that the ES understanding of culture “implies that the formation of 
international societies have been intra- rather than inter-civilizational processes, 
occurring within rather than between civilizations.”451 As noted in Chapter 2, 
according to the classical ES view, starting with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) 
until the Congress of Vienna (1815), the European powers constructed an 
international system and society based on shared diplomatic culture and international 
law. European international society was formed initially among the European states 
and their colonies sharing the same culture. This society later became multicultural 
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and inter-civilizational with the admission of non-Christian and non-Western states 
one after another: the Ottoman Empire, Japan, and China.452 
 
In these studies, the expansion of the international society and diffusion of its values, 
as noted by Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, presented “as a one-way 
process whereby the core, i.e. the areas where international society is most strongly 
embedded (Europe and the West), has influenced the periphery, i.e. the areas where 
international society is being introduced.”453 The ES scholars assume inherently that 
the core of the international society formed by the industrialized states of Europe is 
the most civilized and modernized. They also agree that the export of the European 
international system and society has led to humankind’s overall progress, as it 
enabled the construction of contemporary international society on the basis of 
Western values.454  
 
Buzan argues that the move from cultural homogeneity to heterogeneity led 
inevitably to the transition of international society from being “predominantly a 
Gemeinschaft to being a Gesellschaft.”455 The inter-civilizational dimension and 
cultural plurality differentiate the global international society from earlier ones and 
thus give it a distinction.456 Neumann notes, however, that the ES conception led 
implicitly to a racially white society of states, though it is not pronounced explicitly 
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in the construction of ES theory.457 Bull’s following analyses prove Neumann’s 
point:  
 
The old Western-dominated international order was associated with the 
privileged position of the white race: the international society of states 
was at first exclusively, and even in its last days principally, one of 
white states; non-white peoples everywhere, whether as minority 
communities within these white states, as majority communities ruled by 
minorities of whites, or as independent peoples dominated by white 
powers, suffered the stigma of inferior status.458 
 
 
With the important partial exception of Japan, those racially and 
culturally non-European states that enjoyed formal independence labored 
under the stigma of inferior status: unequal treaties, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, denial of racial equality.459 
 
 
O’Hagan suggests that the ES scholars’ emphasis in their conceptions of civilization, 
race, and religion, in particular, and the West in general, is used to define the 
boundary of the society of states even after its global expansion.460 Edward Keene 
challenges this argument. He argues that, on the contrary, the relations between 
European and non-European states cannot be clarified on the basis of boundaries 
even in the nineteenth century, when the distinction between civilized and 
uncivilized was supposed to be evident. He notes that the non-clarity of the system 
and society distinction was related to the vagueness of geographical and cultural 
boundaries existing at the time. As noted above, nineteenth-century international 
society comprised states differing in size and power—political and economic 
                                               
457 See Neumann, Uses of the Other; also cited in O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 117-120. 
458 Hedley Bull, “The Revolt against the West,” in The Expansion of International Society, eds. Bull 
and Watson, 1984, 221; also cited in O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 119. 
459 Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” in The Expansion of 
International Society, eds. Bull and Watson, 1984, 125; also cited in O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the 
West, 119. 
460 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 108. 
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capacities. European great powers, their colonies, mid- and small-sized European 
states, and non-European powers formed relatively homogenous sub-groups. This led 
to the building of a concentrically layered, complex network of relations. Keene 
notes that non-European states, which for a long time were deemed to be the negative 
other of Europe, like the Ottomans were, had, at times, a higher standing than that of 
the middle and small European powers in the practice of the great powers. He argues, 
therefore, for a stratified analysis of international society.461  
 
He adds further that a dichotomy of insiders and outsiders based on the analytical 
distinction of system and society focusing on the processes through which non-
European states adapted European standards is not explanatory when it comes to 
those states that did not have legal personality or rights and were not powerful 
enough to resist European expansion, such as the smaller states in the Americas, 
Africa, or Asia.462 By focusing on the empirical and historical data, Keene argues in 
favor of the revision and reinterpretation of the nineteenth-century expansion of 
international society on the basis of the two axes of stratification: material and 
prestige inequality.463 The need for revision of the ES approach to the expansion of 
international society is also reiterated by fourth-generation scholars. Buzan and Little 
are currently reassessing and reconstituting the framework used by Bull and Watson 
and revising the established classical ES account.464  
                                               
461 Edward Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Nineteenth Century,,” 
2008. Unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, 2008—cited with special permission of the author, retrieved at http://www.apsanet.org/. 
462 Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Nineteenth Century”. 
463 Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Nineteenth Century”. 
464 See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “The Historical Expansion of International Society,” 
Unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA 50th Annual Convention in New York, 
2009, cited with special permission of the authors, retrieved at http://www.isanet.org/, forthcoming in 
the English School section of the ISA compendium. 
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The ES analysis of the expansion of European international society becomes 
problematic, based on the assumption that the European international society 
generated the global international society. This kind of argument, according to the 
critics, ignores three major ongoing processes. First, it rules out the role of 
imperialism and colonialism in the expansion of international society. Colonialism 
and the standards of civilization, according to Keene, present a dualistic conception 
of international society, as they are used to justify a different modus operandi in non-
European territories, such as intervention.465 European expansion (imperialism and 
later colonialism) made the rules and institutions of Europe known to all regions of 
the world. Enforcement of European standards worldwide was realized during the 
expansion of European international society in the late nineteenth century, and the 
standards were regarded as criteria to be fulfilled. The standards played an important 
role in determining which state would be included or excluded within the civilized 
European international society. They provided the pretext for European imperialist 
global expansion and interference in non-European states' affairs. Europeans insisted 
on the maintenance of unequal treaties, capitulations, and extraterritorial provisions 
until the non-European states conformed to the standards.  
 
Second, it offers a functionalist and determinist conception of socialization. In order 
to qualify for the protection of the norms and institutions of European international 
society, non-European states were required to adopt the “standards of civilization.” 
Gerritt W. Gong argues that even those states that did not want to be a part of the 
                                               
465 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society. 
  
162 
international society complied with these modes of international conduct and 
behavior.466 
 
Figure 5: Classical ES View of the Nineteenth-Century International Arena467 
 
 
Gong defined these standards based on the writings of leading late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century international lawyers, such as James Lorimer, describing 
states as civilized and non-civilized.468 Lorimer divided the world into three 
categories: civilized, barbaric, and savage. These categorizations also led to a 
corresponding classification of the international recognition of states as plenary 
political, partial political, and natural. Varied forms of recognition led to the 
hierarchical stratification within international society, as these correspondingly 
                                               
466 Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization,’, 3-53. 
467 Both Figures 3.1 and 3.2 taken from Figure 4.11—Two contrasting ES views of the nineteenth 
century international arena, in Little, “History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism,” 96. 
468 James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations—A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate 
Political Communities, (Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2005).  
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determined the states, rights, and duties of states.469 The standards, according to 
Gong, were born and reflected in “the liberal European civilization” and “in the 
mores of Christendom.”470 
 
Figure 6: Keene’s View of the Nineteenth-Century International Arena 
 
 
Based on a Judeo-Christian background, Gong enumerates five standards of 
civilization: 
 
                                               
469 Mark Mazower, “An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the 
Mid-Twentieth Century,” International Affairs, 82 (2006): 555. See also Lorimer, The Institutes of the 
Law of Nations.  
470 Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization,’14-15. 
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A civilized state guarantees basic rights, i.e. life, dignity and property; 
freedom of travel, commerce and religion, especially that of foreign 
nationals and minorities.  
A civilized state exists as an organized political bureaucracy with some 
efficiency in running the state machinery and with some capacity to 
organize for self-defense. 
A civilized state adheres to generally accepted international law, 
including the laws of war; it also maintains a domestic system of courts, 
codes, and published laws, which guarantee legal justice for all within its 
jurisdiction, foreigners and native citizens alike. 
A civilized state fulfils the obligations of the international system by 
maintaining adequate and permanent avenues for diplomatic exchange 
and communication.   
A civilized state, by and large, conforms to the accepted norms and 
practices of the civilized international society; e.g. polygamy and slavery 
were considered uncivilized and, therefore, unacceptable. 471 
 
 
 
In a functionalist-determinist socialization process, those states willing to be a part of 
the society of states are socialized to conform to the normative societal rules and 
standards. The constitutive members of the society of states setting the standards also 
acted as role models and took on the role of civilizers. States internalizing the 
European ways and sharing common interests in maintaining the primary institutions 
are deemed to have socialized successfully. Once they are legally recognized as 
equals by the European powers, they were regarded as members of international 
society. Such structuralist accounts fail to provide in-depth understanding of the non-
European states’ perspectives and reasons for adapting to these standards, as it gives 
only the picture from a European perspective.472 Shogo Suzuki argues that the ES 
scholars influenced by the modernization theory, which was trendy in the 1960s and 
1970s, developed this overly structuralist socialization understanding.473  
 
                                               
471 Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization,’ 14-15. 
472 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 12-14.  
473 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 14-17. 
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Figure 7: Socialization into European International Society (T. Parson’s The 
Social System model, adapted to the classical ES arguments by Shogo Suzuki)474 
 
 
 
Suzuki, departing from his case studies of China and Japan, suggests a process and 
agent-oriented approach to socialization of non-European states to European 
standards.475 Building on Long and Hadden’s model, he proposes the end result of 
socialization, described as “the process of creating and incorporating new members 
of a group from a pool of newcomers, carried out by members and their allies,”476 
remains open-ended. This is related to the fact that, though the novice may be 
deemed to be successful in the socialization process, it may not replicate the accepted 
forms and patterns of behavior or may interpret these differently.477  
                                               
474 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 13-15.  
475 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 28-32 and Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 
39-49. 
476 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization and 
Empire, 29. 
477 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 28-32. See also Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of 
Socialization,” 39-49. 
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As suggested by Long and Hadden, three factors play an important role in the 
development of common understandings and in the socialization process: knowledge; 
competence and skill; and commitment. Knowledge is the recognition and awareness 
of the social world and its social and cultural standards. It is essential for “social 
reproduction.”478 Self-consciousness enables “mental readiness to use them as 
needed.”479 Competence and skill is the novice’s ability and skill to reproduce and 
comply with the standards. This is the stage of practice with the rules and standards, 
and failure results in sanctions.480 The final stage is the commitment that is the 
novice’s full recognition and acceptance of these standards as legitimate and 
acceptance of its moral responsibility to uphold them.481  
 
Three drivers of socialization determine whether a state is socialized or not: 
adaptation, strategic learning, and emulative learning.482 Adaptation is the level 
where the ruling elite simply adapt to the changes taking place within its social–
political environment. It is a response to ease the external and systemic pressures. To 
this end, institutional changes and reforms are carried out. There is, however, no 
change of identity or interest.483 Strategic learning is a deeper and broader level of 
socialization whereby a state knows about the social rules and standards of the 
international society and thus puts them into practice in its relations with other states. 
                                               
478 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42-43. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization 
and Empire, 30-31.  
479 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42-43. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization 
and Empire, 30-31.  
480 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42-43. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization 
and Empire, 30-31.  
481 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42-44. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization 
and Empire, 30-31.  
482 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 31.  
483 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 31. 
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It gains skill and competence.484 Emulative learning, on the other hand, is the stage 
of complete convergence whereby a state’s identity and interests are bound with 
those of the international society and extensive institutional changes are initiated. 
The norms, rules, laws, and codes of behavior are accepted as legitimate and thus 
internalized.485  
  
Figure 8: Suzuki’s Stages of Socialization Built on Long and Hadden’s Model486 
 
 
Third, as suggested by Neumann and Welsh, the ES omits the influence and effect of 
the non-European polities’ socialization on the civilizer states and on the structure of 
the society.487 Neumann and Welsh argue that the European international society was 
constructed on “a deeper consensus and cultural logic of us and them.” The European 
powers shared a collective identity, built on the definition of the European other. The 
conventional and classical ES account neglects this functional role of the other in 
deepening and homogenizing the European international society.488  
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486 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 31. 
487 Neumann and Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition,” 26-44.  
488 Neumann and Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition,” 26-44. 
Adaptation 
Emulative Learning 
Strategic Learning 
Rejection Acceptance 
  
168 
Indeed, as the main argument of this dissertation suggests that the growing 
interactions between European and non-European states became more intensive, 
extensive, and dense, there has been a separation of European international society 
from the rest. Meanwhile, the deepening of the European sense of common identity 
and European nationalism led to further homogenization and cohesiveness of 
European society.489 Europe came to be viewed as a “society of nations and states, 
each of which has its laws, its customs, and its maxims, but which it cannot put in 
execution without observing a great deal of delicacy towards the rest of the 
society.”490 The inner core of the international society formed by the European states 
moved toward solidarism and cultural unity within European borders. Beyond the 
boundaries of Europe, there was a different path of development born out of 
European and non-European interactions. It is this outer facet that this study defines 
as the ‘hybrid international society.’ This society is multicultural and inter-
civilizational, as it was built on other regional international systems/societies. There 
were a number of structures built upon elaborate civilizations, with distinctive 
religions, different systems of governance, different types of law, and different 
conceptions of the world and ways of conducting relations, such as Islamic and 
Asian, which can be described as regional international systems/societies.491 The 
relations between the members of these different international systems/societies and 
those of the European international society led to the construction of the hybrid 
international society. Europeans in contact with other international systems/societies 
modified the rules and institutions of the developing European international society. 
                                               
489 M.S. Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713-1783, Third Edition (London: Longman, 
1961), 265; E. Lipson, Europe in the Nineteenth Century, Third Edition (London: Black, 1928), 247. 
490 Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, 11. 
491See Bull and Watson eds., The Expansion of International Society, and Watson, The Evolution of 
International Society of International Society. 
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The evolution of European society and its so-called expansion happened 
simultaneously, affecting each other mutually.  
 
4.2 The Historical and Theoretical Study of the Ottoman Empire and Europe 
from System to Society  
 
The Ottomans were Turcomans from Central Asia stationed on the northwestern 
border of the Anatolian Selçuk Empire at Bilecik in Söğüt (Bithynia) in proximity to 
Byzantium.492 Compared with the other Anatolian beyliks (principalities), the 
Ottomans had certain advantages. According to Rudi Paul Lindner, their 
geographical proximity to the weakened Byzantine Empire, early move from 
nomadic to sedentary warfare, and capability of developing resources in Europe led 
to the quick rise of the Ottomans among the beyliks.493  
 
                                               
492 The primary sources and information with regard to early Ottoman history are still debated, since 
early chroniclers such as Aşıkpaşazade, writing in a romantic folk style, give information with 
periodic intervals for a newly translated version of the original book. See “Aşıkpaşazade, 
Osmanoğulları’nın Tarihi [History of Ottomans],” cited in Rudi Paul Lindner, “Anatolia, 1300-1451,” 
in The Cambridge History of Turkey, 1—Byzantium to Turkey 1071-1453, ed. Kate Fleet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 104-106. For the origins and the foundation of the 
Ottoman Empire, see Carter Vaughn Findley, The Turks in World History, (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 56-132; Herbert Adams Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman 
Empire—A History of the Osmanlis up to the Death of Beyazid I, 1300-1403, (London: Frank Cass, 
1968), 11-53, 263-276; Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire 1300-1481, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1990), 
15-18; Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries—The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, (New York: 
Morrow Quill, 1977), 23-43; Carl Max Kortepeter, The Ottoman Turks: Nomad Kingdom to World 
Empire, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1991), 1-40; Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluşu 
[The Origins of the Ottoman State], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), originally 
published as Les origines de I'Empire Ottoman, (Paris, 1935); Metin Kunt, Suraiya Faroqhi, Hüseyin 
G. Yurdaydın and Ayla Ödekan, Türkiye Tarihi 2—Osmanlı Devleti 1300-1600 [The History of 
Turkey 2—The Ottoman State 1300-1600], ed. Sina Akşin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi 2002), 23-45; 
Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey—Empire of the Gazis—The 
Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808, 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976); Andrina Stiles, The Ottoman Empire 1450-1700, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 3-16; 
Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy, (Huntington, New York: Robert E. 
Krieger Publishing, 1979), 9-21. 
493 Lindner, “Anatolia, 1300-1451,” 107.  
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The Ottoman beylik, by the end of the thirteenth century, had already been “a major 
imperial power reaching as far as the Danube in the north and Euphrates in the 
east.”494 After defeating Byzantine forces at the battle of Baphaeon in 1301, Osman 
Gazi “the eponymous founder”495 of the House of Osman, from whom the Empire 
takes the name “Ottoman,” targeted the northwestern cities of Brusa, Nicae, and 
Nicomedia. The acquisition of these cities by his son Orhan increased the prestige of 
the Ottomans among the Anatolian beyliks. The Ottomans not only extended their 
borders but also increased their population and military power with new territories 
and allies. Two events played an important role in the beylik’s opening to Europe and 
its move toward becoming an empire. The first was the acquisition of the Karasi 
beylik,496 located in Marmara on the Aegean coast of Anatolia. The second was the 
Ottoman political support and military aid to Ioannes VI Cantacuzenus—the 
pretender to the Byzantine Emperor’s throne—against another Byzantine royal 
house, the Palaeologus (or Palaeologi) in the imperial civil war.497  
 
The Ottoman forces aiding Cantacuzenus established themselves at Gallipoli on the 
northern coast of the Dardanelles under the command of Orhan’s son, General 
Süleyman. This made the Ottoman passage into the Balkans easier. The unexpected 
death of Süleyman left the command of the Ottoman forces to his brother, Murat I, 
who established Ottoman rule in Anatolia by defeating the beylik of Karaman and 
then moved his forces further into Thrace, taking hold of Adrinople. Thereafter, one 
                                               
494 İnalcık, Turkey and Europe, 43-50. 
495 Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1972), 4.  
496 Elizabeth A. Zachariadou; “The Emirate of Karasi and that of the Ottomans: Two Rival States,” in 
The Ottoman Emirate 1300-1389, ed. E.A. Zachariadou (Retymnon, 1993), 225-236, cited in Lindner, 
“Anatolia, 1300-1451,” 2009, 110.  
497 Radi Dikici, Şu Bizim Bizans [Our Byzantium], (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2007), 413-424. 
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by one, major Balkan cities, such as Serres, Sofia, Nish, and Salonika, fell to 
Ottoman control. Once it was understood that the Ottoman advance could not be 
prevented, particularly after the defeat of the Serbian forces in 1371, they were 
considered to be a serious threat to Christian Europe. Ottoman forces won decisive 
battles at Nicropolis, Varna, Constantinople, Belgrade, Athens, Morea, Negropont, 
and Otranto. By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ottomans, unifying the 
majority of the beyliks under their rule, established themselves firmly in Anatolia. 
They also controlled southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, either 
through conquest/use of force, marriage diplomacy, or alliance-boundary treaties. 
The House of Osman was recognized as a rising imperial power and dynasty. 
 
The Ottoman Empire, with its Central Asian roots, Altaic-Uralic language, and 
Islamic heritage differed from European states and, thus, were considered to be the 
principal “other” of Europe.498 This does not, however, mean that the Ottomans were 
the inferior and/or uncivilized other of Europe, as has often been depicted in Western 
historical and contemporary studies. Under the influence of Renaissance humanist 
thinking, the view of the Ottomans was improved slightly, but still they were 
depicted as the enemies of Christianity.’499 This trend continued in the following 
centuries.  
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The majority of the studies analyzing Ottoman policies against the non-Muslim 
world are based on two interrelated definitions regarding the nature of the Ottoman 
state: the Islamic (or the shari-a) state and the ghazi state.500 The factors that led to 
the transformation of a small principality on the peripheral borders of an empire to a 
significant great power and world empire threatening Europe naturally led to heated 
and stimulating scholarly debates. The debate on the origins, nature, and institutional 
formation of the Ottoman state still continues. Some, following Herbert A. Gibbons, 
argue that it was a continuation of the Byzantine Empire. Gibbons, writing at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century during the turbulent days of the World War I 
found it unlikely that Turks who for a long time had been depicted as the exact 
opposite of Europe and uncivilized could have established such a complex and 
efficient state. He posited the idea that the Ottoman state was built on the foundation 
of Byzantine Empire was reinforced and developed further as a result of the creative 
force of Christian and European converts both in the army and the state apparatus.501  
 
Others, based on Mehmed Fuad Köprülü’s study, argue that it was a completely 
Turkic structure. Writing in the early Republican era, Köprülü argued that the 
                                               
500 The Ghazi thesis was propounded by Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, (London: 
Royal Asiatic Society, 1965). Studies by J.C. Hurewitz, Bernard Lewis, M.S. Anderson, and Thomas 
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Ottoman state should be studied with respect to “the social morphology, cultural 
traditions, and institutional structures of Anatolian Turks in general and of the late-
thirteenth-century frontiers in particular.”502  
 
The most common and accepted thesis is that of Paul Wittek, whose ghazi/Islamic 
thesis suggests that the Ottoman State had a strong Islamic ideological basis.503 
Wittek, on the other hand, though critical of Gibbons, like Köprülü, argued that it 
was not the Central Asian–Turkic “tribal factor,” as suggested by Köprülü but, 
rather, the ghazi mentality that was the driving force behind the Ottomans’ successful 
rise.504 The argument that the Ottoman state was an exclusively Islamic state 
established by the warriors of the faith (ghazis) presents only one aspect of the 
Empire. It suggests that the Ottomans divided the world into realms of dâr al-
Islam505 and dâr al-harb506 and, hence, designed its policies accordingly. It is often 
claimed that the imperial policy of the ghazis was to spread and expand the lands of 
Islam through jihad/ghaza (gaza)—conquest in the abode of those deemed to be 
infidels—such as Christendom.507 These Hobbesian arguments508 make war an 
                                               
502 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, CA: 
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indispensable part of Ottoman policy and present the Ottoman-European relationship 
as one of perpetual conflict and warfare. In such analyses, there is no room for 
peaceful relations, diplomatic contacts, or cooperation between the Ottomans and 
Europeans.509 
 
In the last decade, Wittek’s thesis received strong criticism. The critics of the ghaza 
thesis, led by Lindner, argued that a superficial understanding of the Islamic basis of 
the Empire rules out pragmatism, which is evident in Ottoman statecraft.510 
Similarly, Lowry, questioning Wittek’s reading of the early Ottoman sources on 
ghaza, concludes that the Empire used religion to legitimize booty. He also 
emphasizes the role of Byzantine and Balkan Christian converts in the expansion and 
consolidation of Ottoman power.511 Cemal Kafadar, pointing to the problematic 
nature of such a critique, brings a new dimension to the debate by arguing that the 
Ottomans were devout and sincere Muslim ghazis but, at the same time, they were 
pragmatic rulers. Their religious values did not prevent them from being tolerant 
toward non-Muslim communities within the Empire’s borders and conciliatory 
toward those outside of it. They were able to achieve a balance between the 
contradictory norms of faith and materialism, pragmatism and idealism. The 
institutionalization and centralization of Ottoman rule was well-thought-out and 
planned in line with short-, mid-, and long-term targets and interests. The Empire’s 
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identity was inclusive and based on heterodox features. To quote Kafadar, the 
Ottoman state-building was “experimental in reshaping it to the need, much more 
creative in their bricolage of different traditions, be they Turkic, Islamic, or 
Byzantine.”512 Thus, the Ottoman worldview and imperial organization is much more 
complex than is generally presented or thought.  
 
Similarly, Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman note that “it is a common 
misconception that the Ottomans were fanatical, both in their religious beliefs and in 
the sense that they based their decisions upon ideology rather than expediency.”513 
Historical and archival sources suggest that the Ottomans were not outsiders or 
strangers to Europe but were active participants in the European international system 
and society. Starting from its early days and onward, the Ottomans, in many respects, 
were not that different from the early modern European dynastic states. Recent 
studies have confirmed that “the early modern Ottomans and the rest of Europe also 
shared much—such as the Mediterranean Sea—as seaborne and land-based 
commercial network, peoples who moved back and forth across the continent and 
similar visions of their roles in the world.”514 The ambiguity of the borders and 
frontiers in early modern Europe influenced the relations between states and peoples. 
The Ottoman expansion in southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean made contact 
between civilizations and cultures inevitable. The Ottoman Empire and the European 
powers “developed new rights and obligations in their dealings with each other, such 
                                               
512 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 121.  
513 Aksan and Goffman eds., The Early Modern Ottomans, 6. For similar arguments in recent studies 
raised by renowned Ottoman historians, see Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World around It; 
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe; İnalcık, Turkey and Europe; Ortaylı, 
Avrupa ve Biz. 
514 Aksan and Goffman eds., The Early Modern Ottomans, 5.  
  
176 
as the establishment of permanent ambassadorships and consulships, 
extraterritoriality, and the so-called capitulatory regime.”515 If interpreted from the 
ES approach, the Ottomans moved from beyond having sufficient contact with 
Europeans to being placed within the European (thin and thick) international system 
and engaged at a societal level, and this, moreover, led to the construction of 
European international society. Goffman and Aksan, supporting this argument, note 
that the early modern Ottomans were not “the static and enervated entity often 
portrayed in western narratives, sluggishly reacting to vigorous European states and 
societies” but, rather, an energetic and innovative power when compared with fixed 
and listless Europeans.516 Accordingly, the main thesis of the dissertation suggests 
that the Ottoman Empire was not only a part of the European international system, 
with its political, economic, and ideational contribution, but also a constitutive 
member of a distinct and unique society within the European states. 
 
The Ottomans had an important place in European power politics and, in the majority 
of historical studies; they were enumerated along with the principal European 
powers, such as the Hapsburgs and the French. To give an example, Heeren (upon 
whose study the ES built its analyses) divided the European international system into 
two sub-regional systems: southern European and northern European. He included 
the Porte (Ottoman Empire) in the southern European international system, along 
with the Papacy, France, Spain, England, Austria, and the German Empire, while the 
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northern European international system comprised Denmark, Sweden, Poland, 
Prussia, and Russia as the principal states.517 The basis of his arguments and 
geopolitical distinction can be debated, but that is beyond the scope of this study. 
What is of particular importance is that the Ottomans were considered to be a 
participant, and to put it precisely, they were a part of the existing structure in 
Europe, whether it is named and conceptualized as a balance of power system, (thin 
or thick) international system/power political international society, or simply a 
society of states. This does not necessarily mean that the Ottomans were completely 
identical in their world outlook or that they converged in all aspects with Europe. 
Nonetheless, it does not mean that they were eternal enemies and the diabolical other 
that had nothing in common, either. Despite its historically and culturally oriented 
interpretive approach, the ES also neglected the complexity of Ottoman-European 
relations. By relying on classical and modern Western historiography emphasizing 
the orthodox Islamic character of the Ottomans, the ES places the Empire within the 
system and argues that the Ottomans could not achieve the requirements of the 
European international society because of Islamic conservatism. 
 
Empirically and historically speaking, the so-called boundary that is argued to have 
existed between the society and system beyond it is imprecise. Keene, pointing out 
the non-clarity of the boundaries of international society, suggests that, in practice, 
some non-European states that were excluded at the ideological level should have 
been placed within the society of European states. For that reason, he argues that 
only with a stratified understanding of international society can this ambiguity be 
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explained.518 Yurdusev, likewise, pointing out the vagueness of the empirical and 
theoretical contradiction with regard to the status of the Ottoman Empire within 
international society, argues that “the empire was, I suggest, inside European 
international society in its coexistence version and outside in the cooperative 
version.”519 This ambiguity in the ES results from a number of factors.  
 
First, it is related to the structural and functional study of international society: the 
conceptualization of the system-society distinction, the identification of the system-
society relationship, and the definition of the primary institutions. Second, it is a 
direct result of the ES’s reliance on Western documents and views while neglecting 
the non-Western ones, particularly with respect to the evolution and expansion of 
international society. Third, the ES’s historical prioritization of the West and its 
persistent inclination to equate the idea of international society with the European 
international society led, inevitably, to the school’s critique for what can be defined 
in the words of Goffman as “Eurocentric mythologizing.” This, as Goffman puts it, is 
“almost axiomatic” in the literature, particularly with respect to Ottoman history.520 
According to Goffman, for generations, the understanding of Ottoman-European 
relations has suffered from an “irresistible temptation to view the globe ‘downward’ 
from Paris and London.”521 Naturally, the Empire “joins the ranks of the ‘others’—
exotic, inexplicable, unchanging and acted upon by the powers of ruling authorities 
                                               
518 Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Nineteenth Century”.  
519 Yurdusev, “The Middle East Encounter with the Expansion of European International Society,” 71. 
520 Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 4. 
521 Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 4-5. Also cited in Little, “The English 
School and World History,” 58. 
  
179 
in Europe.”522 As noted by Little, “it would be surprising if the founding fathers of 
the English School managed to avoid criticism of this kind.”523 Watson, indeed, 
accepts the fact that, in the ES literature, the Ottomans were being excluded from the 
international society based on religious differences; that is, because they were not 
Christian.524 It is, therefore, not possible to analyze the wide-ranging, complex, and 
multilevel interactions between the Ottomans and Europeans spanning from the 
thirteenth to the twentieth centuries with reductionist systemic approaches or 
monistic assumptions while neglecting the intersubjective meanings, culture, and 
societal features. Recent studies based on non-Western archival documents and 
primary sources enable us to construct a more attuned analysis.525  
 
4.3 Hybrid International Society: A Conceptual and Analytical Modification 
 
New country-based and agent-centered studies to be carried out through the use of a 
process-based socialization model, as suggested by Suzuki, will definitely complete 
the incomplete parts of the ES’s historical account of the expansion of international 
society. It is an important modification of the ES’s functionalist-determinist model of 
socialization. The socialization of non-European states was a two-way process 
resulting from both the external pressure of the civilizer states and the internal 
pressure of the Westernized ruling elites. In essence, the overall ES understanding is 
based on the “transmission of a common elite culture that provides the adhesive and 
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lubricant for the establishment of a functioning of international order.”526 However, it 
leaves out one important point. The expansion of the European international society 
was not an easy process, and it led to a gradual and mutual transformation of both the 
European and non-European states and societies throughout this process. In this way, 
it is possible to demonstrate different stages and levels of socialization and its 
varying outcomes.  
 
This modification brings in the agent-structure and meta-theoretical debates to the 
ES. As pointed out by Wendt, in order to construct system-level theories, it is 
essential to analyze actors’ self-constitution in interaction.527 Walter Carlsnaes, 
likewise, departing from Wendt’s point, argues in favor of a combination of inside 
(understanding) and outside (explanation) in analyzing the dynamics of policy 
change.528 Carlsnaes, opposing the positivist either/or approach, aims “to integrate 
the explanatory and understanding traditions within social science and to resolve the 
agency-structure problem tout court.”529 Heiki Patomäki argues that Carlsnaes’s 
main contribution to the metatheoretical IR debate is his distinction of three 
explanatory levels:  
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Accounts of the “in-order-to” intentions of foreign policy actions; 
Explanations of why actors have these particular purposes (in terms of 
“because-of” accounts of the dispositions of actors); and  
Explanations of the structural environment of actors (both domestic 
and international) affect the two levels.530 
 
Wendt and Carlsnaes argue that explanation and understanding are not distinct and 
contradictory modes of inquiry but rather complementary and interdependent. 
Indeed, as Patomäki puts it, “explanation presupposes holistic in-depth analysis” 
while it is “a mode of interpretation and aims at (better) understanding, among many 
other things.”531 The historical expansion of the European international society 
requires a holistic analysis combining explanation and understanding. The non-
European primary sources and views are, therefore, essential. Further elaboration of 
a stratified analysis of international society on Keene’s arguments will enable 
explanation and understanding of the position and socialization of states and groups 
that did not have legal personality, such as the indigenous groups in the Americas, 
Africa, and Asia Keene’s analysis also displays the dualistic nature of the European 
international society.  
 
These modifications, however, do not resolve the vagueness of the position of the 
Ottoman Empire within the ES understanding or explain the distinctive nature of the 
500 years of relationship and encounters between Europeans and Ottomans, who are 
connected in an outstanding relationship. They both admired and disliked each other. 
Their identities are fused with the negative and positive connotations of the other.  
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The military, political, economic, and socio-cultural acculturation of Ottomans and 
Europeans, which started in the fourteenth century, continued well into the twentieth 
century. This inevitably led to move of the relations beyond the system level toward 
the society level long before 1856 and 1923. In their analyses of the interaction 
capacity and process in the pre-modern and modern international systems, Buzan and 
Little found that military interaction has a high level of interaction capacity. If the 
operational and technological considerations of wars are taken into account, this is 
natural. Logistical and geographical limitations imposed on states become 
determining factors. Long-distance transportation of big armies and providing them 
with supplies and equipment is not an easy task, even in the twenty-first century, 
though technological advancement has enabled the long-distance (interregional and 
global) transportation of forces.532 This is followed by political and economic 
interactions. The same logic applies to the political sector. Unless states fall into each 
other’s military sphere, political interactions do not develop, though there are 
historical exceptions to this rule. In the economic sector, the transportation limits 
again play an important role.533 The movement of goods, particularly in pre-modern 
and pre-industrial times, was much more difficult. It should, however, be noted that 
the economic sector and trade is independent of political or military relations. Long-
distance trade was possible even in ancient times among regions that had no political 
or military contact. The socio-cultural sector has the lowest interaction capacity; 
transmission of ideas among people is not limited by distance or boundaries. 
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Technological innovations in the communication networks naturally increased and 
accelerated the development of this sector.534 
 
The Ottomans, within this framework, were definitely a part of the European 
international system. The Ottoman-European military interactions extended over 
centuries. The Empire fought numerous wars with European powers, transferred 
European military industrial innovations, and incorporated them into its warfare. 
Between 1532 and 1791, the Ottomans fought thirty-three wars with the Austrian 
Hapsburgs, while the Ottoman-Russian wars extended over a period of 47 years, 
from 1677 to 1918.535 At the political level, it engaged in European balance-of-power 
politics through a number of alliance treaties and played a role in the development of 
European diplomatic practice and consular institutions by receiving European 
resident missions and recognizing their extraterritorial rights through capitulations. 
Though the Empire did not have a resident mission stationed abroad, it continually 
exchanged representatives with European powers. Between 1384 and 1600, 145 
Ottoman envoys were sent to the Republic of Venice for various diplomatic reasons 
and occasions.536 The Empire was an essential factor in the strategic and political 
calculations of the major European powers. Trade and commercial relations was 
another sector in which the Empire was interlocked with Europe. These also led to 
the development of socio-cultural relations from the very early days of the Empire. 
Renowned artists were invited and commissioned by the Sultans. For example, 
Gentile Bellini was invited to paint a portrait of Mehmed II. The further expansion of 
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the Ottomans and their greater involvement in European affairs led to a great interest 
in and anxiety regarding the Turks, who were both appreciated and degraded. Jean 
Bodin, writing on the Turks in 1576, says: 
The king of the Turks, who rules over a great part of Europe, safeguards 
the rites of religion as well as any prince in the world. Yet, he constrains 
no one, but on the contrary permits everyone to live as his conscience 
dictates. What is more, even in his seraglio at Pera he permits the 
practice of four diverse religions, that of the Jews, the Christians 
according to the Roman rite, and according to the Greek rite, and that of 
Islam. 537 
 
Anthony Nixon, writing on the Turks in 1602, on the other hand, presents a 
completely different picture: 
 
They are, and have been ever, the most inhumane of all other barbarians. 
Their manner of living is for the most part uncivil and vicious. For their 
vices they are all pagans and infidels, sodomites and liars. They are a 
very scornful people and their pride is so great as it is not possible to be 
described.538 
 
These controversial views of the Ottomans are expressed in the books, pamphlets, 
and theoretical plays of these ages. Historical writings dating back to the Middle 
Ages, starting with the first study of the Ottoman Empire in the English language, by 
Richard Knolles, The Generall Historie of the Turkes (1603),539 were written for 
Christian readers presenting Turks as the common, diabolical enemy of Christendom 
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with biblical images and mythical archetypes. As noted by Sıla Şenlen, these 
writings represent the Christian historiography dominant at the time.540 Knolles’ 
illustration of the Turks as uncivilized barbarians influenced not only generations of 
scholars but also the view of the Ottomans among the ruling elites and the public. 
The Ottoman military superiority and the helplessness of the Christian European in 
preventing the Turkish advance in Europe led to the psychological and sociological 
othering of the Ottomans. 
 
The trade privileges granted by the sultans increased the intensity of the sectoral 
interactions. The increasing level of military, political, and economic interactions, 
however, changed the socio-cultural understandings of the other and thus led to a 
process of acculturation. European diplomats and tradesmen stationed in the Empire 
acted as agents of mutual acculturation. Starting from the seventeenth century 
onward, exchanges of diplomats and envoys increased. There was a growing interest 
on the side of the Ottomans as well. The delegations began to be sent for longer 
periods of time. Seyahatnâmes (travelogues) written by the Ottoman envoys were 
highly appreciated by the Sultans. Their views of the European ways, from society to 
culture and military to technology, increased Ottoman knowledge of Europe. The 
increasing acculturation between Europeans and Ottomans were fashioned not only 
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in the field of military or diplomacy but also on more societal and cultural levels 
such as the Tulip Age (1718-1730).541 
 
The Ottomans, through their part in the balance of power politics, not only 
influenced the shaping of the European international system but also acted as a part 
of the pluralist European international society. Despite all negative representations of 
the Empire, it was considered an actor in the European system and society. The 
Empire actively participated in European diplomacy by attending congresses and 
becoming signatory to important international treaties regulating intra- and extra-
European affairs. The Empire also observed European practices, laws, and standards 
in its relations and embarked on an extensive modernization program. The Empire, 
however, was not regarded and treated as an equal by European great powers. To 
quote Bridge and Bullen: 
 
The only state which did not know its place in the hierarchy of power 
was the Ottoman Empire. Although it had extensive possessions in the 
Balkans and although the Treaty of Paris of 1856 formally admitted it to 
the Concert of Europe, it was never regarded as a European state. There 
was a general assumption that only Christian states could properly be 
regarded as members of the European community of nations.542  
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After 1856, the decreasing control of the Empire both in external and internal affairs 
and the European perceptional othering made them a de-facto participant of the semi-
solidarist international society. The ES’s placement of the Ottoman Empire in the 
same category with China and Japan, which were geographically and culturally 
distant and, unlike the Ottomans, unreceptive to the West, leaves out the historical 
and empirical fact that the relations between the Ottomans and Europeans went well 
beyond the system level. For centuries, China and Japan strongly resisted Western 
penetration through denying the right to establish embassies or refusing to grant 
extraterritorial rights in the conduct of commerce and other affairs until the mid-
nineteenth century. They also did not have a condensed and complicated relationship 
with the Europeans like the Ottomans or play a role in the shaping of the European 
inter-state system and order. Factually speaking of a complete fusion of the two is 
not possible, either. Thus, where do the Ottomans stand? Was the Ottoman Empire a 
member of the European international society? These questions still await a clear 
answer because the answer is both yes and no. Similar questions can be asked about 
the position of other non-colonized and non-European states such as China and 
Japan. 
 
The other problematic point is the ES argument that the worldwide internalization of 
European values and practices forms the basis of contemporary international society. 
The worldwide expansion of European international society from the Atlantic to Asia 
between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries does not necessarily mean that it is 
globalized. Its norms, values, and laws were translated, adapted, and emulated in 
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different local contexts; in other words, it is “glocalized.”543 Accordingly, European 
primary institutions acquired new meanings and characteristics. The contemporary 
international society is a fusion of regional systems and societies, a bricolage built 
upon the existing structures and civilizations in various parts of the globe. At present, 
is linked by interactions in the military, political, economic, socio-cultural, and 
environmental sectors at various levels. Regional international societies and systems 
continue to exist under it. Despite sharing common interests, values, and institutions, 
they have different cultural understandings and interpretations. Contemporary studies 
by ES scholars also have suggested that there are sub-global and sub-regional 
societies that have distinct and unique institutions not found at the global level. 
 
Taking this and the historical evolution of European-Ottoman relations from fifteenth 
to twentieth century into consideration, this dissertation suggests the development of 
a new concept of a ‘hybrid international society,’ an amalgam of civilizations and a 
symbiosis of systemic and societal features. It evolved simultaneously with the 
European international system and society. To define it precisely:  
 
A hybrid international society grows out of the multi-sectoral (military, 
political, economic, and socio-cultural) interactions of a group of political 
communities—polities belonging to different regional international systems and 
societies over a sustained period of time, which do not merely form a system but 
also, through dialogue, establish common codes of behavior, rules, values, 
interests, and institutions and recognize their common interest in maintaining 
these arrangements while retaining and/or modifying their distinctive 
institutions and practices. 
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In this dissertation, the concept of a hybrid international society is developed to 
explain the uniqueness of the Ottoman-European relations between 1789 and 1856. 
The concept can be elaborated to explain the relations between non-European states 
and European states in general. To that end, further research is required, specifically 
in the cases of Japan and China.  The international society has evolved empirically 
throughout the ages. At present, it is still evolving and changing according to the 
necessities of our time and to the transformations within the states. It is, therefore, 
essential to revise and reinterpret the basic concepts and premises of the English 
School of international relations theory, in line with new empirical and historical 
information and changes.  
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Figure 9: The Evolution of the Hybrid International Society 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: 
OTTOMAN–EUROPEAN ACCULTURATION 
 
 
5.1 Ottoman Knowledge, Practice, and Strategic Learning of Primary  
International Institutions 
 
Contrary to arguments claiming that the Ottomans disdained European interests, 
values, and methods of inter-state relations, the historical record reveals that the 
Ottomans played a significant role in the formation of the European system and 
shared European powers’ understandings of those institutions’ operations. The 
Ottomans used the concepts of war, balance of power, diplomacy, trade, and treaties 
(i.e., international law) as effective policy tools. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
192 
5.1.1 The Ottoman Empire and War  
 
The Ottoman Empire has been defined by Peter Sugar as “the Near-Perfect Military 
Society.”544 The Ottomans were known for being powerful warriors; therefore, their 
rivals (e.g., the Byzantine rulers or European powers such as France) often joined 
forces with the Turks. War was an essential feature of the Ottoman rise and 
expansion. As noted previously, the Ottoman approach to war and the nature of the 
Empire were aligned with an Islamic worldview. However, Jihad/ghaza has strong 
and deep religious connotations, such as the crusades. Hence, basing an analysis of 
the Ottoman approach to war on the Islamic understanding of Jihad/ghaza is a 
historical and empirical simplification. The Ottoman wars had deeper causes and 
more pragmatic purposes. John F. Guilmartin, Jr., notes that “the causes of wars 
cannot be understood without an appreciation of the institutional context within 
which they were conceived and waged.”545 Before analyzing the Ottoman conception 
of war, an overview of the basic institutional and technological aspects of the 
Ottoman military power must be provided; this will facilitate a deeper understanding 
of the Ottoman worldview. 
 
An institutional and ideational analysis of Ottoman military history can be divided 
into two main periods of study. First is the period, starting with the establishment of 
the Ottoman beylik in 1299 and finishing with the reforms of the early nineteenth 
century, known as Nizam-ı Cedid (the New Army). Second is the period covering the 
                                               
544Peter F. Sugar, “A Near-Perfect Military Society,” in War: A Historical, Political and Social Study, 
ed. L. L. Farrar (Santa Barbara, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 104. 
545John F. Guilmartin, Jr., “Ideology and Conflict: The Wars of the Ottoman Empire, 1453–1606,” 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18 (1988):721–747.  
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era from 1829 to the dissolution of the Empire at the end of the First World War in 
1918. For the purposes of this study, the analysis of the Modern period ends with the 
Crimean War of 1853.  
 
5.1.1.1 The Ottoman State: An Institutional Bricolage 
 
The Ottomans claimed to be a World Empire. Accordingly, they did not define their 
ruling system based on territoriality, nationality, religion, or centrality.546 The 
Empire was, as Norman Itkowitz explains, a “multi-ethnic, multi-national, multi-
religious, multi-lingual”547 imperial system.548 Despite its pluralistic nature, however, 
the Ottoman Empire utilized a sophisticated ruling system. Like all imperial 
structures, the Ottoman system was “a large composite and differentiated polity 
linked to a central power by a variety of direct and indirect relations, where the 
center exercises political control through hierarchical and quasi-monopolistic 
relations over groups ethnically different from itself.”549 Karen Barkey defines the 
Ottoman governance as “a uniquely crafted hybrid civilization” that comprised 
various traditions.550  
 
                                               
546A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” in Ottoman Diplomacy, ed. 
Yurdusev, 2004, 10–13.  
547Norman Itzkowitz, “The Problem of Perceptions,” in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the 
Balkans and Middle East, ed. L. C. Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 35.  
548Itzkowitz, “The Problem of Perceptions,” 35.  
549Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference—The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 9. For more detailed analysis of the basis of the Ottoman state 
see, Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire – The Classical Age 1300-1600, (London A. Phoenix, 1997). 
550 Barkey, Empire of Difference, 7–8.  For more on the nature of the Early Ottoman State, see  Shaw, 
History of the Ottoman Empire, 112–168; Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, 55–94, 
114–143; and Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks- An Introductory History to 1923, (London and 
New York: Longman, 1997), 101–144. 
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The Ottoman administration was an “institutional bricolage,” which Barkey explains 
according to Stark and Bruszt’s definition;551 the Ottomans did not build their system 
of governance “from scratch but through reworking of the institutional materials at 
hand.”552 The Empire was constructed pragmatically, in line with the existing 
structures, environments, territories, and circumstances. The ruling élite built a 
“distinctly productive, and purposefully diverse but nevertheless homogeneous and 
unifying culture. That is, while accepting difference, they built their governance over 
similarities based on institutional structures and the shared understanding these 
generated.”553 The Ottoman state was based on Turkic (Anatolian Seljuk and 
Central-Asian), Islamic, and European (Byzantine/Southeastern) structures. 
According to Goffman, the Empire was a “Euro-Ottoman symbiosis.”554 Despite the 
Empire’s pluralist nature, however, the Empire’s imperial system was also based on 
Islamic and Ghazi features. According to İnalcık and Itkowitz, those features were 
the “foundation stones of the Empire.”555 The Sultans created an ideal type of 
centralist monarchy, based on a cultural and religious plurality. 
 
Barkey enumerates three conditions that maintain the longevity of imperial 
structures: legitimization through a supranational (i.e., religious) ideology or lineage; 
application of several policies, ranging from toleration to assimilation; and utilization 
of “divide and conquer” strategies that keep the peripheral élite fragmented 
horizontally at the social and societal level, while maintaining their vertical 
                                               
551Barkey, Empire of Difference, 7–8.   
552 Barkey, Empire of Difference, 7–8.   
553Barkey, Empire of Difference, 7–8. 
554Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 9. 
555See İnalcık, “The Rise of the Ottoman Empire,” 31; and Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic 
Tradition, 6 and 11.  
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integration with the center.556 In order to establish and legitimize their rule over 
multiethnic and multireligious groups and in order to maximize the longevity of their 
Empire, the Sultans and the imperial ruling élite simultaneously implemented these 
conditions in their administrations.  
 
Islam, both in the early days of the beylik and later in the Empire, was used as the 
major ideological legitimizing force in the Empire. In this sense, the Empire was no 
different from the Byzantine, Hapsburg, or Romanov empires. To quote Barkey, 
“There is no doubt that Islam was important in the ‘identity’ of empire, but more as a 
self-consciously constructed and strategically displayed one, rather than an 
overriding distinctiveness that made the Ottomans clearly different than others.”557 
Further, Barkey argues, it would be incorrect to define the identity or 
institutionalization of the Empire as Islamic. Islam was neither ideologically nor 
institutionally dominant within the structure of the Empire, as suggested by 
Eurocentric-Orientalist accounts. Ottomans separated “religion as an institution and 
religion as a faith”;558 as an institution, it was considered to be supportive of the 
administration and as a faith, it regulated the people’s everyday practice. Islam acted 
as a unifying and legitimizing force for the Empire and the dynastic rule of the House 
of Osman, but still, “it was subordinated to the raison d’état.”559 Islamic Shari-a 
rules were applied effectively throughout the Empire. The Empire’s Islamic and 
                                               
556Barkey, Empire of Difference, 13.  
557Barkey, Empire of Difference, 104-108. 
558Barkey, Empire of Difference, 105. 
559Barkey, Empire of Difference, 105. See also Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in 
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Ghazi bases and, later, the Caliphate560 were used by Ottoman statesmen as tools of 
both internal and external policy.  
 
The Empire did not apply a policy of forceful conversion or Islamization in the 
conquered lands. Quite the opposite; Ottoman Sultans let their local subjects freely 
practice their own religions and maintain their national identities, cultures, 
languages, and traditions. The Ottoman “policy of accommodation” (known as 
istimalet), which started as early as the inception of the beylik under Osman I, was an 
important factor in providing the Ottomans with loyal and trustworthy Christian 
allies. To quote Lowry, the Ottomans’ “latitudinarian attitude vis-à-vis Islam worked 
well for the state in its formative period because it allowed the incorporation of both 
unconverted Balkan Christians of varying backgrounds, as well as converts from 
Orthodox Christianity to Islam, into the emerging Ottoman hierarchy.”561 In 
conquered lands, local Christians were given statuses and rights that had not been 
granted by previous Byzantine or local rulers.562 İstimalet was basically the 
integration of the local élites into the Ottoman ruling system. For example, in return 
for some autonomy, intermediaries such as the Emirs of Hijaz and Yemen and the 
principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia complied and collaborated with the center. 
This enabled the growth of Ottoman power.563 
                                               
560For use of the Caliphate as a special tool of Ottoman diplomacy, see Donald Quataert, The Ottoman 
Empire 1700–1922, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81–85; For a detailed analysis 
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İstimalet was supported by the millet system, which was an indirect administrative 
formation through which the population was separated according to their religious 
affiliations, called millets.564 Ottomans did not differentiate people according to their 
races, languages, or ethnic origins; instead, people were primarily differentiated by 
their faiths. There were four main religious communities within the Empire: the 
Greek Orthodox millet, the Armenian millet, the Jewish millet, and the Muslims. The 
Empire respected the autonomy of those communities under their respective highest-
ranking religious authorities, called Milletbaşı. Each Milletbaşı was responsible both 
to the state and to his community. He represented the state within his community, 
and he represented his community within the overall Ottoman administrative 
structure. In a sense, it can be said that religious communities composed the Ottoman 
community. The Ottoman tolerance toward non-Muslims, according to Dominic 
Lieven, made the Empire “a haven of relative peace, security and tolerance which the 
Ottomans offered not just to Muslims but also to Christian and Jewish subjects of 
their would-be universal empire.”565 Basically, Ottoman imperial rule was 
maintained through separate contracts for governing separate segments. This 
pragmatic understanding and institutionalization were apparent in Ottoman 
administrative and military structures. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
564Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire—The 
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5.1.1.2 Overview of the Ottoman Military Structure  
 
The Ottoman military organization reflected the “institutional bricolage” upon which 
the Empire was built; it was a fusion of “Turcoman nomadic, Seljuk Ilkhanid and 
Byzantine elements.”566 The Ottoman forces in the early years of the beylik mainly 
consisted of armed free men who served voluntarily in return for their livelihoods.  
The Ottoman armed forces began to institutionalize under the rule of Osman I. The 
Ottoman army of the Classical period was formed by the Turcomans, who settled in 
western Anatolia, as well as by Byzantines and Catalans. Even in its emergent 
structure, the Ottoman military was well organized and well trained.567 These forces 
were divided into two groups: yürüks, Turcoman nomad groups who settled in the 
frontal areas and formed tribal contingents, and akıncılar (raiders; later referred as 
the gazi), who served in campaigns voluntarily, in exchange for material gains.568 
Akincis consisted of fast-moving raiders and auxiliary cavalries, and they moved 
ahead of the army. Through surprise attacks and ambushes, they diminished the 
enemy’s will to fight and cut off its communication lines and battle array. 
Additionally, the akincis were used to overpower rebellious and dissident groups 
through guerilla warfare. The akincis were placed under the rule of frontier 
governors, known as uç beys. Akincis who served well were rewarded for their 
bravery and participation (yoldaşlık) in campaigns with lands (fiefs; dirlik–tımar) in 
the conquered territories, particularly in the frontier regions. The marcher districts 
                                               
566Pál Fodor, “Ottoman Warfare, 1300–1453,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 1, Byzantium 
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under the hereditary control of uç beys provided private troops. Uç beys were like 
vassals, and their familial reigns over large estates were hereditary.569 
 
The Ottoman forces were mixed and irregular, consisting primarily of cavalry 
(müsellems – exempted or tax-free men) and infantry (yayas – footmen). Generally, 
yayas were free Turcoman farmers and peasants. During the rule of Orhan I, the 
yayas were organized into a disciplined professional army (i.e., a standing army) that 
was paid by salaries rather than materials or timar. Orhan I assigned his vizier, Allah 
al Din, to form an Ottoman army. Müsellems and yayas became paid soldiers under 
the rule of Murat I (1359); before that time, they had been paid with lands or fiefs.570  
 
The Ottoman’s standing army was created much earlier than those of the European 
powers. The Ottoman military structure was highly complex and was organized 
hierarchically. It evolved according to the needs of the Empire and the changes that 
occurred in internal and external realms. This hinders any clear-cut categorization of 
the imperial forces through the Empire’s centuries. Nevertheless, the Ottoman 
military structure (seyfiye) can be accurately divided into three main branches: the 
Kapikulu Askerleri (Sultan’s Army, or the salaried troops of the Ottoman Court), the 
Eyâlet Askerleri (Provincial Forces), and the Bahriye (Navy).571 The Ordu-u 
Hümayun (Land Forces) consisted of the infantry and cavalry divisions of the Eyâlet 
and Kapikulu forces.  
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The backbone of the Ottoman Army was the Kapikulu corps, which comprised war 
captives, prisoners, and slaves who had been captured in the ghazi raids. The 
majority of Kapikulu were from Southeastern Europe, such as Greeks, Albanians, 
Serbs, Bosnians, and members of other Balkan nations who converted to Islam and 
became known as devshirmehs (devşirme).572 The Kapikulu infantry were 
institutionally divided into a number of corps: the Janissaries (yeniçeri - new troops), 
the Acemis (trainees), the Cebecis (corps of armorers), the Saka (water carriers), the 
Humbaracis (bombardiers) and Topçus (gunners), the Lağimcilar (sappers and 
combat engineers), and the Toparabacis (the cart or gun-carriage artillery).573 The 
most famous of these corps were the Janissaries (who also acted as the Sultan’s 
bodyguards and companions). They were slightly different from the other corps; the 
Janissaries were trained regularly, and the army was their family and home. They 
wore unique uniforms, earned special salaries, and formed a marching band, known 
as a mehter. The Kapikulu Sipahis (armored cavalry) were also salaried.574  
 
The Eyâlet Askerleri, on the other hand, was organized into the following groups: 
Yerlikulu Piyadesi (local infantry – generally consisting of müsellem), İcârelis 
(mercenaries), Azaps (irregular infantry conscripts), Levents (field soldiers), and 
Timarli Sipahis (timariot provincial cavalry). Added to these primary groups was a 
number of provincial guards and subsidiary corps. Among these, the most important 
was the Timarli Sipahis. The timar system was the main source of Ottoman 
cavalrymen. Those who served the state in the military were given the right to collect 
taxes from designated lands (dirlik). A dirlik was akin to a salary given to an officer 
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or soldier of the army. The holder of the timar, in return, provided a cavalry man, 
armed retainers (known as cebelü), horses, arms, and other supplies, in line with the 
tax revenues he received. The timarli siphahis’ major duty was to go to war 
whenever summoned.575  
 
The Ottoman military consisted not only of Muslim forces but also of Christian 
mercenaries. These vassals played an important role in the initial successes of the 
Empire and thus formed the bulk of the Ottoman army. All nations that accepted 
Ottoman suzerainty fought alongside Turkish forces. Among these, Bulgaria, 
Albania, Serbia, Hungary, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania were of 
significant importance for the Sultans. Virginia H. Aksan, in her comparative study 
of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, and Romanov empires, emphasizes the role of “the 
relationship between ruler and ruled.”576 More precisely, Aksan argues that the 
success of military operations and wars depended on the ruling dynasty’s external 
and internal control of violence and its dominance over the distinct multiethnic 
groups under its rule.577 The relationship between the ruler and the ruled formed the 
foundational basis of the Ottoman governance. Once this relationship was disrupted 
as a result of the nationalist awakening (particularly after the French Revolution and 
the imperial center’s decrease in control over frontal and peripheral areas), the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable.   
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The Ottoman Empire was mainly a land power. The Ottoman navy developed in the 
fourteenth century, starting with the conquest of Imarli Island in 1308. The Ottoman 
navy and its organization were highly influenced by Mediterranean and Byzantine 
traditions. The Ottoman fleets were commanded by kapudan (admirals). The naval 
forces were formed of marines known as Levents. Nicolle argues that the “European 
influence on the Ottoman navy was of longer standing, but this is hardly surprising as 
the Ottomans were a major European power.”578 The Ottomans inherited the 
strategies of naval accumulation, bases, port facilities, and shipyards that had been 
used by the earlier Anatolian beyliks, which were incorporated into the Empire like 
the Karesioğulları, Aydınoğulları, Saruhanoğulları, Mentesoğulları, and 
Çandaroğulları. The Ottomans also used the Byzantine facilities they seized around 
the Gulf of İzmit (the ancient Gulf of Astacus) in Marmara. The first Anatolian 
Turkish naval fleet was established by Çaka Bey (Tzachas) in İzmir (Smyrna) in 
1081. The beyliks’ increasing control over the Aegean coast of Anatolia and its 
adjacent seas led to the decrease of Byzantine control.579 The Ottomans’ acquisition 
of the strategically important port and gulf of Edremit (Adramyttium) and the 
possession of other important locations in the Dardanelles area limited Byzantine 
control of the seas. Anatolian Seljuks also gained control of the Mediterranean coast, 
starting with the conquest of Alanya (the Byzantine city known as Calonoros; 
                                               
578Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 24–25. 
579Halil İnalcık, “The Rise of Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and the Crusades,” in 
The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993), 309–341; Idris Bostan, “Ottoman Maritime 
Arsenals and Shipbuilding Technology in the 16th and 17th Centuries,” in The Great Otoman-Turkish 
Civilization,Vol III: Philosophy, Science and Institutions, ed. Kemal Çiçek, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye 
Yayınları, 2000), 735 –744; Idris Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire 
[Ottoman Naval Organization: The Main Maritime Arsenal in the Seventeenth Century], (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu,1992), 1–14; and Svat Soucek, Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime 
Geography, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2008).  
  
203 
renamed Alaiye after Alaeddin Keykubad, the Anatolian Seljuk Emperor), and built 
their naval arsenals in that area.580  
 
As noted earlier, the occupation of the Karesi beylik was of great significance in the 
Ottoman expansion. It also transformed the Ottomans into a naval power because 
they gained control over a small fleet manned by an ex-Byzantine crew. The 
Ottomans built their naval force during the rule of Murad II, and the first Ottoman 
shipyard was constructed in Karamürsel after its capture in 1323. The Ottoman fleet 
was first used in the acquisition of Selanik (Thessaloniki) from the Venetian 
Republic in 1430. The Ottomans used their naval fleet for landings (simply as 
transport vehicles for the army) in Thrace and in Southeastern Europe. During sieges 
and landings, coastal bombardment was used to support the army’s attack. The 
Ottoman naval force contributed to the expansion of the Empire beyond the borders 
of Anatolia from the Aegean to the Black Sea and from the Adriatic to the 
Mediterranean.581 
 
After the effective use of the navy in the Ottomans’ siege and conquest of Istanbul, 
Mehmed II (1452-1481) and his successors established maritime arsenals and 
shipbuilding yards, not only in various parts of Istanbul but also throughout the 
Empire, in Gelibolu, Sinop, Izmit, Suez, Birecik, Samsun, Basra, Kefken, Ruscuk, 
Mohac, Sakarya, Budin, Ineada, Varna, Inebahtı, Preveze, Avlonya, Nova, Antalya, 
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Alanya, Trabzon, Vize, Nigbolu, and Biga.582 During the reign of Mehmed II and his 
successor Bayezid II (1481-1512), the imperial navy was equipped with firearms and 
cannons, and it became a strategic force. Moreover, the recruitment of Muslim 
sailors and corsairs who were highly experienced and skilled in sea combat, such as 
Kemal Reis, Piri Reis, Burak Reis, and Hızır Reis (known as Barbaros Hayreddin), 
increased the technical capability of the Ottoman fleet.583 During the rule of Selim I, 
the main maritime arsenal at Istanbul was expanded to form a grandiose imperial 
fleet. The naval wars between the Ottomans and Europeans marked the affairs of the 
Mediterranean in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, especially during the rule of 
Süleyman I.584 The Ottomans’ major naval rivals in the Mediterranean were Venice 
and Genoa. Eventually, major strategic ports and islands in the Black Sea, Aegean, 
and Mediterranean fell under Ottoman control. In the words of Stvatopluk Soucke, 
the acquisition of Kırım (Crimea), Rodos (Rhodes), Kıbrıs (Cyprus), and Girit 
(Crete) “transformed the Ottoman Empire from a chiefly continental power into one 
that was also a naval and maritime-commercial one.”585 The local balance of power 
in the seas shifted in favor of the Ottomans. The expulsion of the Italians from their 
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trade routes and strategic locations in the Mediterranean was a direct result of 
Ottoman pragmatism. 
 
The Ottoman fleet, composed of galleys like the Venetians’, was formidable in the 
Mediterranean but not in the open seas. The Ottoman Empire was merely a regional 
seaborne state in the eastern Mediterranean, and it could not rival oceanic maritime 
empires like the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British.586 
 
5.1.1.3 Ottoman Weaponry and Military Engineering  
 
Ottoman weaponry, industrial capacity, and engineering skills in the production of 
weapons, artillery, and ammunitions developed in line with the requirements of ever-
changing warfare, strategy, and technology. At first, Ottoman forces used traditional 
Turcoman arms that originated in Central Asia, but over time, their weaponry and 
warfare were modernized. Weapons used by the Ottoman forces included külünk 
(war-hammer), gönder (javelin), yayın (bow), bilik (quiver), çark yayi (crossbow), tığ 
(sword blade), topuz (mace), kılıç (sabre), ok (arrow), nacak (war-axe), and nize 
(light spears).587 The introduction of gunpowder to the battlefield and to naval 
warfare vastly altered organized violence between states and empires,588 and the 
Ottomans began to use firearms. The exact date of firearms’ introduction to the 
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Empire is not clear, but references mention Turkish rifles known as tüfek in the mid-
fourteenth century.589  
 
The Balkans was the main source of Ottoman weaponry and artillery. All gun-
makers in the region were given timar fiefs and thus were converted to Islam. Later, 
the Spanish Jews taking refuge in Ottoman territories brought with them information 
regarding the latest techniques of gun-making. Additionally, Ottomans bought 
weaponry from foreign powers. Orhan I struck a deal with the Genoese, buying arms 
in return for the Empire’s aid in the Genoese war with the Byzantines.590 The Italian 
city-states, despite their numerous conflicts and wars with the Ottomans, were the 
Empire’s main trade partners, and they provided arms and weaponry. Despite the 
Hapsburg and the Papal attempts to ban the trade of firearms and war materials, 
commercial relations between Europeans and Ottomans in the Levant and the Eastern 
Mediterranean continued.591 The colonies of Venice and Genoa also traded with the 
Ottomans.592 Because their relations with Venice were highly turbulent and involved 
long wars, the Sultans maintained alternative sources of weaponry through granting 
commercial privileges to other states.  
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The Balkans, specifically the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and Bosnia, provided 
the Ottomans’ weapons and gunpowder. The Republic of Ragusa was the only 
Adriatic rival of the Italians in maritime trade. For example, in the Ottoman-Venetian 
war from 1463 to 1479, the Empire’s trade with Venice was cut off for a while. 
Mehmed II, through granting capitulations, continued to trade with Florence. The 
acquisition of Bosnia by the Ottoman forces, in 1463, led to the development of the 
Empire’s commercial relations. By the fifteenth century, the Republic of Ragusa was 
predominantly under the Ottoman sphere of economic influence.593 Later, these 
states were replaced by English, French, and Dutch traders in the Levant trade. 
England, France and The Dutch Reopublic became the main sources of Ottoman 
arms.594  
Gabor Ágoston argues that sufficient evidence in the Ottoman archives challenges 
the Eurocentric and Orientalist views, which claim that the Ottomans’ Islamic 
conservatism prevented the Empire from borrowing Western military inventions and 
technologies.595 On the contrary, the Empire was very receptive to new military 
technologies and innovations. The dispersion of the production and use of 
gunpowder in the realm of Islamic states led to “gunpowder empires,” and the 
Ottomans were no exception.596 Learning from their wars with Europeans, the 
Ottomans continuously revised and renewed their weapons technology and tactics.597 
İnalcık noted that the process of acculturation with Europe was based on and justified 
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by Islam and thus supported by the ulema.  The necessity of borrowing and 
transferring technological and industrial knowledge from Europe, in order to 
strengthen the rule of Islam, was understood and supported by Islamic circles in the 
Empire.  
This acculturation in the military started at the inception of the Empire. For example, 
in 1444, the Ottomans learned from an adversary and adopted the Hussites’ 
Wagenburg war tactic, which had been used in Bohemia during the Hussite Wars 
(1419-1436). The Wagenburg tactic, founded by the Bohemian commander Jan 
Zizka, effectively used war wagons or carts in the battlefield. The war wagons and 
carts, equipped with armed crews, were attached to each other to form a square or 
circular fortification, depending on the landscape of the battlefield. This strategy was 
implemented in two stages: defense and an offensive counterattack. In the first stage, 
the crews stationed on the war wagons or carts used artillery fire to provoke the 
adversary to attack. Once the enemy attack started, the forces hidden behind the 
wagons defended their position with firearms and crossbows, inflicting heavy 
casualties on the adversary. In the second stage, the demoralized enemy was counter-
attacked with heavy shelling from the carts. The infantry and cavalry hidden behind 
the carts attacked the enemy from the flanks, thereby concluding the battle with a 
decisive victory.598 As noted by Ágoston, the Ottomans’ quick adaption of this tactic 
was related to its similarity to Central-Asian war tactics. The Ottomans formed a new 
corps called tabur cengi (the camp battle), composed of wagons called darbuzen, and 
they effectively used this strategy in battles. The Ottoman experts modified this 
system and introduced it to the Safavids and Mughals. The Wagenburg tactic came to 
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be known in the Islamic world as the destur-i Rumi (the Ottoman order of battle).599 
Additionally, Mehmed II, in his siege of Constantinople, used large cannons made by 
a Hungarian engineer named Urban, a specialist in the construction of cannons. This 
innovation in warfare spread throughout Europe. 600 
In the fifteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was clearly superior to its European 
rivals, especially the Hapsburgs and Venetians, in terms of firepower and logistics.601 
Ottoman artillery and engineering were highly developed between the fourteenth and 
sixteenth centuries; hence, Turkish gunpowder and firearms were of much higher 
quality than those of Europe.602 Despite the inconveniences of using technology in 
warfare, due to physical and human constraints,603 the Ottoman weapons industry 
was centralized, unlike European ones. Tophane-i Amire (the Imperial Cannon 
Foundry) was established by Mehmed II in 1453, after the first successful use of 
cannons, and it was the world’s first centralized cannons production facility. Later, 
Tophane-i Amire was extended to produce armory, gunpowder, and naval yards. 
Ágoston describes it as the largest military industrial complex existing in Europe at 
that time.604 
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The Ottomans employed European military experts well before the modernization 
that occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Military experts of Italy, 
France, the Dutch Republic, and England were organized into a separate corps within 
the Ottoman army, known as tayfa-i efrenciye (corps of Europeans).605 Ágoston notes 
that this military acculturation between the Empire and Europeans continued until the 
end of the eighteenth century; this declaration challenges the traditional argument 
that the acculturation ended in the sixteenth century.606 The Ottomans’ acculturation 
policy enabled the Empire to maintain military technology and knowledge that was 
equal to the Europeans’ until the end of the seventeenth century.607  
 
Some scholars have argued that after the Empire reached its peak in the sixteenth 
century, it entered an era of stagnation and decline following its naval defeat at 
İnebahtı (Lepanto - 1571) and the failure of its second siege of Viyana (Vienna - 
1683).608 Contrarily, Jonathan Grant argues that in the realm of arms production, 
transfer, and technological diffusion, the Empire’s “‘decline’ was certainly not 
inexorable.”609 Grant also notes that comparison of the Ottoman military conditions 
to those of Western Europe by considering “civilization” to be the basic of unit of 
evaluation leads to a moral judgment, which distorts the historical conditions. To 
quote Grant: 
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In its broadest application, Ottoman ‘decline’ has served as a negative 
judgment on Islamic society as a whole and its inability to match the 
march of progress and rising power of Western society since the 
seventeenth century. In this instance the unit of comparison is the 
civilization. Such a basis for comparison is ill-chosen because the notion 
that the strength of a civilization can be measured in military success is 
an obviously dubious proposition, as examples of Renaissance Italy or 
the thirteenth-century Mongols make clear.610 
 
Grant adds: 
Besides selecting a vague unit of measure, proponents of the decline 
thesis tend to be rather imprecise about the scale by which they measure 
the Ottoman “decline”… Most often scholars have used the term the 
West or Europe generically, when they actually meant England, France 
and Holland. The use of these western European states as the basis for 
measuring Ottoman military decline has obscured the actual Ottoman 
conditions by placing them in the wrong context. The Ottomans did not 
operate in western Europe, but rather in eastern Europe and the eastern 
Mediterranean. In fact decline is not a useful term at all, because it 
reflects more a moral judgment passed by Europeans convinced of their 
own superiority than an accurate assessment of Ottoman capabilities after 
1571 or 1683.611 
 
 
After placing the Ottoman military technology and armaments industry in Keith 
Krause’s model, which was developed for analyzing the diffusion of military 
technology, Grant concludes that from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century, 
the Ottomans remained at the third tier of the international military production 
hierarchy (i.e., it remained merely an importer, copier, and reproducer of military 
technologies).612 The first tier is formed of the innovator and producer states (e.g., 
England, the low countries, and Sweden); the second tier is formed of adapter and 
exporter states (e.g., Italian city-states); and the third tier comprises states that 
import, copy, and reproduce technologies to create or develop their arms industries 
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(e.g., the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Poland, Hungary, and—from the mid-nineteenth 
century to the early twentieth century— China and Japan).613 
 
One point of Grant’s argument requires clarification. The Ottoman Empire mainly 
operated in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, but it also belonged to the 
Western European international system and balance-of-power politics since 1525. 
The Empire formed alliances with France and the Protestant powers of Europe. 
Moreover, the Ottomans fought many wars on the European continent that changed 
the socio-political structure of the European international system (for example, the 
Great Northern War over the Baltic question, 1700-1722, which shaped the political 
equilibrium in the North).614 The Ottoman Empire rivaled Austria, Spain, Portugal, 
and Russia. Its policies and administration shaped the Southeastern European sub-
regional international system. The Ottoman imprint and legacy are visible in the 
Balkans’ political, economic, and social structures even to this day. Still, considering 
the Ottomans’ military production capabilities (but not their geographical position or 
area of engagement), the Empire belongs in the third tier as an importer and 
reproducer state.   
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In comparison with the states in its tier, the Ottoman Empire was able to provide its 
artillery and firearms domestically. In the eighteenth century, Russia, the Empire’s 
major regional rival, improved its capability by acquiring flintlock firearms. Russia 
also built a navy of galleons rather than galleys. The Ottoman administrators realized 
this after several wars that ended with the Ottoman defeat against Russia 
(specifically after the loss of Crimea), and consequently set about reforming their 
industry and military. They once again became equals with Russia in military 
production levels.615 Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottoman arms industry 
was able to catch up with the high quality of the earlier period. The military reforms 
and recruitment of foreign military and technical experts led to reversal of the 
downward trend and preserved the Empire’s self-sufficiency until the early 
nineteenth century.616 
 
This trend, however, did not extend to the later nineteenth century; the Empire after 
the Crimean War became financially and militarily more dependent on Europe. The 
Empire’s ruling élite were well aware of the need to modernize and reform their 
defense industry; however, arms importation was the most workable option. 
Importing and choosing from among the best European innovators and producers’ 
was, therefore, the policy the Ottomans adopted.617 Over time, however, this policy 
became unfeasible and inefficient. The increasing borrowing by the state from 
European banks (specifically French and British ones) at high interest rates strained 
the weakened Ottoman economy. Renovation of the Ottoman defense and armament 
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sectors was not easy, since it required not only great finance but also foreign 
technical knowledge.618 
 
From 1854 to 1914, the imperial (external and internal) gross borrowing reached 
around 399.5 million Turkish liras. The declining economy, the state borrowing, and 
the trade and production capacity of the Empire took their toll; the Ottomans were 
under the threat of bankruptcy by 1880.619  The fiscal difficulties of the Empire, the 
apparent need of military, political, and socio-economic reforms, the changing 
mindset, and the conscious realization of the changes in the post-Vienna international 
order led to a radical change in war as an institution of Ottoman statecraft. Before 
analyzing and presenting this perceptional change, the next section reviews the basis 
of early Ottoman view of wars and the Euro-Ottoman military acculturation that 
expanded over centuries.  
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Figure 10: Keith Krause’s Model of Military Technological Diffusion 
 
5.1.1.4 The Ottoman Perceptions of War from 1299 to 1789 
 
The Ottoman wars of the early modern era were explained in the context of 
Jihad/ghaza. The Ottomans fought not only against Christendom, but also against 
Muslims—the Turcoman beyliks and other regional Islamic powers rivaling and 
challenging the Ottoman rule as did the Persian Safavids—to protect the Ottoman 
sovereignty and control in Anatolia; that is, to secure the integrity of their realm. 
There were also wars against rival Sunni states, internal dissidents, and dynastic 
rivals. The Jihad and ghaza were used to justify and legitimize the wars in the eyes 
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of the Turcoman-Muslim population and warriors.620 The Ottoman–European wars, 
on the other hand, were not only wars fought to expand and defend the dâr-al-Islam; 
their causes were more complex and pragmatic. For that reason, crediting the 
Ottoman wars solely to Islam is not correct.621 To quote Guilmartin: 
 
Religion, which was a causal mechanism in the Ottoman wars, is of 
limited value in explaining underlying motivation….Religion was a 
causal factor in the wars of the Ottomans, but we cannot be certain of 
what degree it acted in its own right rather than simply as a means of 
legitimizing preexisting conflicts. Although the wars of the Ottoman 
Empire cannot be understood without understanding the religious factors 
involved, their influence must be examined within the total cultural, 
economic, social and political context, not in isolation.622 
 
To be able to analyze the Ottoman approach to war and to what extent Ottoman wars 
can be categorized as Jihad or Ghaza, an in-depth understanding of the Jihad and its 
doctrinal Islamic conceptualization over time is required. The primary reason for 
Jihad was similar to the Christian understanding of Just War, that is, prohibition and 
limitation of wars among Muslims. Jihad is divided into two main categories 
according to Islamic jurisprudence. Al-Jihad al-Akbar (greater Jihad) is the moral 
struggle carried out by peaceful means like preaching and calling to the way of Allāh. 
Al-Jihad al-Akbar is permissible against the al–Mushrikûn (infidels and polytheists). 
Al-Jihad bil Saif (lesser Jihad), on the other hand, refers to the armed struggle 
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against non-believers. The doctrinal development of Al-Jihad bil Saif and its 
interpretation on the verses of Holy Qur’an progressed in four phases. The first phase 
justified the fight against the non-believers of Mecca who treated Muslims unjustly. 
Later, the neighboring cities and countries that treated Muslims unjustly were added. 
In the third phase, there is direct and explicit order to wage war against all al–
Mushrikûn. In the fourth and last phase, the doctrine was developed to include non-
believers and believers who did not hold their pledges to Muslims. The verses of the 
Holy Qur’an on Jihad are: 
To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight) 
because they are wronged and verily, Allāh is Most Powerful for their 
aid. [they are] those who have been expelled from their homes in 
defiance of right [for no cause] except that they say: our Lord is Allāh. 623 
 
Fight in the cause of Allāh those who fight you, but do not transgress 
limits, for Allāh. loveth not transgressors. 624 
 
Fight those who believe not in Allāh nor the Last Day, nor hold that 
forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allāh. and His Prophet, nor 
acknowledge the religion of truth, (even if they are) of the People of the 
Book; until they pay the jizya with willing submission and feel 
themselves subdued.625 
 
In essence, Jihad doctrine first requires the use of all peaceful means, including an 
invitation to embrace Islam. Secondly, it requires that the enemy attack first. Only 
then is waging of a war of self-defense permitted (jus ad bellum). The sparing of 
combatants and civilians and civilian and military objects is also essential in the 
Islamic understanding of war. During the war (jus in bello), torture, treachery, 
perfidy, or killings of an enemy hors de combat are prohibited. The decent treatment 
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of prisoners of war and the wounded is another principle to be followed during the 
war.626 These principles form the basis of Al-Jihad bil Saif.  
 
The misconception of Jihad as religious wars for expanding the abode of Islam also 
leads to incorrect categorization of the Ottoman wars. As noted, forcible conversion 
to Islam is contrary to the notion of the Jihad. For that reason, in the lands they 
conquered, Ottomans tolerated free exercise of the local faiths and religions. The 
Ottomans, however, practiced Jihad al-Akbar by setting up Bektashi Sufi 
zâviyyes/tekkes (dervish convents) and settling the Turcomans in southeastern 
Europe. There were also zâviyyes/tekkes belonging to the Sunni order like Mevlevis, 
Naksibendis, and Kadiris. Among these, Bektashi orders contributed most to spread 
of Islam in the region. To this day, these orders are preserved in Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia, which have significant Muslim populations.  
 
In the early days of the Ottoman beylik and empire, the wars against the Christians 
were justified on the basis of Islam. The first series of wars were fought against the 
Byzantine Empire. The aim of these was to pressure weakening Byzantium by 
controlling its peripheral areas, which stretched from Anatolia to the Balkans.627 In 
these wars, the Christian mercenaries and auxiliary troops played an important role. 
Ever since the Ottomans stepped into the Balkans, they had attracted important 
Christian support, as the Balkan saying reveals: “better the turban of the Turk than 
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the tiara of the pope.”628 Imber, in his analysis of Ottoman texts on Ghaza, argues 
that the words gaza/gazi were used for akın/akıncı, signifying a raid rather than a 
holy war. As noted by Imber and Lowry, the Ottoman akincis were more concerned 
with material achievements than converting Christians to Islam.629 War was seen 
more in material terms: It was a source of wealth and income.630  
 
In written Ottoman sources of this period, ghaza was stipulated as “a way of 
acquiring proper livelihood.”631 Acquisition of new territories and populations meant 
not only power, but also arable rich lands, timars, and taxes. The Ottoman economy 
was predominantly agrarian. The Empire lacked strong industry (except military) and 
labor forces. Lands and taxes were important sources of income for the imperial 
treasury. Non-agricultural sectors like trade, finance, arts, and crafts were in the 
hands of the non-Muslims, though some Muslims and Turks were engaged in trade 
relations. War was therefore a tool of territorial and economic expansion. It was also 
a projection of the power and strength of the Ottomans. It was the way they were 
able to bring together and unite various Muslim and non-Muslim and Turkic and 
non-Turkic groups in their border regions. As noted in Chapter Two, in the early 
modern age, wars were fought for chivalry, dynasticism, religion, and material gains. 
An in-depth study of the crusades from early on also suggests that these wars cannot 
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be categorized as purely holy wars, since the crusaders’ forces were made up of 
poorer segments of Christian societies hoping to achieve wealth and prestige by 
fighting in the East. In this sense, the Ottoman understanding of war was not very 
different from that of the other early modern European states.  
 
It should, however, be noted that the Europeans also justified their major wars with 
the Ottomans on the basis of religion as crusades. When the Ottoman power was 
rising, the Europeans were religiously and politically divided and thus were not able 
to prevent Ottoman expansion.632 The crusades were used to unify the divided 
Europe within a common cause, value, and identity. The perceived Ottoman threat 
led to a new type of crusades, which in definition is closer to the Islamic 
understanding of Jihad. Crusades were no longer regarded as wars to extend the 
realm of Christendom to the distant lands of the East, but as wars to defend 
Christianity against advance of Islam to the borders of Europe. Still, some European 
powers, doubting the sincerity of the Papacy and their allies, hesitated to join the 
crusades.633 The two battles of Kosovo (1389 and 1448),634 and the battle of 
Nicopolis (1396) and Varna (1444) were presented as the defense of Christendom 
against Islam. The Papacy either called for formation of combined Christian forces or 
coordinated these forces. The Ottoman conception of these wars as Jihad/Ghaza was, 
therefore, natural.635  
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The first formally organized crusade against the Ottomans was the Battle of 
Nicopolis. The largest crusader force, combined under the command of the 
Hungarian King Sigismund, French King Charles VI and Burgundian and German 
barons, was defeated. Nicopolis was counted among the most shocking and 
demoralizing defeats in European history. The next crusade organized against the 
Ottomans was gathered on the Byzantine call of aid.636 The Ottoman capture of 
Thessalonica in 1430 and the ensuing naval blockade of Constantinople by Murad II 
alarmed Byzantium. Despite these, the Byzantine call was not that well received in 
Western Europe. France and England were still involved in the Hundred Years war. 
Central Europe and Germany had internal issues.637 The Eastern European forces 
(Poland, Hungary and Wallachia), gathered at Pope Eugenius IV’s call and led by 
John Hunyadi of Transylvania and King Ladislas of Hungary were also defeated.638 
The following fall of Constantinople and Byzantium to the Ottoman assault639 
resulted with new calls for crusades against the Ottoman Empire. The small 
successes on the side of the European powers, such as the saving of Belgrade in 1456 
or the papal occupation of the Greek islands, could not prevent consolidation of 
Ottoman power and rule in the Balkans. The Ottomans now directed their attention to 
the major Christian strongholds in the Mediterranean and southern Italy.640 The 
Ottoman attack on Rhodes met with the strong defense by the Knights Hospitallers 
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belonging to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem stationed on the island.641 The 
southern Italian city of Otranto, however, fell under Ottoman control. The panic 
spreading throughout Italy and Europe led to an immediate call for crusades.  
 
The death of the Mehmed II and the ensuing internal power struggle between his 
sons provided the Europeans a chance to regain Otranto. Francis I of France, Henry 
VIII of England, Maximilian I of German Empire, Charles I of Spain and the 
Netherlands, and Manuel I of Portugal accepted the call of Pope Leo X. The death of 
Emperor Maximilian I, however, disrupted European unity, as European powers 
were plunged into a war of succession.642 During this era, the Ottoman understanding 
of war continued to be legitimized by religion not only against the Christians, but 
also against the rival Shii and Sunni states to protect the unity of the abode of Islam.  
After defeating the Safavids of Iran, Selim I (1512-1520) directed his attention to 
Syria and Egypt. The Ottoman conquest of Egypt brought the empire in conflict with 
the Portuguese, since Egypt had a significant place in Portuguese plans for expansion 
into the Indian Ocean.643 Thereafter, the Ottoman fleet and armed forces engaged in 
rivalry with the Portuguese in India and Arabia. 
 
The Ottomans under Süleyman I (1520-1566) continued to take over European 
strongholds. Many campaigns were conducted in the Balkans and Mediterranean. 
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Belgrade was taken in 1521. The Hospitallers were defeated in Rhodes in 1522. The 
wars with the Spanish Hapsburgs concluded with Ottoman victory. The Hapsburg-
Venetian crusader fleet under the command of Andrea Doria was defeated at the 
Preveze (Prevesa) Naval Battle in 1538. Then in Mohács in 1526, the Christian 
armies once again were decisively defeated. Having failed in three successive 
crusades, the European states realized that the Ottomans were institutionalizing in 
Europe and that they needed to search for new alternatives for dealing with the 
Ottoman threat.644 Two options arose: conversion or coexistence.645 Coexistence and 
conciliation with the Turks had a better chance of succeeding than did conversion, 
based on the favorable trade and alliance relations Europeans had with the 
Ottomans.646 The Ottomans while continuing their wars against the European powers 
started to infiltrate the European balance of power, politics, and diplomacy by 
concluding military alliances with Christian powers in their fight against other 
Christian powers.   
 
The Empire became formally allied with France in its struggle against the Habsburg 
bid for dominance on the continent. Ottoman forces carried out joint campaigns with 
the French against the Habsburg forces. For example, in 1541, Süleyman I was on a 
campaign against Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in Hungary. Meanwhile, the 
famous Ottoman admiral Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa was on a joint naval campaign 
with the French fleet in the Mediterranean (1543–1544). After the joint operations, 
                                               
644McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 40–43. 
645Robert Schwoebel, “Changing Ideas and Ideals in the Sixteenth Century,” Studies in Renaissance, 
12 (1965):164–187. See also Bisaha, Creating East and West.  
646Schwoebel, “Changing Ideas and Ideals,” 166–177. 
  
224 
the Ottoman fleet wintered in Toulon.647 In the literature, this has been presented as 
an exceptional deviation from the general norms and principles of the European 
international system and Christian ethics. Christine Isom-Verhaaren, however, argues 
that such a representation is a distortion of history. She notes that, “the alliance was 
neither an aberration nor regarded as particularly sensational in the sixteenth 
century.”648 The Empire was regarded by its contemporaries as an important actor 
and thus part of the fifteenth and sixteenth century European and Mediterranean 
international system. From the mid-fifteenth to late sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman 
wars were conducted on the basis of raison d’état and political pragmatism, though 
they were still legitimized on the basis of Islam. The wars under the reign of 
Süleyman I were great successes except for the failed sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 
Malta in 1552.  Under Selim II (1566-1575), Murad III (1575-1595), Mehmed III 
(1595-1604), and Ahmed I (1604-1618), the Ottoman power on the battlefield started 
to decline despite a number of successes like the seizure of Chios in 1566 and of 
Cyprus after the defeat at Lepanto in 1571.649 
 
Amira K. Bennison suggests that the Ottoman “championing of faith cannot 
therefore be seen as qualitatively different to Russian support for Orthodox 
Christianity or the Hapsburgs’ leadership of the Holy Roman Empire.”650 Serdar 
Palabıyık, in his analysis of the early wars of the Empire, similarly notes that ghaza 
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“was widely used for the legitimization of mundane wars fought for the 
establishment and consolidation of the Ottoman state.”651 As Lowry noted, the 
Ottomans’ materialistic understanding of war was not one of short-term booty and 
plundering like that of Attila the Hun or the Moguls. The Ottomans established 
imârets (soup kitchens), bridges, mosques, zâviyyes, hans, kervansarays, and 
hammâms in the conquered territories. Hacı Evrenos, the leader of the Ottoman 
akıncı forces that conquered northern Greece, is a good example of this. He was, in 
Lowry’s words, “an accomplished state builder rather than a simple semi-nomadic 
leader intent on the short-term acquisition of slaves and booty.”652 Ottoman history is 
full of similar examples, including Gazi Süleyman Paşa, Gazi Burak, Gazi Mihal, 
and Gazi İsa Bey.  
 
By the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman engagement in wars on two fronts, 
with the Hapsburgs in the West and the Safavids in the East, led to serious defeats. 
The rise of the Duchy of Muscovy as a strong rival in the European international 
system was another complication. Continuous defeats in the long wars of the 
seventeenth century not only led to materials losses, but also to losses of morale and 
prestige. During these years, Ottoman reformist intellectuals like Katip Çelebi, 
İbrahim Müteferrika, Defterdar Sarı Mehmet Paşa, and Giritli Ahmed Resmi Efendi 
all searched for ways to reclaim the glorious days of the Empire. 653 During this era, 
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there was also growing desire for peace—sulhiyye.  In the poems and writings of the 
age, as Palabıyık argues, there was constant praise of peace. From the Treaty of 
Zitvatorok (Zsitvatorok) of 1606, which ended the long-lasting war with the 
Hapsburgs, to the French Revolution, Ottomans retreated from the idea of war.  
 
5.1.1.5 The Ottoman Military Modernization and Acculturation  
 
The first series of reforms began in the military. These reforms were caused by 
internal and external factors. The defeat of Ottoman forces in successive wars against 
European powers and the loss of important territories coupled with internal political 
and social decentralization led to restorative and radical reformist thinking in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
 
Avigdor Levy notes that the early military reformist thinking was essentially 
restorative; that is, they were proposed to strengthen the imperial central 
administration through reformed armed forces to reestablish order and to safeguard 
the sovereignty of the Empire against its enemies.654 The most famous these were 
Koçu Bey, Kâtib Çelebi, and Nâima. Pointing out the inefficiency in the military and 
administration, these Ottoman writers argued in favor of restoring the central power 
and military discipline to re-gain the power and prestige of the Empire among great 
powers. 
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As noted, the backbone of the Ottoman military organization was the Janissaries and 
the Timarli Sipahis. Over time, corps lost their ordering principles and became 
corrupt. The Janissary corps, which mainly had been made up of devshirme converts 
who were subjected to strict training, were highly disciplined and admirably devoted 
to the absolute rule of the Sultans, eventually was filled with ordinary jobless 
Muslim civilians and peasants. Since they were not professional soldiers, these 
civilians were more concerned with their privileges. Because of administrative laxity, 
Timariots, on the other hand, were given to non-military purposes. Moreover, the 
timar holders and sipahis, who were supposed to be ready for war, became involved 
in trade and other businesses rather than military training and preparation. The two 
main corps of the army, which had brought it so many successes, were undisciplined 
and disintegrated. Coupled with the burden on the treasury, the Ottoman military 
capability was in decline.  
 
The first reforms began under the reign of Sultan Murad IV (1623-1649), followed 
by those of the grand viziers—the Köprülü family (1656-1702)—were effective. 
Central administrative control over the frontal and peripheral areas was re-
established, while the military was brought under strict discipline and training. By 
the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the Ottoman loss of territories to 
the north of the Danube to Austria and then the loss of its control of the Black Sea to 
Russia made it clear that reactionary restorative reforms were not enough.  
 
Carl Max Kortepeter notes that the years between the Peace Treaty of Belgrade in 
1739 and the Ottoman Russian war of 1768 was “the real test of whether or not the 
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Ottoman state would respond to the Age of Reason in the military field.”655 During 
the Ottoman military modernization, technological and tactical acculturation with 
Europe increased. The first European expert serving in the Empire was Comte 
Claude Alexander de Bonneval. Bonneval was able to modernize the Humbaraci 
corps into modern artillery corps. He came to be known as Humbaraci Ahmet Paşa.  
Bonneval also established engineering and gunnery schools.  He was followed by 
Baron de Tott, who formed an artillery regiment know as Süratçi. The continuing 
Ottoman defeats required more extensive and radical reforms.656  
 
Inspired by Koca Yusuf Paşa’s guard of captives in the Russian campaign of 1791, 
Selim III decided to establish a new corps trained along western lines. Nizam-ı Cedid 
and (new army – order) were based on completely new thinking, despite their failure 
as a reform process; they represented a departure from the conservative reformist 
thinking of earlier times, which revolved around reviving the classical institutions. 
Nizam-ı Cedid army was a “nucleus” of a larger project. This new corps was 
recruited from unemployed Turks and German and Russian renegades. The major 
problem was the antagonistic reaction to the corps of the conservative forces of the 
army—janissaries and the society—the ulema. Despite plans for forming a 
completely separate force under separate command, the Nizam-ı Cedid corps was put 
under the Bostanniyan-ı Hassa corps, the élite infantry guard. A separate treasury to 
support equipment and training of the corps was founded under the name Irad-ı 
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Cedid. The new corps started training in Levend Çiftlik.657 Its first test came with the 
French invasion of Egypt in 1798; the success of these forces of Selim III enlarged 
the forces. The overthrow of the Sultan in 1807 by conservatives led to the 
dissolution of the corps.  
 
Mahmut II attempted a more radical and controversial remodeling of the army 
modeled on the Prussian and Russian systems, but he met with violent opposition by 
the janissary corps. He forcibly suppressed the janissaries; this event is known as the 
Vaka-i Hayriye. Once the major obstacle to reforms was cleared, he continued to 
reform of the army along Prussian lines. The ultimate aim of these reforms was to 
strengthen the central state by building of a modern army and modern governance.658 
These radical reforms required financing well beyond the limits of the Ottoman 
treasury. Since the imperial economy depended on taxation, money could only be 
generated by reforming the taxation system and the central and provincial 
bureaucracy. Additionally, improved communications and transportation networks 
were required to extend government control. Educated and professionalized civil and 
army personnel were other important aspects of the reforms.659 Military hierarchy 
was also reorganized. The Sultan assumed full power to appoint the head of the new 
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Mansure troops Serasker (the commander in chief). This transformation terminated 
the traditional autonomy of the different corps in the Ottoman army and assured the 
political power of the Sultan. In a way, the Nizam-i Cedid army was revived under a 
new name, Sekban-ı Cedid, and then by Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i 
Muhammediye.660 The changing international system and the European powers’ 
move toward society proved that reform in the military was not enough to protect the 
Empire against new threats. It was evident that the Empire needed to adapt itself to 
the changes in Europe.  
 
5.1.1.6 The Ottoman Perceptions of War from 1789 to 1856 
 
During 1600s and 1700s, Ottomans, exhausted due to wars, visualized war 
negatively. War was no longer seen as a viable option or tool to achieve the Imperial 
interests. In the 1800s, the Porte carefully followed the change in the European inter-
state system into a society of states under the supervision of the Great Powers. They 
realized that they had to be a part of this change, and to do that they had to change as 
well. There was a considerable change in the Ottoman understanding – a move from 
security through power to security through order. This shift becomes clear in the 
writings of the reformist élite and specifically in those of the Mehmed Sadık Rıfat 
Paşa.  
 
Mehmed Sadık Rifat Paşa held important positions in the Tanzimat era such as the 
Undersecretary of the State for Foreign Affairs (Amedi Vekili). In his draft of 
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reforms, he noted that European-style reforms were essential for the Empire since the 
European system had been altered. In his analysis, the newly enforced European 
inter-state system after the Congress of Vienna was defined as a “civilization” 
(sivilizasyon). According to Mehmed Sadık Rifat Paşa, this new conception directed 
by the Great Powers was not only aimed at preserving peaceful and orderly relations 
between European powers, but also at limiting the destruction of wars.661 The 
Ottoman Turkish translation of sivilizasyon, if interpreted in terms of the ES 
theoretical understanding, gets close to Bull’s conception of an international society. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottomans tried to resolve internal and 
external conflicts by peaceful means and to avoid wars at all costs. When wars 
proved to be inevitable, the Ottoman ruling élite either tried to assure support of one 
or more powers through concluding short-term flexible military alliances, acted in 
concert, or used strategic retreat. The protection of its sovereignty and the prevention 
of foreign intervention on behalf of its Christian community were the major concerns 
of the Empire. The reformist élites’ strong belief in the reform process and its smooth 
progress without interruption can be counted as other reasons for the Ottoman 
preference of peaceful means over war. Another important departure from the earlier 
periods was the legitimization of wars on European public law. 
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5.1.1.6.1 Avoiding Wars at All Costs: French Occupation of Egypt 
 
The Ottoman policy of avoiding wars becomes evident in the French occupation of 
Egypt. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, contrary to Ottoman expectations, 
the major threat to the integrity of the Empire came from the Empire’s old esteemed 
ally – France  and not from Russia.662 The Ottoman élite used all possible 
diplomatic means to resolve the conflict without use of force, but the deliberate 
French act of aggression made war unavoidable.  
 
The Ottoman administration, alarmed by the rumors of the French involvement in the 
Balkans and settlement in the Ionian Islands, tried to find out the truth about the 
French naval preparations at Toulon through use of its intelligence networks and 
diplomats abroad.663 Despite assurances given by the representative of Russia on the 
reliability of the information, the Ottoman administration preferred to wait until the 
French acted. The Ottomans were expecting the French to occupy Albania, while the 
British were expecting an attack on the British Isles.664  
 
On 21 July 1798, Seyyid Âli Efendi, Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, met with the 
French Foreign Minister Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. He informed 
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Talleyrand that the Empire could not remain indifferent to any act of aggression 
within its borders. Talleyrand assured Seyyid Âli Efendi that as long-time allies they 
would not act against the Porte. He also told Seyyid Âli Efendi that the French navy 
was prepared to occupy the island of Malta, which had become a pirate base in the 
Mediterranean.665 In his conversations with Talleyrand, Âli Efendi was convinced 
that the French were speaking the truth.666  
 
Meanwhile, the French chargé d’affairs in Istanbul was invited to the house of Âtıf 
Efendi, the Reis-ül Küttab, on receipt of the information that the Directory was 
recruiting personnel with knowledge of Arabic in the French force in Toulon. The 
French chargé d’affairs affirmed Ottoman suspicions about the recruitment of Arabic 
speakers in the French force in Toulon. By referring to the complaints made by 
French merchants against the Memlük Beys and the commercial importance of Egypt 
for France, he personally noted that there was a likelihood that the French navy 
might be heading to Egypt. The Reis Efendi, in response, reminded him that the 
international code of conduct and respect between states required the State of France 
to direct its complaints to the Porte. He added that had this been done, Porte would 
have punished those who were guilty. While these conversations were going on, the 
French expeditionary force under the direction of Napoleon Bonaparte was already 
on its way to Egypt.  
 
In 1798, the French force consisting of 35,000 men seized the control of Egypt. This 
deliberate act of aggression in violation of international law and conduct needed a 
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strong response. The Porte, however, postponed the declaration of war until it had 
secured strong European allies and prepared its military. 667  Selim III negotiated with 
Britain and Russia. Even after the deliberate act of aggression, some members of the 
Ottoman ruling élite favored a peaceful diplomatic arrangement over war. 
Particularly, the Vezir-i Âzam and Seyh-ül İslam supported this view.668 The 
representatives of Prussia, Russia, Austria and Britain were informed of the situation. 
Austria, despite its peace with France, guaranteed its neutrality. The British urged the 
Porte to cut off its diplomatic ties with France and its Embassy in Istanbul. The 
relations between the two states were frozen, and the French citizens were confined 
to their homes until events calmed. 669 After the British fleet, under the command of 
Admiral Nelson, defeated the French fleet stationed in the Bay of Aboukir, the Porte 
decided to officially declare war. The involvement of envoys from Holland, Spain, 
Austria and Sweden led to its delay.670 This time, Russia, intending to force the Porte 
to declare war, anchored its navy in Istanbul. The Ottoman declaration (beyanname) 
of war against France written by Reis-ül Küttab, Âtıf Efendi was justified on the basis 
of European norms and international law.671 This was a serious deviation from the 
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was basically to take revenge upon Memlük Kölemen Beys (against their ill-treatment of the French 
merchants and subjects residing in Egypt) and to cut off British trade with India was considered to be 
a pretext. The punishment of Beys is our job and right, not theirs. Britain, on the other side, is our ally 
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Ottoman classical tradition of legitimization on the basis of Jihad. The Porte also 
demanded the support of other states by proclaiming that this kind of an act of 
aggression should be considered not only contrary to the established inter-state law, 
but also a violation of the general (international) peace and order.672 In 1801, 
combined Ottoman (Nizam-ı Cedid) and British forces defeated the French in Egypt.  
 
Throughout the crisis, Selim III tried to thwart the French occupation through use of 
diplomacy and negotiation. The French seizure of Egypt, however, once again 
caused the Porte to take refugee in balance of power politics and Great Power 
alliances. Despite the fact that there was a deliberate act of aggression  violation of 
international law and infringement of the rights of the Ottoman State  highest-
ranking officials at the Porte favored resolution of the conflict through diplomatic 
means. As pointed out by Finkel, during these years peace gained popularity and 
acceptance over war in the Porte.673  It was likely that the Porte would have opted for 
conciliation if there had not been strong British and Russian pressure.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
and friend. Alhough, at the beginning, Monsieur Ruffin refused to have any information on the issue, 
later he accepted that he had known the intentions of his country and gave us a copy of the original 
instruction he received from his government. Monsieur Talleyrand, (the French foreign minister) 
deceived our Ambassador in Paris, Âli Efendi. In advance, the Porte informed the French that if they 
attacked Egypt, this would be considered an unfriendly act and a reason to go to war (casus belli) by 
our side. Under these conditions, the Porte declared war and all French diplomatic personnel unless 
otherwise stated will reside in the Seven Towers.” See Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız 
Diplomasi Münasebetleri, 244–245 (translation from Turkish to English is mine). 
672Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri, 245. 
673Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 425. 
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5.1.1.6.2 Preventing Foreign Interference in Internal Uprisings: Serbia and 
Greece 
 
The 1804 local insurrection broke out among the Serbs of Belgrade under Ottoman 
rule.  In the nineteenth century, Ottoman central control over peripheral and frontal 
areas decreased immensely. The unlawful janissary corps called yamaks and dayıs 
acted autonomously. At the beginning of the Serbian uprisings, the Porte followed a 
conciliatory approach. The peaceful resolution of the conflict was more favorable to 
the Empire. The Sultan, accepting the complaints of his Serbian subjects, tried to 
ameliorate the situation through use of classical methods like changing the 
administrators, declaring amnesty, increasing the subjects’ rights or forbidding the 
entry of the yamaks to Belgrade. When these did not work out, the Sultan applied a 
different policy. The international context and balance of power politics toughened 
the position of the Empire. The Ottomans regarded the Serbian uprising as an 
internal matter and were very sensitive about any kind of foreign intervention in their 
affairs. Selim III did not want to count on any foreign power. For example, in 1806 
he refused the Austrian proposal of mediation by Archduke Karl.674 Meanwhile, the 
Tsar demanded that the Sultan conclude a strict military alliance with Russia and 
place his Orthodox–Christian subjects under his formal protection.675 This was also 
refused. Thereafter, “the non-interference in internal affairs” as a principle of 
                                               
674Harvey L. Dyck, “New Serbia and the Origins of the Eastern Question, 1751–55: A Habsburg 
Perspective,” Russian Review, 40 (1981):1–19; Lawrence P. Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising 
(1804–1813) and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Eastern Question,” Slavic Review, 37  
(1978):422–423; Stanford Shaw, “The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising 1804–1807,” in The 
First Serbian Uprising, 1804–1813, ed. W. S. Vucinich, (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), 
71–94. 
675J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question—An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940), 181; Barbara Jelavich, History of The Balkans  Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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international law was highly pronounced by the Ottoman élite. The Sultan, by taking 
into consideration the general balance of power between the Great Powers of Europe 
and the local (regional) balance of power in Serbia (between the Serbian militia and 
ayan – yamak forces), decided to arm Serbs and allied his forces with those of the 
local Serbian militia against unlawful janissaries. In other words, he carefully 
exploited the rivalries between internal and external dynamics to achieve his ends. 
His aim was to restore order and suppress the powerful opposition of his internal and 
external rivals, the janissaries and Russia, respectively.  
 
The localized movement transformed into general uprising against the regime of the 
Sultan.676 The Serbs, inspired by Franco-Russian provocation, turned against the 
Porte. As the Serbs gained success in their fight, Djordje Petrovic (Karageorge), as 
the leader of the revolt, desired to safeguard Serbian autonomy with foreign support. 
Serbian leadership appealed to St. Petersburg and Vienna.677 The Serbian appeal was 
not welcomed by the two powers that had particular interests at stake.678 In 1801, the 
Ottoman Nizam-ı Cedid forces’ victory against the French in Egypt enabled 
concentration on Serbia. The Sultan, concerned about foreign involvement, decided 
                                               
676Shaw, “The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising 1804-1807,” 78; Branimir M. Janković, The 
Balkans in International Relations, trans. Margot and Boško Milosavljević, (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1988); Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813),” 422–423. 
677Jelavich, History of The Balkans, 197 
678A Septinsular Republic under joint Russian-Turkish control was established in the Ionian Islands. 
Russia was in an advantageous position as it was given important concessions in the Danubian 
Principalities by Selim III, in line with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774). Tsar Alexander I neither 
desired to be in conflict with the Ottomans nor lose the confidence of its co-religionist Serbs. So, they 
refused to assist Serbs in their war against the Sultan. A peaceful resolution of the issue was also more 
favorable to Austria. Hapsburgs preferred the continuance of the Ottoman rule rather than the 
establishment of a semi-autonomous or independent Serbia. Emperor Francis I refused Serb appeals 
for military-political aid and declared neutrality. See Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 246; 
Janković, The Balkans in International Relations, 60–61; and Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising 
(1804–1813)”, 422 –423. 
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to resolve the issue tout court, through use of force.679  Meanwhile, all powers having 
interest in the matter played it out in line with their interests. The French, trying to 
draw the Porte on its side, provoked the Sultan against Russia.680 Among European 
powers, only Britain did not have direct interest in the Serbian question; the British 
Ambassador at the Porte, Sir Charles Arbuthnot, supported peaceful resolution of the 
conflict.681 This was the preferable solution on the Ottoman side as well. The Porte 
tried to reach an agreement with the Serbs. On the negotiations held at Zemun in 
May 1804, the Ottomans accepted the majority of the Serbian demands.682 Selim II 
preferred to resolve the issue before it attracted more foreign intervention. The 
increasing demands of the Serbs, however, prevented the possibility of peace. The 
Serbian demand of a foreign power guarantee for the fulfillment of Ottoman 
promises was unacceptable for the Porte as it would be infringing Ottoman 
sovereignty. In the first phase of the uprisings, the order could not be restored.  
 
By 1806, the international context and balance of power started to be shaped in favor 
of the Serbs. Having no other option, the Porte once again allied with Napoleonic 
France. The new sultan succeeding Selim III, Mustafa IV, stood firm on the issue and 
refused any conciliatory move towards Serbs.  While the Napoleonic France’s bid for 
                                               
679 Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 198. 
680 Paul F. Shupp, The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question, 1806–1807, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1931), 73–74.  
681Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813),” 423. 
682Serbs demanded: “the dayis to be deprived of power; the yamaks to be forbidden to hold any 
property outside the cities; the Sultan to officially pardon the Serbs for all their acts and to issue 
fermans forbidding Ottoman officials from punishing them once order was restored; the Ottoman 
governors to accept elected knezes as leaders of the rayas and an elected chief knez to represent the 
Serbs to the Ottoman authorities;  the knezes to collect taxes only and the Sultan to avoid arbitrary 
taxes; the Sultan to guarantee the free exercise of religion and the right to repair all churches and 
monasteries; the Sultan to abolish taxes and other artificial barriers to free trade and communication 
within Serbia.” Shaw, “The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising 1804–1807,” 78–79. 
682Shaw, “The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising 1804-1807,” 78–84. 
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hegemony kept European Great Powers occupied, Mahmud II replaced Mustafa IV 
in 1809, and the Porte negotiated with the Serbian leadership. Restoration of peace in 
the region was one of the priorities of the new Sultan. An amnesty was declared and 
those Serb leaders who returned were appointed as knezes. For a while, events were 
pacified. Miloš Obrenović rivaled Karageorge and became the oborknez 
(administrator) of three major districts. The Ottoman forces left in the region were 
less than those of the Serbs who were still armed. The reign of terror that continued 
for years broke the bonds and trust between Muslims and Christians living in 
Serbia.683 The second revolt, led by Milos, took place in 1815. The changing 
conditions and balance of power favored the Serbs. The defeat of Napoleon in 1815 
enforced Sultan Mahmud II to declare Serbia autonomous. Maraşlı Ali Paşa, the vali 
of Rumeli (the governor of Rumelia), negotiated with the Serbs. The settlement 
resolved a number of problems dating since 1804. Serbs were granted full amnesty, 
as well as the right to collect their taxes, to bear arms, to travel and trade. A Serbian 
national skupstina was established, and Milos became the supreme knez (prince) of 
Serbia. On Milos’s demand, the Sultan reestablished the Serbian Orthodox Church 
and the Serbian bishopric, which had been integrated into the Greek Church. A 
semiautonomous Serbia was recognized.684 
 
Throughout the Serbian uprisings, the Porte, at intervals, applied a conciliatory 
approach. At the beginning of the first Serbian uprising, the major concern for the 
Sultan was the immediate suppression of disobedient yamaks and ayans. As it was 
considered an internal problem, the direct response was the use of force. The Sultan 
                                               
683Jelavich, History of The Balkans, 202. 
684Jelavich, History of The Balkans, 203. 
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used the local balance of power and allied his forces with those of the Serbs. Then 
when the Serbs attacked the Porte, while it was busy with France in Egypt, the Sultan 
pacified his relations with the yamaks-ayans and used them against the rebellious 
Serbs. The internationalization of the issue left the Empire with no option other than 
returning to the general balance of power between Great Powers, given that those 
powers had started to play off Serbs according to their interests at the Porte. The 
Ottoman success together with its allies, Russia and Britain, over France in Egypt 
was a major relief for the Empire. The Sultan searched for a European ally. As a 
result of the pacification of its relations with France, the Sultan allied his Empire 
with that of Napoleon. This alliance and conflicting interests over Serbia brought the 
Porte on opposite camps with its former allies, Russia and Britain. The Sultan offered 
resolution of the conflict through negotiations and diplomacy, to avoid further 
internationalization of the issue. The Serbs refused all. No option was left then but 
the use of military power. Over the years, the question of the Serbian uprising 
remained on the agenda of the Great Powers. Owing to the significantly altered 
international system and order, the Empire agreed first on a semi-autonomous Serbia 
and then on an autonomous Serbia. The Ottomans combined use of the institutions 
was remarkable (the balance between local and general power, diplomacy and war), 
although, in the end, the Porte lost its complete control over Serbia. At least these 
primary institutions enabled the Porte to prolong the loss of Serbia and to re-establish 
order for a while. The Porte now had to deal with a more urgent and complicated 
issue, the Greek Question. 
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The Greek insurgence of 1821 was a more organized movement. A Greek aristocrat 
called Hypsilanti who was the Russian Tsar’s aide-de-camp and the head of a secret 
society of the Greeks named Filike Eteria (or Philike Hetairia, the Society of 
Friends) started it. According to the plan of the Philike Hetairia, the uprisings were 
to take place in three different regions: Moldavia and Wallachia (in Romania), the 
Morea, and finally in Istanbul.685 The European Great Powers intervention on the 
side of the revolutionaries led to the internationalization of the Greek issue.686 
 
Like the Serbian uprisings, the Porte viewed the Greek insurgence as an internal 
matter and sought to resolve it on its own. This was a classical approach, but from 
the Ottoman point of view, all revolts among its non-Muslim subjects were 
considered to be internal affairs. To restore order, the Porte changed administrators 
and decreased taxes. When these measures were not effective, to re-establish order 
and security in the region, the Porte tried to suppress the revolutionaries through use 
of force. The Ottoman Empire was acting in line with the common and consented 
law of the nations and principles of the Concert that stipulated the right of legitimate 
governments to suppress revolutions. This time, the Great Powers of Europe, to 
protect their interests, intervened. Having recently resolved the issue of Napoleon 
and reestablished the international order that had been overthrown by France, they 
desired to preserve the status quo. Throughout the crisis, the European powers 
                                               
685For the details of the Greek rebellion and the Eastern Question in general, see Douglas Dankin, The 
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followed a delicate “balance of diplomacy” along with “balance of power.” Greece 
and the Ottoman Empire were strategically important for the preservation of the 
European international society and order. Any kind of change in this region could 
challenge and threaten the political and economic interests of the Concert Powers.  
 
As the fighting intensified between the Turks and Greeks, the Russian Tsar, 
Alexander I, demanded that he be allowed to intervene for the protection of his 
Orthodox Christian fellows. As pointed out by Erik J. Zürcher, “Tsar Alexander, one 
of the principal architects of the international order established in 1815, set too much 
store by the international ‘system’ to intervene unilaterally against the wishes of the 
other powers.”687 The Greek crisis posed a serious threat to the general peace of 
Europe. Metternich worked to prevent any power, especially Russia, from 
unilaterally interfering on behalf of the Greeks. The British had commercial and 
strategic interests involved. They convinced the Tsar that his interests would be best 
served if the Ottoman Empire and the existing system were preserved. The Tsar 
agreed with them and did not interfere. The new Tsar, Nicholas I, the brother of 
Alexander I, initiated a change in the Russian foreign policy. At this time, the 
Ottoman Sultan asked for the help of his nominal vassal, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, 
the governor of Egypt.688 Mehmet Ali Paşa had a strong army and navy. The Sultan 
was aware of Mehmet Ali Paşa’s desire for autonomy, but, for the time being, he 
needed his help, and he was the strongest among the Sultan’s local powers. In this 
way, the Sultan hoped not only to appease him, but also to control him for a while. 
Mehmet Ali Paşa sent his son İbrahim Paşa to suppress the Greek revolt in Morea, 
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for which he was promised by the Sultan the island of Crete. İbrahim Paşa 
successfully put down the revolt. Once more, Russia was prevented from interfering 
unilaterally.689 The British called for a concerted act against the Ottomans.690 
Austria, suspicious of both Russia and Britain, remained opposed to any intervention 
in Ottoman internal affairs. The French, on the other hand, also wanted to play a role 
in the Near East to protect its financial and strategic interests. It formally joined the 
Anglo-Russian partnership in 1827. The three powers sent an ultimatum to the Porte. 
The Ottomans’ refusal resulted in the European blockade of the Morea peninsula and 
burning of the Egyptian-Ottoman fleet at Navarino.691  
 
The Ottoman government, in response, repudiated the Convention of Akkerman 
(1826) with Russia. The last phase of the revolt was characterized by the Russo-
Turkish War of 18281830. The war lasted until the Ottomans were obliged to sign 
peace in 1829.692 The Treaty of Edirne (Adrinople) reaffirmed the provisions of the 
Convention of Akkerman,693 and the Porte was forced to recognize Greek autonomy. 
Finally, in 1830 the New London Protocol provided the establishment of a totally 
independent Greek state, and two years later the allies brought Prince Otto of Bavaria 
to the throne of Greece.694  
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During the Greek revolution, all the Great Powers except Prussia in one way or 
another had rivaling and conflicting geo-strategic interests in the Ottoman Empire 
and the Balkans. The major source of contention among these powers was the 
question of Russia. They mitigated the conflict by use of multilateral diplomacy and 
joint use of force (collective security).695 In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman 
Empire, like Austria, continued to be an ardent supporter of the principle of non-
interference. In this case, the role played by the Great Powers, the multilateral 
diplomacy, and their joint use of force against another sovereign Great Power 
(though declining) is exemplary because, according to Nicholas Onuf, this “repeated 
intervention in Turkey had produced a ‘special custom’ as an exception to the 
general rule of non-intervention.”696 The European powers’ political or military 
intervention in Ottoman territories was regarded as deliberate violation of 
international law and infringement of the Porte’s sovereign rights.  
 
5.1.1.6.3 Concerted Intervention: The Egyptian, Lebanese and Holy Places 
Crises 
 
The first and second Egyptian crises between 1831 and 1841 were, in the modern 
sense, civil wars resulting from the claims of Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa against his 
nominal ruler, Mahmud II. In the words of Schroeder, “The Near Eastern crises of 
                                               
695Benjamin Miller and Karina Kagan, “The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era,” International Studies 
Quarterly, 41 (1997):66 –68. 
696 Nicholas Onuf, “Humanitarian Intervention: The Early Years” (paper presented at the Center for 
Global Peace and Conflict Studies Symposium on the Norms and Ethics of Humanitarian 
Intervention, University of California, Irvine, California, May 5, 2000), 
www.socsci.uc.edu/qpacs/onufhumanitarain.pdf. 
  
245 
the 1830s seemed like those in Spain and Portugal: the product of a civil war within 
the Ottoman Empire complicated by great-power contests for influence in it.”697 He 
also added that the Eastern one differed on one major point as it “put both the 
Ottoman Empire and the European equilibrium at risk.”698 Encouraged by the 
weakness of the Ottoman Empire during the Greek Revolution and disappointed by 
his gains in support of the Empire, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa decided to overthrow 
the Sultan. In 1831, Mehmet Ali699 attacked Syria. The French, with the Drovetti 
Project,700 supported Mehmet Ali. The Drovetti Project was a plan drafted by the 
French in cooperation with Mehmet Ali aimed at establishment of a joint rule over 
Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli.701 The French, on the other hand, being afraid of 
unilateral Russian intervention, urged the British to save the Ottoman Empire.702 The 
French played a double-sided policy.703 Mehmet Ali’s forces under the command of 
his son Ibrahim Paşa were successful. Mahmud II’s forces were defeated at Nizip on 
June 24, 1839. The rising Egypt was a threat to Ottoman and European integrity. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the European international society of the nineteenth 
century was established to preserve the common interests of the five Great Powers 
and the status quo and to prevent self aggrandizement by one power at the expense of 
others. The European balance of power was the fundamental primary institution upon 
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which the other four primary institutions were built.704 This delicate balance was 
achieved by combined mechanics of alliances, diplomacy, arbitration, military 
intervention and reciprocal compensation (or “proportional aggrandizement” in the 
words of Gulick)705. In one way or another, all of these were closely tied to the 
protection of the Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.  
 
The Sublime Porte made use of the primary institutions of the European international 
society simultaneously rather than searching for a unilateral or diplomatic bilateral 
solution. It acted in concert with the interested Great Powers.  The Sultan, on the one 
hand, approached Britain, France and Russia to resolve the issue through diplomacy 
with bilateral alliances or arbitration. The Ottomans also requested a concerted 
diplomacy or military action to reestablish law and order.  On the other hand, the 
Porte was prepared for a unilateral military intervention. This was a diversion from 
the Ottoman attachment to the principle of “non-intervention in its internal affairs.” 
The Porte and the Sultan preferred and requested European involvement in the 
approaching crisis by putting aside their concerns about foreign interference in the 
Empire’s internal affairs. Mahmud II tried to exploit the European local balance of 
power as much as he could.  From the Ottoman viewpoint, Prussia was considered to 
be too disinterested and militarily weak to influence the course of the events. Austria 
seemed agreeable, but did not have a strong navy and fleet. France was among the 
preferable choices, but its well-known connections to and diplomatic support of 
Mehmet Ali drew it out of consideration. The only options left to the Porte were two 
diplomatically and politically influential European states with strong military and 
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naval power: Britain and Russia. First Britain was to be called; in case the British 
refused to be intermingled in the Egyptian affair, then the Porte would appeal to 
Russia.706 The Ottoman appeal conveyed by its Ambassador in London, Namık Paşa, 
was declined.707 Still Namık Paşa tried to draw the British to the side of the Empire 
over the French occupation of Algiers. The British Foreign Minister and Prime 
Minister responded that it was not the right time to discuss the matter as they were 
occupied with insurrections in Portugal and Belgium. The British King in his 
response reiterated his concerns over growing relations between the Porte and 
Russia. Namık Paşa responded by saying that the Porte was also aware of the danger 
posed by Russia to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, but under the 
circumstances the Russian offer of help could not be overlooked by either the Sultan 
or by the Porte.708 The issue of Algiers was also brought to the attention of the 
French by Mustafa Reşit Paşa, the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris; however, this 
effort was met with disinterest.709 
 
Mahmud II, informed of the result of his negotiations in London, decided to play off 
the European powers against each other.710 The Sultan’s intention was not to accept 
the Russian help but to change the international circumstances to his favor and to 
bring the Egyptian case to the European agenda. Namık Paşa visited France and 
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continued his search for an ally there.711 Ibrahim’s forces advanced toward Anatolia 
and occupied Kütahya in 1833. The Porte continued with its overtures to curb the 
French support to Egypt. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured the Porte 
that they would intervene if İbrahim did not stop at Adana. The French navy was 
already dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the Ottoman forces under 
Reşit Mehmet Paşa were almost destroyed by those of İbrahim.712 The French 
offered their unilateral mediation to the Porte via their chargé d’affaires in Istanbul, 
Monsieur de Varennes. The Sultan welcomed this offer, and the French intervened 
diplomatically on behalf of the Ottomans, but Mehmet Ali refused to collaborate.713 
 
Russia, informed of the result of the Ottoman approaches in London, renewed its 
offer this time officially through the Tsar’s envoy General Muraviev. The Tsar 
declared the Viceroy of Egypt a rebel against his ruler and offered his help and full 
support to the Sultan in this matter. Mahmud II was concerned over the real Russian 
intentions and rejected the Russian offer. However, he kept the rejection secret since 
the French, concerned about growing Russian influence over the Porte, were trying 
to resolve the issue through the arbitration of the French emissary, Vice Admiral 
Baron de Roussin.714 
 
The Sultan also preferred resolution of the conflict through third-party mediation and 
negotiation, but the third-party efforts of the French, the Russian and the Porte’s 
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envoys (Halil Rıfat Paşa and Reşit Bey) failed.715 Mehmet Ali refused to concede 
and threatened the Porte with marching his forces to Istanbul if his wishes were not 
accepted.  Mahmud II appealed to Russia, and on February 20, 1833 the Russian fleet 
anchored in the Bosporus. The Russian troops also moved into the Danubian 
principalities. On July 8, 1833 the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi was concluded between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire. It was a defensive alliance but 
“practically made [the Porte] a feudatory of the Czar.”716 The majority of the 
European Great Powers saw the OttomanRussian treaty as a threatening advance on 
the side of Russia. The rumors that the Ottoman Empire had become a protégé of St. 
Petersburg alarmed all powers.717 
 
Britain and France718 were anxious over the freedom of passage of the Russian 
warships through the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean at all times, making Russia 
                                               
715Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, 100–101. 
716Duggan, The Eastern Question, 85 (parenthesis added and mine). 
717The most contested articles of this treaty were Article 3 and its separate article. “Article 3: In 
consequence of the principle of conservation and mutual defense, which is the basis of the present 
Treaty of Alliance, and by reason of a most sincere desire of securing the permanence, maintenance 
and entire independence of the Sublime Porte, his majesty the Emperor of all Russians, in the event of 
circumstances occurring which should again determine the Sublime Porte to call for the naval and 
military assistance of Russia… engages to furnish, by land and by sea, as many troops and forces as 
the two high contracting parties may deem necessary. It is accordingly agreed, that in this case the 
land and sea forces, whose aid the Sublime Porte may call for, shall be held at its disposal. Separate 
Article: In virtue of one of the clauses of the first Article of the Patent Treaty of Defensive Alliance 
concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two high contracting 
parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance 
for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, as his majesty the Emperor of all the 
Russians, wishing to spare the sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be 
occasioned to it, by affording substantial aid , will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place 
the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in the place of the 
aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the patent 
Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the strait of the 
Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any 
pretext whatsoever. The present Separate and Secret article shall have the same force and value as if it 
was inserted word for word in the Treaty of Alliance of this day.” See M. S. Anderson. ed., The Great 
Powers and the Near East 1774-1922 - Documents of Modern History, (London: Edward Arnold, 
1970), 42–44.  
718See Duggan, The Eastern Question, 85; Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 34–35. 
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invincible at war. Further explanations were demanded by London and Paris of the 
secret clause of the alliance treaty. Another Great Power mediation attempt was 
carried out by Austrian, British and French ambassadors. The Sultan accepted a 
settlement over Syria but refused to give Kilikya (Cilicia) to Mehmet Ali. The Porte 
accepted to act in cooperation with the Concert Powers and requested them to 
negotiate a peace treaty with Mehmet Ali on its behalf. This was a remarkable move 
for the Porte, which signaled a greater convergence of the European and Ottoman 
interests. A Convention was signed in 1840 which offered international guarantees 
for the Ottoman integrity. The peace proposals of the allies were rejected by Egypt, 
and combined Ottoman and British forces landed in Syria. İbrahim’s forces were 
defeated and forced to retreat. Mehmet Ali accepted giving up the conquered lands 
and his claims over Ottoman territories. In return, the Porte declared him as the 
hereditary ruler of Egypt.719 The Egyptian crises were turning points in the European 
realization that the Porte should be an insider of the Concert and the European 
international society for the sake of European order. In fact, the 1840 Convention 
materialized this change of understanding on paper. 
 
The Lebanese crisis (18401845) was an extension of Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa’s 
revolt against the Porte. The two cases are intertwined. The ruling family of Mount 
Lebanon was chosen among the Christians. For years, local rivalry and hatred 
revolved around two major groups: the Maronites and the Druzes. By the end of the 
eighteenth century, the local balance of power was in favor of the Druzes and the 
region came under the control of emirs (princes) of the Şihabi (Shibâb  Shebab) 
                                               
719Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1815-1914, 72–74. 
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family, a tribe claimed to be descendants of the Prophet Mohammed.720 Emir Başir II 
of the Şihabis was a man of politics and diplomacy who cleverly exploited every 
possible opportunity. In the words of Temperley, “He was indeed Christian, Druse or 
Turk as it suited his purpose.”721 When İbrahim Paşa occupied Syria, the local 
balance of power in the region toppled down and Bashir II sided with Mehmet Ali 
Paşa and the French. The gap between Druzes and Maronites enlarged. The majority 
of the Druzes moved into the Ottoman camp. The Syrian Serasker (commander in 
chief of the Ottoman forces) declared Emir a rebel and replaced him with Numan 
Canbulat (Janblat).722 Başir had to rely on the support of the Maronites and İbrahim.  
 
Staring from the late 1830s onwards, the European Great Powers’ interest in the 
affairs of Syria and Lebanon revived. The rivalry between France and Britain in the 
Levant was not something new. The French were involved in the region long before 
the British and were widely established with their clergy, missionaries, merchants 
and consulates. The changing British perception of the 1840s was briefly expressed 
by the following statement: “Syria is the key of the Levant and the Lebanon is the 
key of Syria.”723 The British, in order to get a stronghold in the region, decided to use 
religion as a vehicle. Britain, concerned about putting an end to the rule of İbrahim, 
armed and provoked the Druzes while the French armed the Maronites. The first 
                                               
720Caesar E. Farah, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861, (London: I.B. 
Tauris Publishers, 2000), 4; Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 133; Harold Temperley, 
England and the Near East: The Crimea, (London: Longmans Green, 1936),  177–178. 
721 Temperley, England and the Near East, 177. 
722Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 14. 
723According to Harold Temperley, these were the words of Lord Palmerston. See Temperley, 
England and the Near East, 70. The same statement is found in the London Morning Chronicle, 
August 9, 1845. The same expression can be found in Colonel Rose’s dispatch to the British Foreign 
Service, No.73, 23 July 1841, FO 78/456. Whether it is the words of Lord Palmerston or Colonel Rose 
or a comment in the London Morning Chronicle, it represents very well the British view with regard 
to Lebanon and Syria. 
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disturbances started in 1834 and later led to the insurgencies of the 1840s against 
Bashir II and Mehmed Ali’s forces.724 The Sultan, who desired to reestablish his 
control over Syria, once again requested the support of the Great Powers through his 
diplomatic networks in European capitals.725 The Druzes, who had been unhappy 
with Başir’s rule and the occupation of the Egyptians, started the uprising in Dayr al-
Qamar. 
 
The Porte, through an order of the Sultan (buyrultu), tried to re-establish control and 
end cleavages in the area. The buyrultu dated June 23, 1840 assured the communities 
that the Porte would respect all previous privileges and rights if they supported the 
European allies’ efforts to drive out the Egyptians.726 The Sultan acted together with 
the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia on the pacification of 
the Levant. The Porte’s move was directed by its fears of the spread and transition of 
the uprisings into an organized movement to oust the Porte. The Sultan needed the 
support of the Quadruple Alliance to end the bloodshed, to defeat the Egyptians and 
to reinstate his rule. The introduction of the convention signed in London on July 15, 
1840 by Plenipotentiaries of the Porte and the four powers formally expressed the 
importance of the territorial integrity and safety of the throne of the House of Osman 
for European international order and peace.727 
                                               
724Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 22–24. 
725Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 23–32. 
726Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 37. 
727“In the Name of the Most Merciful God, His Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their 
Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, 
King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their 
support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reason of hostile 
proceedings of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt, - difficulties which threaten with danger the integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Sultan’s throne,- Their said Majesties, moved by the 
sincere friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan; animated by the desire of maintaining 
the integrity and independence  of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe; faithful 
  
253 
The use of force by the Quintuple Alliance of Britain, Ottoman Empire, Russia, 
Austria and Prussia was justified on the ground that it aimed to preserve the local 
(the Levant) and general (international) balance of power, the international order and 
thus the existence of the international society.728 In this case, the Porte, by acting 
together with the European powers, showed that it shared the interests of the four 
European powers, that is, the preservation of the status quo and order. The Porte also 
desired to survive, and likewise the European powers preferred the survival of the 
Ottoman Empire. The convergence of their interests made cooperation in this case 
possible. 
  
The concerted intervention reinstalled the Ottoman regime and the balance of power 
in the region. The protégé system used by the Great Powers to control the local 
groups placed the Orthodoxies under Russian, the Druzes and Protestants under 
British and the Maronites and other Catholic groups under Austrian and French de 
facto protection.729 The Muslim population of the area was left to the possession of 
the Porte. In a small region like Lebanon, the areas of influence blurred and the Great 
Power interests clashed. The British and the French continued to rival each other for 
mastery in the Levant. All of these led to confrontations and proxy wars among the 
local groups and protégées. These strained relations between the Porte and the Great 
Powers, particularly in relation to Ottoman sovereignty.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
to the engagement which they contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by their 
Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th of July, 1839; and desirous, moreover, to prevent the 
effusion of blood which would be occasioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently 
broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pacha of Egypt and the subjects of the Sultan; Their 
said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have resolved, for the aforesaid purpose, to conclude 
together a Convention.” See Albrecht-Carrié, The Concert of Europe, 134. 
728Bull, The Anarchical Society, 200–227. 
729Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire, (London: John Murray, 1995), 113. 
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After the defeat of the Egyptian forces in Lebanon in 1840, Bashir III replaced 
Bashir II.  Another fight broke out between the Maronites and the Druzes. The 
Druzes wanted to regain their lost political influence in Lebanon. The Porte 
intervened to depose Bashir III and assert their political rule.  A viable solution had 
to be found that would satisfy all concerned: the locals, the Great Powers and the 
Ottomans. Otherwise, the Porte would have to deal with increasing foreign 
intervention. After exchanging views with the European powers, long meetings 
(Sahilhane, meeting) and negotiations, the Porte accepted a plan for bi-communal 
autonomy. Mount Lebanon was divided into a northern district administered by a 
Maronite governor (kaymakam) and a southern district administered by a Druze 
(1842). The tensions between the communities erupted in 1845. The Porte imposed a 
general disarmament with the Règlement of Shekib Efendi. However, violent 
disturbances continued in the region.730 
 
The ensuing crises over the Holy Places and the Crimean War of 1853–1856 
reflected the deeper tensions and diplomatic problems of the European order. The 
historical debate over the origins and details of the war still continues. The 
arguments as to the causes are varied. Some blame French and Russian expansionism 
(specifically pan-Orthodoxy and pan-Slavism); others blame overall Great Power 
politics. The dominance of Russophobes in the British and French government 
circles, the clashes of personalities, the inability of the statesmen in conflict 
management and resolution, the Ottoman diplomatic incapability, the clash of 
liberalism with conservatism and the preservation of the European balance of power 
                                               
730 Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 1–30;  Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 
133–134; Temperley, England and the Near East, 169–198. 
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are counted among the causes of the war. 731 To quote Harold Temperley, a century 
later “the origins of the Crimean War are not even yet wholly revealed.”732 Although 
the war is depicted as an unnecessary or accidental conflict, underneath the Holy 
Sites dispute, deeper issues were at stake. This conflict was a part of the European 
concern over control of the Ottoman territories and straits. To quote Henry Kissinger, 
“The real causes of the war were deeper, however. Religious claims were in fact 
pretexts for political and strategic designs.”733 M. S. Anderson, more or less in a 
similar manner, argued that it was the outcome of “a series of struggles between the 
great powers” of Europe for ascendancy.734 Winifred Baumgart, on the other hand, 
defined it as “a direct outgrowth of the so-called Eastern Question,” 735 although “in 
itself this was a petty and absurd affair of only local relevance.”736 Similarly, Shaw 
noted that it was a part of the greater struggle for mastery in the Middle East.737 It 
was the involvement of the Great Powers on behalf of the religious communities that 
led to its internationalization and intensification.  
 
                                               
731 Merriman, A History of Modern Europe, 794; Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the 
Middle East, Seventh Edition, (Colorado: Westview, 2002), 152; Grant and Temperley, Europe in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 269–270; Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. 
118–123; Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1815-1914, 101–106. See also Norman Rich, Why the 
Crimean War?  A Cautionary Tale, (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1991), 1–17; Stavrianos,  The 
Balkans since 1453, 319; A. J. P. Taylor, From Napoleon to the Second International Essays on 
Nineteenth-Century Europe, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), 216–220; Vernon J. Puryear, “New 
Light on the Origins of the Crimean War,” The Journal of Modern History, 3 (1931): 220; Gavin 
Burns Henderson, Crimean Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays, (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & 
Company, 1947); Zürcher, Turkey—A Modern History, 55–57; Camile Rousset, Histoire de la Guerre 
de Crimee, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1887), vol. 1, 1–82 ; Vicomte de Guichen, La Guerre de 
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Granier de Cassagnac, Souvenirs du Second Empire, 3 vols. (Paris, 1879–82), vol. 2, 226–227 ; Taxile 
Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, 6 vols. (Paris : Germer Baillière, 1868-75), Vol. 1, 522-530 ; 
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732HTemperley, England and the Near East, ix. 
733 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 93. 
734M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe—Aspects of European History 1815–1914, (Totowa:  
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The Holy Sites problem arose from a minor and local religious issue, over the 
division of the rights between the Orthodox and Latin Christian subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire in the Holy Lands. Napoleon III argued for their rights to custody of 
holy sites on behalf of the Latin Christians of the Ottoman Empire – the Great 
Church of Bethlehem, the Sanctuary of the Church of the Nativity, the tomb of the 
Virgin (St. Mary) in Gethsemane, the Grotto of the Holy Manger, the tombs of 
Christian crusaders of the Kingdom of Jerusalem like Baldwin and Godfrey, and the 
Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. This led to a crisis with Russia claiming 
the status of defender of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman realm since the 1774 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.738 The French presented their demands in a diplomatic 
note.739 The language used in the French note not only indicates the French 
                                               
738“VII. Though Russia claimed that it was the legitimate protector of the Orthodox Christian subjects 
of the Sultan, in legal terms, there was no written declaration of such a right even in the Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca as argued by the Tsar. The two articles of the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 
question were as follows: The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and 
its churches, and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all 
occasions, representations, as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of which mention 
will be made in Article XIV, as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such 
representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighbouring 
and sincerely friendly power. XIV. After the manner of the other Powers, permission is given to the 
High Court of Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the Minister’s residence, to erect in one of the 
quarters of Galata, in the street called Bey Oglu, a public church of the Greek ritual, which shall 
always be under the protection of the Ministers of that Empire, and secure from all coercion and 
outrage.” Thomas Erskine Holland, The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey 1774 to 1853, 
(London: MacMillan, 1877), 41 and 44. 
739Remise par le ministre de France à la Sublime-Porte le 28 mai 1850 (16 redjeb 1266) - Le général 
de division, ministre de France près la Sublime-Porte, a eu l’honneur de donner lecture a S. E . Aali-
pacha, ministre des affaires étrangers de Sa Majesté le sultan, d’une dépêche pêche par laquelle le 
gouvernement de la République le charge de revendiquer efficacement, en faveur des religieux latins, 
la possession des lieux saints que l’article 33 des capitulations de 1740 leur a garantie. Ces lieux sont : 
La grande église de Bethléem, le sanctuaire de la Nativité avec le droit d’y placer une nouvelle étoile, 
de changer la tapisserie de la grotte, d’y agir, enfin, comme les possesseurs exclusifs. Le tombeau de 
la sainte Vierge, la pierre de l’onction, les sept arceaux de la sainte Vierge dans l’église du Saint-
Sépulcre.Le gouvernement français réclame encore, pour les religieux francs, le droit de réparer la 
coupole de l’église du Saint-Sépulcre ; et enfin, il demande que dans cette dernière église toutes 
choses soient remises en l’état ou elles étaient avant l’incendie de 1848. Il prouvera surabondamment 
que les sanctuaires et les droits ci-dessus énumères appartenaient aux religieux latins en 1740.La 
franchise et le courage avec lesquels la Sublime-Porte est entrée dans des voies d’améliorations 
morales et de civilisation, l’adhésion qu’elle a donnée par sa conduit sage et mesure aux grands 
principes du droit public européen, laissent, au gouvernement français la ferme conviction que, dans 
cette circonstance, il ne fera pas inutilement appel á la bonne foi et a l’esprit d’équité du 
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upholding of the role of a protector of the Latin Christians in the name of all 
European Latin Catholic states, but also supports the changing European perception 
of the Porte in the mid-nineteenth century. In this sense, paragraph three of the note 
is essential. In this paragraph, the French Minister reiterated their trust that the 
Ottoman Empire as a moral and civilized state would adhere to and respect the major 
principles of the European public law on the basis of equality. The way the 
diplomatic language is used in the note indicates the European Great Powers’ 
growing acceptance of the Ottoman Empire into the European public law and its 
obedience to the general principles of the laws of the international society. Although 
the Great Powers of Europe still regarded the Ottoman administration as different, 
there was a shared understanding of the necessity to bring the Porte into the 
European Concert and the international society. 
 
Initially, the Porte was not receptive to the French demands. The Porte replied by 
saying that in order not to infringe upon the rights of any group, a neutral 
commission would consider the demands in line with previous international 
agreements, capitulations and firmans. The Sultan was concerned about the Russian 
reaction and thus, did not want to enter into another unnecessary war. The Porte sent 
a note to the French Foreign Minister on December 22, 1850.740 The Ottoman 
                                                                                                                                     
gouvernement de S.M. impériale, et que celui-ci en fournira une nouvelle preuve par son respect pour 
les engagements dont la France réclame l’exécution.II mettra de la sorte, et pour toujours un terme a 
des difficultés sans cesse renaissantes, et à d’interminables récriminations qu’il n’entre certainement 
pas dans sa pensée de vouloir perpétuer. Note Remise par le ministre de France à la Sublime-Porte le 
28 mai 1850 (16 redjeb 1266) in Baron Ignace de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane, 
avec les puissances étrangères depuis 1536,  Tome Troisième—Première Partie (Paris: Amyot, 1868), 
229–230. 
740Il est certain que la Sublime-Porte a constamment, et de tout temps été dans l’habitude d’exécuter 
avec droiture et de la meilleure foi du monde ses traites avec les puissances amies, et il n’est pas 
moins vrai de dire qu’un traite qui n’a subi, a une époque quelconque, aucun changement, aucune 
modification du consentement des deux parties contractantes, conserve toute sa vigueur dans toutes 
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response presents the Ottoman inclination for the peaceful and diplomatic resolution 
of the issue in line with European public law. The reference to European public law 
and its application within the Ottoman territories has become an established practice 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Porte became an ardent supporter 
of diplomacy and European public law in regulating its inter-state relations, 
specifically those with European powers. This point becomes more evident in the 
practice and diplomatic correspondence of the Porte in this epoch. 
 
The French, concerned over the possibility that the commission’s decision would 
confer rights according to treaties and firmans dating earlier than those of 1740, 
refused the Ottoman proposal with a diplomatic note on January 6, 1851.741 The 
French insistence on the reinstitution of the rights of Latins in line with the 1740 
capitulatory treaty continued. This time, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Âli, stated that the Porte wished to evaluate the matter impartially on the principles 
of European public law and the rights of all concerned parties in a mixed commission 
                                                                                                                                     
ses dispositions. Seulement, et il superflu de le dire, comme tous les Chrétiens des diverses croyances 
ont part aux saints lieux chrétiens, qui existent a Jérusalem, et qui sont visites par eux, chaque partie 
est en possession de plusieurs anciens firmans et titres. Cela étant, la Sublime-Porte ne peut 
naturellement pas prononcer sur cette question qu’au préalable une commission mixte n’ait vu et 
médite profondément les firmans et autres pièces authentiques et valables qui ont été donnes, soit 
avant, soit après le traité précité ; et nul doute que le gouvernement français, qui a déjà donne tant de 
preuves de son amour pour l’équité et la justice, n’apprécie cette excuse bine fondée et ne l’accepte. 
Note de la Sublime-Porte au ministre de France, en date du 22 décembre 1850 (17 sáfer 1267) in de 
Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane, Tome Troisième—Première Partie, 247. 
741Aussi, tout en considérant comme équitable la proposition de S. Exc. Aali-pacha, en tant qu’elle ne 
concerne que les titres antérieurs a 1740, le ministre de France se voit avec un profond regret, oblige 
de protester formellement contre l’examen dont il est question de toutes pièces ou actes postérieurs a 
cette époque. En agissant ainsi, il éprouve le besoin de déclarer qu’il cède a l’accomplissement d’un 
devoir rigoureux et pénible. En conséquence, et tout renouvelant a S. Exc. Sa protestation formelle, 
tant au nom de France qu’au nom de la catholicité tout entière, le ministre de al République a 
l’honneur de lui faire savoir que, ne pouvant accepter en aucune façon la discussion des documents 
postérieurs aux traités qui lient la France á la Sublime-Porte, il va communiquer a son gouvernement 
le mémorandum de M. le ministre des affaires étrangères et demander de nouvelles instructions 
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of experts.742 The commission was formed to negotiate the claims, but this strained 
the relations between the Porte, France and Russia. Under the political pressures of 
France and Russia, it was extremely difficult for the Sultan to make an impartial 
judgment and decision on the issue. The diplomatic activity in Istanbul was intense 
and diverse. Monsieur Titov, the Russian ambassador, threatened to leave Istanbul 
with his delegation unless the Tsar’s wishes were accepted. The French Ambassador, 
Monsieur de Lavallette, on the other hand, threatened a French naval blockade of the 
Dardanelles if the Porte preserved the status quo favoring the Orthodox Christians. 
Fuad Efendi, the Reis ül-Küttab, requested the arbitration of Britain in reaching an 
arrangement that would be agreeable to both states on behalf of Colonel Rose, the 
chargé d’affaires of the British Embassy. Upon French insistence, a committee 
consisting of Ottoman diplomats and bureaucrats, the French, and the Greek 
Orthodox Christians, assembled to discuss the issue of rights. In the end, the Sultan 
declared a new firman. Instead of directly agreeing and accepting the Latin claims, 
the Porte refused these claims over the Holy Places on the ground that these places 
belonged to all Christians. According to the firman, the common use and reparation 
of the big dome of the Great Church of Bethlehem was declared to be the 
responsibility of all Christians, with no differentiation of sects. The use and control 
of the small dome remained with the Orthodox Christians as it was before; as to the 
                                               
742La Sublime-Porte, dont l’une des anciennes et constants habitudes est aussi d’observer avec la plus 
grande loyauté et franchise les traits avec les puissances amies, n’hésite nullement a déclarer de 
nouvenu que tous les articles du traite conclu l’année 1740 de l’ère  chrétienne, les quels n’ont pas été 
modifies par un autre traite, conservent leur force et vigueur.…, il y a tout lieu d’espérer qu’en se 
concernant ensemble on pourra aviser aux moyens de résoudre cette question d’une manière conforme 
a la dignité et aux droits fondes de toutes les parties. Note de la Sublime- Porte au ministre de France 
(marquis de Lavalette), en date du 29 juin 1851 (29 châban 1267) in de Testa, Recueil des traités de la 
Porte Ottomane,  Tome Troisième – Première Partie, 250–251. 
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rest of the Holy Places like the tomb of St. Mary, the Grotto of the Holy Manger, the 
Church and the Grotto of the Nativity in Bethlehem and that of the Church of the 
Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, the Catholic and Orthodox Christians would have equal 
rights of control and usage.743 Even after this declaration, the details of the issue 
continued to be a problem between the sides. The Porte assured the French of 
acceptance of almost all of their demands with a note. Russia, on the other hand, with 
the Sultan’s firman dated February 9, 1852, was guaranteed of the preservation of the 
status quo favorable to the Orthodox community. The Orthodoxy, mainly the Greeks 
of the Empire, celebrated the firman as the “Charter of their Liberties.”744 This 
contradiction on the Ottoman side was related to the Empire’s wish to resolve the 
issue without war and without infringing its relations with the European Great 
Powers. The other concern of the Porte was the resolution of the local conflict in 
accordance with the demands of its local subjects. The Porte’s stakes were higher 
than all of the great powers – its control or loss of control over the region was on the 
negotiation table, and neither Britain nor Austria was willing to support the Empire. 
The French refused the Sultan’s firman on the grounds that it was not binding. From 
the Ottoman’s point of view, it was unjust to exclude one of the sects from the places 
respected by all Christians. The Sultan declared that his firman would be put into 
force. This created further resentment on the side of the European powers since this 
meant that the Sultan’s firmans would be treated as being above the laws of 
                                               
743Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi – Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri (1789-1856) [The 
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Europe.745 Additions made to the firman by the Porte upon French and Russian 
arguments further exacerbated the situation.  
 
In 1853, Tsar Nicholas I sent his special envoy Prince Menshikov to Istanbul. 
Menshikov’s mission was based on outright hostility rather than conciliation. It was 
not a diplomatic mission; the Russian aim was to deliver an ultimatum to the Turks 
and use the threat of force to coerce the Porte to its acceptance. To quote Temperley, 
the mission was simply a “show of force.”746 First of all, the Prince arrived in a 
Russian warship together with a delegation consisting of military and naval 
officers.747 Menshikov’s diplomatic protocol mistakes were humiliating, according to 
the protocol principles of the European international society. One of the general rules 
for foreign delegations was to announce their arrival to the hosting state’s prime 
minister and foreign minister in charge. Menshikov was supposed to present his letter 
of credentials from the Tsar to the Porte’s highest-ranking officials. However, 
Menshikov failed to do this and sent his letter with a messenger. As described by 
Temperley in detail, then Menshikov asked the Ottoman Grand Vizier to leave his 
office and meet him at the entrance of the Sublime Porte. This was contrary to the 
protocol rules and was declined by Mehmet Ali Paşa.748 In his reception ceremony 
by the Grand Vizier, Menshikov, instead of wearing his uniform, wore civilian 
attire.749 As noted by Richardson, this was another violation of the “convention.”750 
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Finally, he refused to pay an official visit to the Ottoman Foreign Minister in his 
office even though he had been expected for hours by Fuad Efendi. This was, indeed, 
an intentional and planned act to humiliate Fuad Efendi, who was held responsible 
for giving concessions to the French in Jerusalem.751 In the wording of Temperley, 
this was disrespectful of the “invariable custom.”752  This behavior was not 
welcomed by the Sultan and regarded as an insult to the Sultan himself, as “… in the 
East an affront to the servant is always an affront to the master.”753 Such rudeness 
was not acceptable in the Western norms as well. The European corps diplomatique 
at the Porte criticized the Russian’s arrogance and behavior. To quote Trevor Royle, 
events developed, “much to the horror of the diplomatic community.”754  
 
Regardless of the Ottoman desire for diplomatic negotiations, Menshikov’s orders 
were “clear-cut and brooked no possibility of negotiation.”755 Menshikov was to 
ensure the reinstitution of the traditional Orthodox rights with a sened (that carries 
the force of a treaty), the Russian right of representation on behalf of all Orthodox 
churches and subjects of the Empire. The major aim of the Russian delegation was to 
extend the interpretation of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and to officially guarantee 
a Russian protectorate over the Porte on paper.756 Finally, he was charged with the 
conclusion of a defensive alliance between the two Empires. On March 16, 1853, 
Menshikov delivered a note to the Porte stating the Russian wishes and desires with 
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regard to the Holy Places. The Ottoman side requested time for thinking and 
informed the Prince that they would declare their decision later. 757 
 
The Ottoman ruling élite was conscious of the fact that they had to take into account 
the positions of other states and their interests (international responsibility) while 
making decisions about their internal and external affairs, specifically on those issues 
which had the likelihood to affect the European balance of power and their respective 
position. Therefore, when required, they did not hesitate to take the view of respected 
members of the corps diplomatique and inquired into the position of their home 
states. Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe (Canning), the British Ambassador, was an 
esteemed diplomat. When his views were asked, he advised the Sultan to resist 
Russia’s demands. The Ottomans refused the Russian draft treaty. Russia, in 
response, occupied the Danubian Principalities in July 1853. The Porte did not 
declare war as soon as the news of the Russian occupation of its Danubian 
Principalities arrived. In fact, the Porte prolonged its declaration of war until it felt 
ready for war. The European powers also remained reluctant to act immediately. The 
British were still indecisive. On the side of the European powers, the Russian 
                                               
757Article 1 of the Secret Treaty proposed to the Porte by Prince Menshikov is as follows: “The 
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remonstrances will be received as coming in the name of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly 
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1854-1856, 35–36. See also A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Vostochnaia Voina, (St. Petersburg, 1903–13) vol. 
1, no. 110, 382-385, cited in Rich, Why the Crimean War, 37. 
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occupation was not interpreted as a declaration of war.758 This was related to the fact 
that the Russian occupation was based on a treaty right that enabled it to occupy the 
principalities when deemed necessary for the internal order.759 There was no internal 
disturbance in the principalities. The aim of the Russian occupation was to force the 
Porte to retreat and accept the Russian virtual protectorate. 760 
 
At the end of a conference gathered in Vienna, the four powers (Britain, Austria, 
France and Prussia) issued a note known as the “Vienna Note” without consulting the 
Porte and tried to dictate it as the basis of negotiations with Russia.761 The Porte 
refused the note, which was identical to Menshikov’s draft treaty. The Russian side, 
concerned about the involvement of the Concert powers, made one last attempt at a 
diplomatic resolution of the issue (the Olmütz mediation), but it was too late. The 
British and French navies were already ordered to the support of the Porte. On 
September 26, 1853, after the arrival of the British and French fleets to the 
Dardanelles, the Ottoman cabinet voted for war; the official declaration came eight 
days later. The Porte demanded immediate Russian evacuation of the Principalities 
within two weeks’ time and declared that if at the end of two weeks the Russians did 
not leave Moldavia and Walachia, the Ottoman forces would move into the region. 
The Ottoman army was mobilized for war.762 
 
To sum up, throughout the crisis over the protection of its sovereignty and 
independence, the Porte tried to exploit every possibility to resolve the issue through 
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diplomacy, negotiation, arbitration and international law. The Porte tried to resolve 
the issue by satisfying the demands of France and Russia, but this led to further 
complications. The Porte, realizing that the demands surpassed religious and moral 
considerations, upheld its sovereign rights. The Ottoman security was at stake and, if 
required, it had to be secured through war. From the perspective of the international 
society, this war was a just war for a just cause. The Ottomans fought a defensive 
war against a virtual attack on their sovereignty and territorial unity, while the 
European powers fought for preserving the European equilibrium and international 
order of the European society of states. In a Bullian understanding, the Crimean War 
was the kind of war that can be “assigned a role for the maintenance of international 
order.”763 The Crimean War, in the words of J.A.S. Grenville, was a “point of 
transition in the history of Europe,”764 while Alan Palmer argued that it marked the 
birth of modern Europe as it led to changes in the European great power 
equilbrium.765  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: 
OTTOMAN-EUROPEAN ACCULTURATION 
 
 
6.1 Ottoman Perception of Diplomacy  
 
As noted, the Empire’s representation as the Islamic other led to the argument that 
the Ottomans had an unfavorable attitude toward diplomacy.766 Based on the 
orthodox Islamic understanding of the Ottoman state, it is argued that only after the 
Empire’s military superiority against Europe had declined did the Ottomans accept 
adopting and being bound by European institutions (specifically diplomacy and 
international law).767  In his analysis of the Ottoman Empire’s diplomatic practice, 
Naff also bases his argument on Islamic conservatism:  
 
Ottoman thinking in diplomacy, as in all matters of government 
derived from the Muslim concept of state, . . . was rooted in the 
Shari’a (Holy Law); traditionally, the Shari’a provided for all the 
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exigencies of life and government, thus making the Muslim state, in 
theory, self-sufficient. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire was pre-
eminently a Shari’a state. The Ottomans clung stubbornly to the 
illusion of Islam’s innate moral and cultural superiority over 
Christian Europe. They expressed this belief in their ideas of self-
sufficiency and in their practice of non-reciprocal diplomacy. The 
Muslim prejudice that whatever was western was tainted prevented 
the Ottomans from wholly accepting or imitating western ways.768 
 
 
The arguments not only of ES theoreticians but also of eminent scholars in the fields 
of history, political science, and international relations are founded on this 
misconception of the Ottoman state. Ottoman historians also diverge over 
conceptualization of Ottoman–European interactions until the end of the eighteenth 
century, regarding both diplomacy and foreign policy. Some argue that it would be 
misleading because the Empire did not consider Europeans to be equals and/or acted 
on the basis of reciprocity.769 This is an open debate; however, as the departing point 
of this dissertation is the ES approach, Bull’s conceptual understanding of diplomacy 
will be taken into account. One point needs clarification here: all habits and practices 
used in conducting relations and communication between political entities by 
authorized and professional agents to minimize friction and establish peace and 
coexistence will be referred to as diplomacy or a diplomatic method. These terms are 
also used to define external relations of the Ottomans before the establishment of 
permanent embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Contemporary studies suggest that enough evidence has accumulated to support the 
argument that the Ottomans, from the inception of the beylik, had developed an 
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understanding of foreign policy and diplomatic methods. In some respects, Ottoman 
diplomatic methods were similar to those of the European states but differed in some 
ways.770 Contrary to the general view, diplomacy was one of the classic tools of the 
Ottoman Empire’s foreign policy. It had diplomatic relations with European and 
Islamic states. Ottoman diplomacy, however, had some different characteristics. 
Yurdusev notes that “when we refrain from the sweeping conceptual and historical 
generalizations and do justice to the complexity of the Empire and its historical 
practice,” then it will be possible to identify and present the uniqueness, subtlety, and 
finesse of the Ottoman style of diplomacy.771  
 
It should be noted that studies excluding the Empire from early modern and modern 
European diplomacy ignore the fact that diplomacy as an institution of international 
society was not fully developed at the time, even among the European powers. To 
give an example, the Ottoman Empire is criticized for failing to enter into reciprocal 
relations with the European powers or to send permanent diplomatic missions. Two 
factors should be noted. First, it should be remembered that it took time for European 
great powers and courts to reciprocate Italian-style resident diplomacy. The majority 
of diplomatic activity in the second half of the fifteenth century continued on an ad 
hoc basis. The usefulness and functionality of resident diplomacy led to its 
acceptance as a desirable practice, but financial and physical difficulties still 
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prevented it from being common.772 It was not viable to open resident embassies all 
over Europe. Up until the mid-nineteenth century, England, for instance, had no 
resident embassies in the German Confederation or in Italian states. France was no 
exception. Similarly, the practice of resident diplomacy was not very common 
among smaller European powers.773 The preferred method was to send permanent 
diplomatic missions to large courts and simultaneously assign the ambassador to 
smaller nearby states. British Ambassador John Fane (Lord Burhersh, later the Earl 
of Westmorland) is an example of this practice. He was ambassador to Prussia 
between 1841 and 1851, but his mission included the smaller North German duchies 
of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and Anhalt-Dessau.774  
 
The other point is that existing regular European missions in some European and 
non-European territories remained generally at the level of consulates, and higher-
level diplomatic missions were seldom in practice. To quote Keene, “non-European 
states were thus by no means alone in lacking regular and permanent postings of 
accredited diplomats from the major European states or in their failure to establish 
their own diplomatic missions on any substantial scale.”775 The fact that consular 
systems were more common suggests that, even in the nineteenth century, when 
diplomacy was accepted as the master, distinctive institution of European 
international relations, a network of permanent diplomatic missions, corps 
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diplomatique,776 and diplomatic culture among all the European states was 
progressing. Diplomacy in theory and practice developed and became more 
sophisticated over centuries.  
 
6.1.1 Characteristics of the Early Ottoman Diplomatic Organization  
 
Yurdusev classifies Ottoman diplomatic methods as conventional and 
unconventional. Conventional diplomacy is the generally agreed conduct of interstate 
relations, starting in the Renaissance. It includes reciprocal exchange of resident 
ambassadors, meetings and negotiations, multilateral conferences and congresses. A 
diplomatic corps sharing common training, style, manners, protocol, immunities, and 
language is another distinctive feature of conventional diplomacy.777 Unconventional 
diplomacy is defined as all those habits and practices that are not conventional, for 
example, the Ottoman practice of sending envoys on an ad hoc basis, or the 
unilateral granting of Capitulations.778  
 
The Empire, as Yurdusev argues, had a pragmatic interpretation of the Islamic 
division of the world into three realms: dâr-al harb, dâr-al Islam and dâr-al Sulh.779 
Ottoman pragmatism enabled the establishment of commercial and diplomatic 
interactions with the Christian powers within the dâr-al Sulh (the realm of peace). 
The Empire, as noted in chapters 3 and 4, was not in continuous war with European 
powers, though warfare made up a significant part of Ottoman relations. From the 
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early days of the beylik, the Ottomans concluded treaties and truces with Christian 
states (from Byzantine to the Republic of Venice). The majority of early modern 
diplomatic and consular practices and institutions were formulated from Ottoman-
Italian interactions and acculturation. Ottoman diplomacy was formulated from 
Ottoman threat perceptions, interests, and raison d’état. 
 
6.1.1.1 The Office of Nişancı and Reis ül-Küttab 
 
The Ottoman administrative structure was formed under the rule of Orhan I. All 
internal and external formal correspondence of the Empire was carried out by 
officials and secretaries called nişancı (also known as tuğraî, tevkiî, or muvakkî). 
Nişancı also had other diplomatic functions and duties until the institutionalization of 
the office of Reis ül-Küttab.780 The major diplomatic and foreign policy decisions 
were, however, decided by the Sultans and Vezir-i Âzams (Grand Viziers). The Veziri 
Âzam was responsible not only for execution of the decisions but also for carrying 
out meetings and negotiations with foreign representatives.  
 
The exact date of the institutionalization of the office of the Reis ül-Küttab (or Reis 
Efendi, chief of secretaries) is not clear. There are two main theories. One holds that 
it is an institutional formation dating back to Seljuks, which passed into the 
Ottomans in the early days of the beylik. The other view holds that it came into 
existence during the rule of Süleyman I.781 The conduct and organization of imperial 
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foreign relations was supervised by the Reis ül-Küttab. Still, in a modern sense, this 
officer acted as an undersecretary of foreign affairs. Reis were responsible for 
secretarial duties, including diplomatic correspondence. Vezir-i Âzams formed the 
backbone of state affairs, dealing with major internal and external affairs. Beginning 
in the seventeenth century, Reis assumed greater responsibilities in the conduct of 
imperial foreign affairs.782  
 
With the increasing complexity of Ottoman interactions in military, political, 
economic, and sociocultural sectors with the great powers of Europe, the office of the 
Reis ül-Küttab became predominantly occupied with foreign affairs. This officer, 
however, was not the sole decision-maker in the foreign policy of the Empire and 
was hierarchically under the Vezir-i Âzam. As Naff puts it, “a Grand Vizir was 
something more than a prime minister and the Reis ül-Küttab something less than a 
foreign minister”; hence it cannot be compared with European counterparts.783 In the 
words of Shaw, it was still “the closest thing the Ottomans had to a foreign office.”784 
Gradually, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with reforms of Selim III and 
Mahmud II, the office became institutionalized, in line with the modern European 
ministerial system. The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the leading 
institution in the Tanzimat era and in reforms.  
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6.1.1.2 Dragomans and the Tercüme Odası (Translation Office) 
 
Dragomans (translators, tercümans)785 were used by European envoys and the 
Ottoman administration to carry out daily diplomatic correspondence and 
communications. Among the Muslim and Turkic population of the Empire, few 
people had knowledge of foreign languages and countries. The dragomans were 
chosen mostly from the minorities of the Empire. Greeks, Levantines, Jews, and 
Armenians were employed both by the embassies and by the Sublime Porte. They 
were well educated and Europeanized and had good knowledge of Europe. The 
dragomans were the main sources of Ottoman intelligence and information. 
Dragomans of the embassies were sent to the Porte on a daily basis to follow and 
translate all Ottoman Turkish and foreign correspondence.  
 
The Chief Dragoman (Grand Dragoman, Divan-ı Hümayun Tercümanı) acted as the 
righthand man of the Reis ül-Küttab, and together they influenced the conduct of 
Ottoman diplomacy and, at times, the course of events. All important and 
confidential information passed through their hands. To give an example, during the 
French invasion of Egypt, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris wanted to visit Toulon to 
learn the destination of the French naval fleet and reasons for military preparations. 
He was prevented by his dragoman, named Cordica, on the grounds that such 
behavior would be inappropriate. Indeed, Cordica was subverted by Talleyrand, as 
was all important information and correspondence between the Sublime Porte and 
Paris. Had it not been for Cordica’s interference, Seyyid Ali Efendi might have 
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learned that the French were heading to Egypt, and the French navy could have been 
intercepted by the British navy.786 During the Greek revolution, the Greek dragomans 
gave false reports to the Porte on the course of developments. They were replaced by 
educated Turks and other nationalities.  
 
Being a dragoman in Istanbul was a prestigious position. The dragomans were 
exempted from taxes and enjoyed certain privileges, including immunities like those 
of the foreign diplomats for whom they worked, known as berâts/berâtlis.787 Those 
who excelled in Foreign Service were rewarded. After his skillful performance in the 
Karlofça (Karlowitz) negotiations, Alexander Mavrocordato was assigned as the 
hospodar (bey) of the Danubian Principalities.788  The superiority of the dragomans 
in Ottoman diplomacy is well expressed in the following words of Mavrocordato to 
Austrian Consul Stefano (November 30, 1784):  
 
If Prince Kaunitz is prince of the Holy Roman Empire, I am prince of 
the very holy Ottoman Empire…. I am the master; I am a prince of a 
family which has reigned for two hundred years, a reigning 
sovereign, I will say what I please; I fear neither the Emperor nor 
Prince Kaunitz.789 
 
 
The European powers interested in developing relations with the Ottoman Empire 
gave importance to their dragomans and diplomats, training them in Oriental-Eastern 
languages and cultures. They were carefully chosen. The republics of Venice, Genoa, 
and Ragusa chose their dragomans from among professional merchants with 
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expertise in language, business, and cultural dealings with the Ottomans. They were 
headquartered in Istanbul but operated all around the Empire, specifically in the 
Balkans and the Levant. To this end, for example, in 1754, Austrian Empress Maria 
Theresa established the Imperial Oriental Academy (Kaiserliche und Königliche) in 
Vienna to improve trade and cultural relations with the East, particularly the Ottoman 
Empire. At the academy, prospective diplomats studied Turkish and Persian 
languages and cultures.790 Similarly, a school was run by Capuchin friars in Istanbul 
named École de Péra where teenagers from France were educated in the Turkish 
language to be dragomans. Later, in Paris, under Louis XIV, a school of Oriental 
languages was founded to educate professional interpreters and, given the 
commercial and political relations between the Ottoman Empire and France, Turkish 
was the first language taught.791 Though the Empire had no resident embassies in the 
European capitals, these were an essential factor in European diplomacy. The Empire 
was considered important in European diplomatic protocol and corps. The 
establishment of the Tercüme Odası (Translation Office) after the diplomatic and 
bureaucratic reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II as part of the ministerial diplomatic 
system and the roles played by diplomats like Âli Paşa, and Fuad Paşa in the 
Tanzimat reforms increased the institutional credibility of the office.  
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6.1.2 The Ad Hoc Period of the Ottoman Diplomacy (1299-1793): 
Characteristics and Practices 
 
The use of ad hoc diplomacy was common among European powers until 
theemergence of the permanent diplomacy considered to be the Renaissance 
innovation. Still, as noted, ad hoc and resident diplomacy coexisted in the early-
modern Europe. Until the establishment of permanent embassies, the Ottoman 
Empire conducted its diplomatic relations on an ad hoc basis. The Empire sent 
envoys and ambassadors abroad for different purposes starting in the era of Sultan 
Mehmet I. Envoys were sent to deliver ratified treaties and peace and truce 
agreements; to present sultans’ personal letters to European monarchs; to inform and 
greet accessions to the throne; to be present at peace talks; to discuss truces, frontier 
demarcations and changes, especially after wars; and to set up friendly diplomatic 
relations.792 For example, according to the list found in the Topkapı Palace archives, 
in 1417 Mehmet I sent an envoy to Venice to present the ratified version of an 
agreement dated 1416.793 Envoys were exchanged frequently. The Ottoman 
diplomatic activity was sporadic, lasting from a few weeks to months, depending on 
the nature of the mission and the progress of negotiations between the sides. From 
the seventeenth century onwards, there was a change in the duration of the envoys’ 
visits. In the 1790s onward, the envoys were sent for longer periods ranging from a 
year to three years.794  It can even be said that the Ottoman diplomacy was becoming 
                                               
792Bülent Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period”, in Ottoman Diplomacy, ed. Yurdusev,, 
2004, 48. 
793 For a full list of Ottoman envoys and ambassadors sent abroad on an ad hoc basis, see Faik Reşit 
Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri [Ambassadors of the Ottoman State and Their 
Sefaretnames], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), 221-235. 
794 Ali İbrahim Savaş, Osmanlı Diplomasisi – Ottoman Diplomacy (Istanbul: 3F Yayınevi, 2007), 15. 
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permanent before the official establishment of the embassies under Selim III and 
Mahmud II.  
 
The Ottoman preference for ad hoc diplomacy was related to the fact that the 
Ottomans had enough sources of information on European affairs. Ottomans did not 
feel the need to establish regular missions to collect information on military, political 
and socio-economic developments. The hospadars (beys) of the Danube (Wallachia, 
and Moldavia), non-Muslim and Muslim merchants, and the Dragomans of the Porte 
provided the Empire with necessary information about European advancements.795 
The Ottoman archives are proving this point. The Ottoman Empire was informed 
about the military preparations of its enemies and potential threats. It had agents all 
over Europe. Foreign missions furnished the Empire with valuable information on 
European affairs.796 The Imperial Chancery transmitted essential information 
obtained from resident foreign missions of European powers. The Sultans’ 
welcoming of the foreign missions is further evidence of Ottoman pragmatism. 
Therefore, the fact that the Empire did not have permanent missions and diplomacy 
did not render it incapable of gathering information. The Empire was informed and 
involved in European affairs through its information network.797 Most scholars agree 
that the Ottoman sultans as an imperial power considered themselves to be superior 
and therefore preferred not to send permanent and resident missions to Europe. The 
fact that Ottomans established a cosmopolitan world empire led to their self-
                                               
795 Naff, “Reforms and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 302-303. See also G. R. Berridge, 
“Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” in Ottoman Diplomacy, ed. Yurdusev, 2004, 
114-130; Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period,” 36-65.  
796 Savaş, Osmanlı Diplomasisi, 10-18. Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim 
III”, 115-117. 
797 Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III”, 114-130.  
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perceived superiority, but this did not prevent them from having diplomatic and 
commercial relationships. Most of the Capitulations – though they were granted 
unilaterally and were not technically bilateral treaties according to the European 
understating - in essence contained reciprocal articles for regulating commercial and 
diplomatic relations. The argument that because of its Islamic nature the Empire did 
not enter into reciprocal relations is, again, a partial claim. Muslims living 
permanently in non-Muslims lands found that it was inconvenient to properly 
practice their religion according to Islamic law. As Wright noted, “It was impossible 
for a Muslim traveler to properly observe his faith in the West ― there were no 
mosques, no dispensers of Halal meat―and if he tried to do so the ecclesiastical 
authorities were very likely to pounce.”798 It should be noted that Ottomans did not 
send permanent missions to other Muslim states either. Indeed, as Mansel argues: 
 
In practice, whatever zealots on both sides might claim, there was no holy war 
between Islam and Christianity. The theory existed; hatred for ‘infidels’ was 
frequently expressed in Constantinople and Paris. Yet such hate was applied with 
even greater force to heretics within Christianity or Islam - whether Protestants or 
Persian believers in the Shii form of Islam.799 
 
As Berridge concluded, while Ottomans considered unilateral/ad hoc diplomacy a 
political and diplomatic advantage, this type of diplomacy suited European interests 
as well. First, European powers did not have to grant diplomatic immunities and 
                                               
798 Wright, The Ambassadors, 2006, 234. 
799 Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 189. 
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privileges to Ottomans as they did not have resident missions.800 Secondly, 
Ottomans’ reliance on European missions in Istanbul for contacts and 
communications led to the interception of important information and increased the 
advantageous position of the European powers in negotiations. Resident missions 
were used chiefly “for spying and making mischief for their governments.” 
Therefore, it was considered “to be better to send than to receive.”801 For that reason, 
European powers also preferred this unilateral and ad hoc diplomacy of the 
Ottomans. European powers did not have permanent resident missions in the other 
Islamic states either. They only sent permanent missions to the Ottoman Empire 
because it was considered to be the center of East. 802 
 
6.1.2.1 European Permanent Embassies and Diplomatic Corps in Istanbul  
 
The Empire received permanent diplomatic missions and hence encouraged 
establishment of commercial and diplomatic relations by granting trade privileges 
and extra-territorial rights. Ottomans regarded the resident ambassadors of European 
powers to be guests of the Sultan rather than representatives of their states. Their 
expenses were therefore met by the Sultan. The empire continued to subsidize 
foreign missions and assume their expenses even after the Empire‘s economy was 
weakened.803  
 
                                               
800 Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” 122. 
801 Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” 123. 
802 Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” 27. See also G.R. Berridge, Notes on the 
Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Constantinople in the 1620s, Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations ‘Clingendael,’ No. 92, 2004, retrieved from http://www.clingendael.nl. 
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Ottomans recognized the international rights and extraterritorial rights of the foreign 
representatives, nationals and tradesmen residing in the Empire through the use of 
âmans and ahdnâmes, in line with the Islamic Law of Nations. The Venetian bailos, 
consuls and dragomans of European powers were considered to be exempt from 
taxes and customs duties through berâts, and extraterritorial rights were granted to 
nationals of capitulary states in lawsuits that did not include Ottoman citizens. 
Details regarding the conduct and status of foreigners were pointed out in 
Capitulations.804 To assure their freedom of commerce and navigation, the non-
capitulary states were granted a right called cottimo (elçilik ve konsolosluk hakkı) 
that enabled commercial vessels to sail under the flag of a capitulary state after 
paying a consulate fee.805 The Ottomans had a very favorable approach to diplomacy 
and diplomatic relations when compared to China or Japan. Both states refused the 
stationing of European resident embassies and their extraterritorial rights. The 
Chinese and Japanese resented European infiltration while the Ottomans invited 
them. The Ottomans’ worldview and tolerance enabled diplomacy to flourish and a 
diplomatic corps in Istanbul. Geoff R. Berridge notes that Constantinople after 1453, 
like Rome, should be counted as “the chief center for the diffusion of Italian practice 
to the rest of the world.”806 Similarly, Philip Mansel suggests that the mere presence 
of permanent embassies in Istanbul from the mid-sixteenth century onwards makes 
the Ottoman Empire diplomatically a part of Europe. To quote Mansel:  
 
                                               
804 Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period”, 36-65; Antonio Fabris, “From Adrinople to 
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805 Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period,” 41. 
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No other capital welcomed so many embassies. Ambassadors came to 
Constantinople from London and Paris, Stockholm and Samarkand, Goa and Fez….. 
The Ottoman Empire was at once a European, Middle Eastern, African, Black Sea, 
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean power. It stretched from Morocco to Mesopotamia 
and Poland to Yemen. It had more neighbors - more matters for dispute or 
negotiation - than any other state.807 
 
The first residential embassy was established by the Venetian bailo Bartelemi 
Marcello in 1454. In 1535, after the conclusion of France’s alliance with the Empire 
in 1534, the French Ambassador Jean de la Forét arrived in Istanbul. This was 
followed by the arrival of William Halborne of England in 1538 and Cornelis Haga 
of the United Provinces (Netherlands) in 1612. The European diplomatic and 
commercial corps established in Pera and Galata were in close contact with each 
other. Over centuries, this enabled the development of a unique diplomatic culture 
made up of European and Ottoman elements and a diplomatic life of intense rivalry 
and cooperation. Colonel Rottiers, a nineteenth century visitor to Istanbul, wrote: 
 
The society of Pera is as brilliant as that of which I have just written 
[Pera low life] is hideous. In no place in the world, except Paris, are so 
many savants, artists, travelers and men of taste of every kind found 
together… The larger receptions offer a charming mixture of the most 
diverse national qualities, blended with an exquisite taste and 
amiability. The soirées of the Palais de Russie were above all 
magnificent, those of the ambassadors of France and England were 
distinguished by more taste and less richness; but the formal dinners at 
the Austrian embassy effaced all else.808  
 
                                               
807Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 189. 
808 Colonel Rottiers, Itineraire de Tiflis a Constantinople, Brussels, 1829, 345, quoted in Mansel, 
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The fact that the Ottoman Sultans did not have courts like those of the European 
monarchs led to the diplomatic corps and the embassies established in the Istanbul as 
the center of all activities.809 Another district of Istanbul having a cosmopolitan 
culture was Galata, the trade centre of the city, where foreign merchants – the 
Venetians, Genoese, French, Dutch, English and Muslims (including Turks) – did 
business and engaged in socio-cultural interactions.810 Mansel argues that in the 
Ottoman Empire, the foreign representatives were treated better than they were in 
Russia, so they were able become a part of the Ottoman internal and external life.811 
 
From the Ottoman viewpoint, receiving and sending envoys was highly esteemed. 
The fact that the Chinese did not send a permanent envoy to Istanbul even in the 
nineteenth century was considered to be strange, and the Ottomans wondered how 
China could be considered to be an empire.812 
 
6.1.2.2 The Ottoman Protocol, Ceremonies and Practices: Euro-Ottoman 
Symbiosis 
 
The heterogeneous and cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman diplomatic methods was 
different from those of Europe. The Ottoman diplomacy was based on 
Islamic/Ottoman, pre-Islamic and universal principles. The institutional bricolage 
upon which the empire was built also influenced Ottoman diplomacy. Costas M. 
Constantinou suggests that an approach differentiating the Ottoman, Islamic and 
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universal features of the Ottoman diplomacy to compare it with the “European-
turned-universal” would be misleading. Constantinou also notes that “to seek 
‘Muslim’ features in the diplomacy of the Ottoman empire, an empire that 
incorporated other religions too, and where Christians, e.g., Greeks, Armenians, and 
many other Europeans, participated in the formulation and execution of imperial 
diplomacy” is wrong. 813 
 
6.1.2.2.1 The Ottoman Protocol 
 
Ottomans also practiced European diplomatic protocol, but sometimes the issues of 
precedence and equality created problems among the diplomatic corps. The rank of 
the ambassadors in the Ottomans’ protocol list and the Empire’s designation of the 
most favored nation changed, based on the relations and personal contacts of the 
ambassadors with the Ottoman élite.814 This at times led to frictions and rivalry 
among the diplomatic corps. The British, French and the Dutch rivaled each other. 
When the British obtained special trading privileges in 1583 and then the Dutch in 
1612, the French were concerned that they lost their prestige at the Porte.815 The 
French and English tried to prevent the Dutch Ambassador Cornelis Haga’s reception 
by the Sultan. The European rivalry on the continent and overseas was also reflected 
                                               
813Costas M. Constantinou, “Diplomacy, Grotesque Realism, and Ottoman Historiography,” 
Postcolonial Studies, 3 (2000): 213-226.  
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at the Porte.816 For centuries, however, France ranked first in the Ottoman protocol 
list as the esteemed ally of the Empire.  
 
6.1.2.2.2 The Ottoman Ceremonies 
 
The majority of the ambassadors of the European monarchs did not experience any 
problem in direct contacts with the ruling élite of the state to which they were 
assigned.  In the Ottoman Empire, this was not the case. The complicated, 
hierarchical bureaucracy of the Empire prevented the direct and private meeting of 
the representatives of European powers with the Sultan. This practice, defined as one 
of the unconventionalities of Ottoman diplomacy, is offered as an evidence of 
Ottomans’ unequal treatment of Europeans. However, it should be noted that few of 
the high-ranking officers within the Ottoman bureaucratic organization could meet 
directly and privately with the Sultan. As noted above, even the Reis ül-Küttab first 
reported to the Vezir-i Âzam, and if the Vezir-i Âzam considered it an issue worthy of 
the Sultan’s attention, only then the matter was presented directly to the Sultan. 
Therefore, European representatives were generally accepted by the Grand Vizier or 
by one of the ministers in the Ottoman Court.817  Although the Europeans considered 
this an unusual practice, Constantinou notes that it was another Byzantine legacy to 
                                               
816Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. de Groot and Maurits H. van den Boogert eds., Friends and Rivals 
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817Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” 114130; Arı, “Early Ottoman 
Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period,” 3665; Savaş, Osmanlı Diplomasisi, 7078.  
  
285 
the Ottomans. The Byzantine emperors also used intermediaries called logothetes to 
communicate with the foreign delegates.818  
 
Ceremonies and receptions were considered to be of utmost importance and thus 
were magnificent. Preparations lasted for days for these colorful events. In the 
receptions of foreign delegations, the envoys were first welcomed by the Mirahur 
(the master of the horses) at the outer gate of the Topkapı Palace with dozens of 
decorated horses and janissaries. The envoy was first met by the Vezir-i Âzam and 
then the Sultan at the Imperial Chancery. This was followed by the exchange of 
letters of goodwill and presents. The letter of goodwill and friendship and the gifts to 
be presented to the Sultan were all indicated and agreed upon in the capitulations. 
These ceremonies, which lasted for hours, were considered long and arduous by the 
foreign envoys. However, according to the Turkic and Islamic traditions, they were 
signs of hospitality and honor given to the person of the envoy and the state he 
represented. The Ottoman exchanges of ambassadors at the frontiers, called 
mubadele, were also extremely ceremonial events.819 Ottomans attached great 
importance to protocol and etiquette. These also applied to the Ottoman delegations 
sent abroad. It took months for an Ottoman delegation to be prepared; the gifts to be 
presented were selected with great attention and care. Generally, delegations 
consisted of many people. To give an example, İbrahim Paşa’s delegation sent to 
Vienna consisted of 763 accompanying persons. As of the mid-eighteenth century, 
                                               
818Constantinou, “Diplomacy, Grotesque Realism, and Ottoman Historiography,”217. See also Harold 
Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, (London: Cassell, 1954), 26.   
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the Empire even had a separate treasury named elçi hazinesi (envoy treasury) to meet 
the expenses of its delegations abroad.820  
 
Indeed, the grandeur of the Ottoman delegations fascinated the Europeans. For 
example, the delegation of Mehmed Çelebi aroused great interest in Paris. The 
Ottoman delegation’s attire and presents led to a new trend all over Europe known as 
Turquerie.  Ottoman style clothing, decorations, and motifs were imitated.821  
 
6.1.2.2.3 The Ottoman Diplomatic Practices  
 
The Ottoman diplomatic practices were also of a heterodox nature. The fact that the 
Empire was predominantly an Islamic state did not preclude the conduct of its 
relations with the outside world on the basis of both Islamic and universal practices. 
Three practices dominated the early Ottoman diplomacy: the use of dynastic 
marriages to conclude alliances and treaties, the threatening use of the Seven Towers, 
and the use of capitulations to regulate commercial and diplomatic relations.  
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6.1.2.2.3.1 Marriage Diplomacy: A Common Practice  
The Ottomans, starting from the early days of the beylik, concluded alliances and 
practiced diplomacy with the Byzantine Empire, Anatolian beyliks and southeastern 
European powers. The House of Osman was not different in its foreign and domestic 
policy orientations from the European dynastic states. The highest concerns of the 
succeeding rulers and sultans were the maintenance of internal peace and order; the 
preservation of the dynastic rule of the House of Osman within the expanding 
boundaries of the beylik and then the Empire; and the securing of allies against 
enemies.  
Just like its European counterparts, the early Ottoman Empire’s policies were also 
characterized by the principles of dynasticism. The Ottomans extended their power 
and rule over new territories through use of military power and/or boundary and 
alliance treaties. Marriage diplomacy, which was a common practice among dynastic 
European powers from medieval to Napoleonic times, was also considered an 
effective tool of Ottoman external relations. The Ottomans used dynastic marriages 
with the Byzantine, East European and Balkan royal houses as well as Turcoman 
beyliks for increasing their territories, extending their rule and gaining allies and 
mercenary troops. To give a few examples, it is known that Orhan I’s first wife 
Nilüfer Hatun was the daughter of a Byzantine feudal lord. His second wife was the 
Byzantine Emperor Andronicus III Palaeologus’s (also written as Andronikos III 
Palaiologos) daughter, Asporsha.822 Later, when Cantacuzenus requested Ottoman 
military support and aid in 1346, he offered marriage of his daughter Theodora Maria 
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to Orhan. An Ottoman force of 20,000 men under the command of Süleyman Paşa 
(son of Orhan) was sent to fight against the Serbs, and in return, the Ottomans further 
reinforced their alliance with Byzantium by conclusion of a dynastic marriage 
agreement of the Emperor’s daughter to Orhan I. By this marriage, Orhan I also 
received the privilege to conduct military operations and incursions into Thrace 
under Byzantine rule.823  
Succeeding Ottoman sultans continued with this policy. Sultan Murad I married the 
sister of the Bulgarian King Ivan Shishman, Maria Tahamara, to secure the territories 
gained and to conclude peace. He also married Pasha Melek, daughter of Kızıl 
Murad Bey, in order to secure their rule in Anatolia.824 Bayezid I (also known as 
Yıldırım – the Thunderbolt) was married to Olivera Despina (or Mileva), the 
daughter of Lazar of Serbia. It is known that his brother in law, Stefan Lazarević, 
fought along with Bayezid I in a number of battles, the most famous of which was 
the Battle of Ankara in 1402 against the forces of the Timurid Empire.825 This was a 
tradition of the Anatolian Seljuks continued by the Ottomans; there were marriages 
between high- ranking Seljuk aristocrats with those of the beyliks and Byzantium. 
Marriage diplomacy, however, did not prevent future conflicts or wars between the 
Ottomans and their allies. Diplomacy and alliances were highly fragile. As noted in 
Chapter Two, Machiavellian thinking dominated medieval politics; for the sake of 
dynasties, lies were told, rivals were supported, and alliances and trusts were often 
broken. Therefore, in the practice of marriage diplomacy the Ottoman Empire was no 
different from the early modern European states. This common practice continued 
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well into the nineteenth century. Napoleon Bonaparte’s divorce from Josephine, who 
had borne him no heir, and his marriage to Austrian Princess Marie-Louise to seal 
the alliance between France and Austria, is exemplary of the continuation of the 
practice.  
 
6.1.2.2.3.2 The Seven Towers: A Common Practice  
 
Most of the time these representatives were treated well, but under conditions of war 
they were held in the Seven Towers as “prisoners of war,” in today’s terms. The 
captive foreign representatives were used for trading of information, as leverage for 
influence, or as mediators.826 The threat of the Seven Towers was an effective 
instrument of Ottoman diplomacy. It was also a factor in the Ottoman preference of 
non-resident diplomacy, by means of which the possibility of Ottoman hostages in 
the hands of rival powers in times of conflict was ruled out.827  
 
This was not an unusual practice for Europeans, although it is generally referred to as 
one of the unconventionalities of Ottoman diplomacy. During the VenetianOttoman 
wars, the Muslim and Turkish merchants residing in Venice at the Fondaco dei 
Turchi (Turkish Trade Office) were held captive by the Venetian authorities. During 
the Battle of Lepanto (1571), the Turkish merchants residing in the Fondaco dei 
Turchi took refuge in their residence at Cannaregio. Even in peace time, the Turkish 
merchants residing in the Republic of Venice were restricted in their daily life, and 
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the area they lived was kept guarded like a ghetto.828 Another example was the arrest 
of the Ottoman envoy, Zülfikâr Paşa, and his delegation sent to Vienna to inform the 
Austrian Emperor Leopold I of the succession of Süleyman II to the throne. The 
hidden aim of the mission was to achieve a conciliation, and, if possible, a 
conclusion of peace. Having fought Austria, Poland and Venice on separate fronts 
for years after the failure of the Second Siege of Vienna (1683), the Ottomans were 
exhausted and wanted peace. The timing of the diplomatic mission was unfortunate 
(corresponding to the ongoing war). The Ottoman delegation was kept under arrest in 
unpleasant conditions from 1688 to 1692. In his sefaratnâme, Zülfikâr Paşa 
expressed his feelings of disappointment and degradation caused by the ill treatment 
of the Austrian authorities.829 Indeed, the imprisonment of foreign representatives 
during war time was a common Byzantine practice known as Xenodochium 
Romanorum. In Nicolson’s words, Seven Towers was a prison for the esteemed 
where the visitors watched.830 Similar practices were also common in Moscow and 
Peking.831  
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6.1.2.2.3.3 The Capitulations: The Ahdnâmes, Amâns and Protégé System in 
Commercial, Consular and Diplomatic Relations  
 
The commercial and diplomatic relations of the Empire832 were organized through 
use of capitulations (Ahdnâmes – covenant letters) and Amâns (guarantees). The 
capitulations were decrees that unilaterally granted privileges and extraterritorial 
rights to resident Europeans in the Ottoman Empire by the Sultans. The capitulations 
conferred a privileged status upon foreigners residing in Ottoman territories, 
particularly those dealing with trade. In general terms, capitulations included the 
following rights: liberty of travel and worship, safe conduct, tax exemption, and 
criminal and commercial extraterritorial jurisdiction.833 The foreigners thus exempted 
from Islamic law and taxes enjoyed extraterritorial rights and the rule of their 
countries. Nasim Sousa defined this practice as an example of “the personality of the 
law,” meaning that the law of a country followed its citizen everywhere he/she 
went.834 The first capitulations were granted unilaterally and non-reciprocally to 
enable safe conduct. They were valid for the life of the grantor Sultan. The successor 
Sultans retained the right to review, modify, renew or abolish the capitulations. As 
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the Ottoman-Venetian Treaty 1517,” De Turcicis Aliisque Rebus Commentarii Henry Hofman 
Dedicati, Utrecht Turcological Series III (1992): 79104; Hans Peter Alexander Theunissen, 
OttomanVenetian Diplomatics: The ‘Ahd-names – The Historical Background and Development of a 
Category of PoliticalCommercial Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of Corpus 
Relevant Documents, EJOS, Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies, I (1998): 1689.  
833James B. Angell, “The Turkish Capitulations,” The American Historical Review,  6 (1901): 256. 
834Ruud Peters and Bernard Weiss eds., The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Perception, 
Theory and Practice in the 18th Century, (Boston: Brill, 2005), 1961. See also Shih Shun Liu, 
Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Its Decline, (New York: Columbia University, 1925), 6175. 
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Naff puts it, capitulations were mere reflections of the Ottoman view of “the 
inferiority of the Christian West,” since the Sultan did not accept the sovereign 
equality of his European counterparts and unilaterally granted the capitulations with 
the right to declare them void whenever he decided.835 The unilateral granting of 
capitulations did not preclude these treaties from having both commercial and 
political reciprocal clauses. To give an example, the Ottoman and Venetian 
Ahdnâmes of 1430 recognized the same rights granted to Ottoman merchants in 
Venetian territories and dominions.836  
 
The fact that the Ottoman Empire did not have resident embassies abroad and that it 
was predominantly an Islamic state did not preclude conduct of its relations with the 
outside world on the basis of equality (taken as reciprocity within the context of the 
capitulations),837 universal practices and rules. To give another example, the Peace 
Treaty between Mehmed II and the Doge of Venice dated 1446 was written in Greek.  
The Doge and the Sultan are referred to as authentic (Highness), which is a Greek 
expression to designate sovereignty. In the early days of the beylik, the Ottomans 
used the Greek language in conducting their external affairs and treaties. The other 
striking feature of this treaty was the reiteration of equal rights granted to Venetian 
and Ottoman merchants.838  
 
                                               
835Naff, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the Eighteenth Century,” 98. 
836Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The ‘Ahd-names, 195196. 
837Reşat Arım, Foreign Policy Concepts, Conjecture, Freedom of Action, Equaliy, (Ankara: Dış 
Politika Enstitütüsü, 2001), 45. 
838Karl-Heinz Ziegler, “The Peace Treaties of the Ottoman Empire with European Christian Powers,” 
in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History, ed. Lesaffer, 338364. For the original 
text, see Theunissen, OttomanVenetian Diplomatics: The ‘Ahd-names, 197.  
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It is known that extraterritorial rights similar to Ottoman capitulations were exercised 
by earlier civilizations. The Anatolian Seljuks and the Byzantine Empire also granted 
trade privileges and safeguarded the conduct of Levantine trade with the Italian city-
states through capitulations. The Ottomans after the conquest of Istanbul continued 
with this and granted capitulations to Italian city-states (Genoa, Venice, Florence and 
Naples), France, Britain, and the Dutch Republic.839  
 
The development of capitulary regimes between Muslim and non-Muslims is 
generally attributed to the differences of religious understandings of trade. It is 
argued that the Muslims, reluctant to trade and travel in foreign lands, used 
capitulations to attract foreigners to trade in their lands and ports.840 In the Ottoman 
understanding, the capitulations were, indeed, more than simple commercial 
dealings.841 The Empire’s political considerations and balance of power politics 
played an important factor in the granting of the capitulations. Even the first set of 
capitulations had a political side. They were used as tools for concluding an alliance 
with France against their common enemy, the Hapsburgs. Later capitulations granted 
to Holland and Britain were also seen as ways to deal with common enemies and 
used for establishing friendly/cooperative relations. Thus, these measures determined 
the basis of Ottoman political relations with these states in the following centuries.842 
The capitulations were considered important tools for establishing good and friendly 
                                               
839Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlı’nın Avrupa ile Barışıklığıı: Kapitülasyonlar ve Ticaret,” Doğu Batı 6 
(2003): 5581.  
840Paul Pradier-Fodéré, Revue de Droit International, (Paris, 1869), 119, cited in Angell, “The Turkish 
Capitulations,” 255. 
841Nasim Sousa, The Capitulary Regime of Turkey,  (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1933), 15.  
842A. H. De Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Earliest Diplomatic 
Relations, 16101630, (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut Leiden/Istanbul, 
1978). 
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relations. In the introductory and body parts of the capitulations, the mutual promises 
to keep good and friendly relations were repeated.843 The Ottoman recognition of 
capitulations to France in 1535 as well as to Britain in 1579 and the Dutch Republic 
in 1615 had pragmatic reasons. France was the Catholic rival and Britain and the 
Dutch Republic the Protestant rivals of the Hapsburgs – the major enemy of the 
Ottomans.  
 
As noted above, over time, capitulary rights were extended to include the berats 
(protégés) – which conferred the right of protection recognized as being given to 
foreign powers. This right has been abused and used for political reasons. Berats 
were sold to local traders – Greeks and Armenians under the protégés of these 
powers conducted trade with tax exemptions.844 As the Empire lost its advantageous 
position in international relations, particularly after the Treaty of Passarowitz, the 
capitulatory states started to dictate the terms of the capitulations. The European 
powers and the Ottoman Empire’s Christian subjects gained private rights for buying 
and selling all kinds of goods. Broader treaty privileges and standards of justice 
turned in favor of the Europeans. The capitulations extended guarantees and the 
principle of reciprocity to the high seas, particularly to the western Mediterranean 
region.845  
 
Capitulations soon became tools in the hands of the powerful against the weak 
Ottomans. They became reciprocal and continuously binding. The fact that the 
                                               
843Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The ‘Ahd-names, 195196. 
844Salahi Sonyel, “The Protege System in the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Islamic Studies, 2 (1991): 
56-66. Peters and Weiss eds., The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System, 61115. 
845Naff, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the Eighteenth Century,” 99. 
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Sultans no longer had the right to declare them null and void, in line with the 
political context, destroyed the reciprocity. In other words, capitulations became a 
type of “unequal treaties,” like the Treaty of Nanking concluded between China and 
the Western Powers (1842) after the Opium War, used for Western penetration of the 
Empire. The Ottoman administration tried to annul the capitulations, working against 
its interests in the Paris Congress of 1856, and then in 1862. The European powers 
opposed any change in the system that would favor the Ottomans. Eventually, this 
practice led to the Empire’s economic decline. 
 
6.1.3 The Resident Ottoman Diplomacy (1793-1856): Characteristics, Principles 
and Practices 
 
By the late eighteenth century, the European powers had trained diplomats, as well as 
a network of permanent missions and foreign ministries. Still, the control of foreign 
policy was executed by few, and foreign ministries, as small establishments, 
performed basic clerical tasks. The actual separation of diplomacy from politics as a 
profession came later with the further bureaucratic institutionalization and 
renovations in communications technology. These led to changes in the conduct of 
diplomacy. Until the nineteenth century, the major task of diplomats was the 
settlement of disputes and arrangement of peace treaties.  
 
Studies by Roderic Davison and Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj revealed that though the 
Ottoman Empire did not have an established foreign ministry and a network of 
trained diplomats, the Ottoman negotiators carried out principled and skillful 
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negotiations in the Karlofça (1699) and Küçük Kaynarca (1774).846 It can be argued 
that from 1699 onwards, as a notable end result of the Treaty of Karlofça, Ottoman 
relations with the outside world changed radically.847 The loss of important territories 
and changing balance in favor the Ottomans’ two major enemies – Austria and 
Russia – brought a transformation in the Ottoman mindset. The fact that the Empire 
was the defeated party at the negotiation table with no capability to dictate led to the 
Ottoman realization that they were no longer a great power and that if extensive 
reforms were not carried out, they would face the fate reserved for weak powers like 
Poland – partition at the hands of the strong. Under the reigns of Selim III and 
Mahmud II, a series of radical military and administrative reforms were carried out. 
The most important of these was the bureaucratization of Ottoman diplomacy with 
the establishment of permanent embassies and the foundation of a foreign ministry.  
 
6.1.3.1 Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II: The Founding of 
Permanent Embassies and Foreign Ministry 
 
The Ottoman reform process corresponds to the French Revolution. In the majority 
of the studies concerned with the subject, the Ottoman policy regarding the intra-
European affairs is described as distant and disinterested. It is, therefore, common to 
find arguments that the Ottomans took little interest in the events taking place in 
France until Napoleon and the French forces under his command occupied Egypt. 
                                               
846Roderic H. Davison, “Russian Skill and Turkish Imbellicity: The Tteaty of Kuchuk Kainardji 
Reconsidered,” Slavic Review, 35 (1976):463–483; Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Diplomacy at 
Karlowitz,” in Yurdusev, ed. Ottoman Diplomacy, 2004, 89-113.  
847See Virginia H. Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace – Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-
1783, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 18–19; Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream – The Story of the Ottoman 
Empire 1800-1923, (Great Britain: John Murray, 2005), 333; Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? 
Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response , (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 17; 
Quartaert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, 78–80. 
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The Empire, on the contrary, since its inception was interested and connected in one 
way or another to Europe since they were a part of the intra-European balance of 
power politics. Changes within the European interstate system were, therefore, of 
great significance for the Ottoman Sultans in safeguarding the territorial integrity and 
security of the Empire.  
 
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, both the Ottoman Empire and European 
powers, conscious of the decreasing military power of the Turks, knew that their 
futures were tied to each other. France had long been a traditional ally of the Empire, 
and the French had been aiding the Empire in its military and technological reforms 
ever since the Tulip Era. The continuation of good and friendly relations with France 
was deemed essential for the modernization and westernization of the Empire. The 
French Revolution, along with the pressure of the Allies on the Ottomans, however, 
made relations difficult. The Revolution corresponded to a period when the Empire 
was preoccupied with a two-front war against Austria-Russia (1787-1792) and 
internal reactions against reforms within the army and administration. The Empire 
was relieved by the Revolution. It diverted attention from the Ottoman territories to 
France. The conclusion of the Peace Treaties of Ziştovi (1791) and Jassy (1792)848 led 
to six years of peace with Europe and enabled Selim III to concentrate on reforms 
and the internal problems of the Empire without fear of an imminent attack. 849 
                                               
848For details of the negotiations of the Ziştovi and Yaş peace treaties, see Câbî Ömer Efendi, Câbî 
Târihi – Târîhi Sultân Selim-i Sâlis ve Mahmûd-ı Sânî – Tahlîl ve Tenkidli Metin I  [Câbî History – 
History of Sultan Selim II and Sultan Mahmut II – Analytical and Critical Text Vol. I], prepared by 
Mehmet Ali Beyan, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), 28-31.  
849Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New – The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807,  
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 247. 
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The French Revolution increased the need to gather first-hand information on Europe 
and speeded up the establishment of permanent and resident embassies. This led to 
the transition of Ottoman diplomacy from unconventional to conventional 
methods.850 The Empire started sending its envoys for longer periods, and during the 
Revolution, a number of Ottoman diplomats were in Europe. Throughout the course 
of the Revolution, the Empire received direct and indirect intelligence through the 
dispatches and reports of the Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna, Ebubekir Ratib 
Efendi851 as well as from the French Embassy, which was still open, and other foreign 
embassies in Istanbul. Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi, through the use of his diplomatic 
contacts not just in Vienna but all over Europe, was sending dispatches and reports 
about the developments within and outside of France. He was in contact not just with 
the Austrians but also with the French émigrés and Jacobins. Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi, 
who later became the Reisül-kȗttab, was highly trusted and respected by the Sultan, 
having previously served as his tutor while he was prince.852 In his dispatches, Ratıb 
Efendi noted that France was a dynamic millet (unlike the Habsburgs – a state with a 
single religion, nation, and language) and a non-dismissible European power, and 
would sooner or later regain its status. Therefore, he advised the Sultan to wait 
before acting.853 He also warned Istanbul that the time was ripe for concentrating on 
the reform process, as the Revolution would have a spill-over effect all over Europe 
and last for many years.854 
                                               
850For detailed analyses of Ottoman diplomacy with its unconventional and conventional features, see 
Yurdusev ed., Ottoman Diplomacy, 2004. See also Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European 
States System,” 141-152. 
851Fatih Yeşil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Otoman Eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi’s 
Observations,” Bullation of SOAS, 70 (2007): 283–304; Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of 
Europe, (London: Norton, 1982).  
852Yeşil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Otoman Eyes,” 283–304. 
853Yeşil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Otoman Eyes,” 283–304. 
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Until the political scene in Europe calmed down, Ottoman relations with the new 
regime in France were put on hold. Selim III hesitated in his diplomatic moves and 
initiatives toward France; the Empire preferred to wait for the European great powers 
to act first. Meanwhile, it also stayed away from European alignments. Naturally, 
Selim III wanted to ally his weakening Empire with the strong, victorious powers 
and, therefore, waited until the strong side was determined at the end of the wars.855 
The major concern of the Sublime Porte was to find itself a new powerful ally. Under 
the circumstances, securing British foreign support for the reform initiatives seemed 
to be a viable and pragmatic solution.856 The Ottoman elite highly appreciated the 
William Pitt government’s reaction to Russian expansion and fortification in the 
Black Sea region at the expense of the Ottomans. This event elevated Britain to the 
status of a potential ally, while the future of France was uncertain. Sultan Selim III 
decided to send the first Ottoman resident mission to London rather than to Paris.857 
Later, between 1793 and 1796, the Empire sent permanent missions to Vienna, 
Berlin, and Paris.  
 
The first ambassadors, however, proved to be mostly ineffective and unsuccessful. 
Though they were chosen from highly respected members of the Ottoman ruling 
elite, the bureaucracy, or the ulema, the Ottoman envoys were not trained as 
professional, career diplomats. They were not experts in conducting European 
diplomacy and protocol. Moreover, some of the ambassadors did not speak foreign 
languages and, thus, they were dependent on the dragomans chosen from Ottoman 
                                               
855 Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi. Wajda Sendesni, Regard de L’Historiographie 
Ottomane sur la Révolution Française et L’Expédition d’Egypte – Tarih-i Cevdet, Les Cahiers du 
Bosphore XXVII, (Istanbul: Les Editions Isis, 2003), 59–75.  
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minorities with perfect knowledge of foreign languages. There was a need to develop 
the communications system and technology. It took days and months to send 
information to the Porte and receive instructions from Istanbul. Furthermore, resident 
embassies added to the increasing costs of the Empire. Consequently, by the 1820s, 
the Ottoman state suspended this system, called back its ambassadors, and left the 
dragomans as chargé d’affaires and consuls for organizing commercial links with 
European powers.858  
 
The westernization and bureaucratization attempts of the Ottoman Empire gathered 
momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century during the last years of 
Sultan Mahmut II. In 1833 and 1836, respectively, the new Tercüme Odası 
(Translation Bureau/Department) and the Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) were founded. The Reis-ül-küttab, responsible for foreign affairs, 
was now called the Nazır (Minister of Foreign Affairs). Tercüme Odası gained more 
importance, and in 1859, Mülkiye (the Imperial School) was established to train civil 
bureaucrats and diplomats.859 The inventions in the field of telecommunications, 
particularly the use of the telegraph, accelerated the communications network 
between the Empire and its missions abroad. In addition to the four existing 
embassies (London, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris), new embassies were opened in 
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Teheran, Athens, Stockholm, St. Petersburg, Turin, Brussels, and Washington 
respectively. During the Tanzimat era, within this new administrative structure, the 
role and importance of the European model-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
outstanding.860 
 
Apart from the conduct of foreign affairs, the Ministry was involved in the 
formulation and initiation of internal reforms. Its leading role in the reform 
movement resulted from the fact that the personnel required for the initiation of the 
reforms with the knowledge and expertise of Europe were concentrated mainly at the 
Ministry.861 Under the Nazır’s direction, a European-style ministry gradually 
developed. Similarly, professional diplomats and bureaucrats with European 
outlooks and methods were trained. These men were conversant in French and 
sometimes were more European in their manners than some European bureaucrats. 
For example, Keçecizâde Fuad Paşa, Mehmet Emin Âli Paşa, Halil Şerif Paşa, and 
Mehmet Reşit Paşa were all diplomats and reformers who later became Foreign 
Ministers and Vezir-i Âzams. 862 
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6.1.3.2 Characteristics, Principles and Practices of the Tanzimat Diplomacy 
 
In the nineteenth century, there was a convergence of Ottoman interests with those of 
the major European great powers. The British were concerned about securing their 
trade route to India – which was the jewel of the British crown colonies. The 
Austrians’ policies and interests in southeastern Europe were challenged by those of 
Russia. Russian Slavic expansionism in the region at the expense of Austria was not 
desirable, and the safety of weaker Ottoman control was to the benefit of the 
Austrian Empire. The French, on the other hand, being isolated, desired to reverse 
the increasing British influence both on the continent and in the Near East. The 
Ottomans, pressured by the direct Russian threat, wanted to keep their borders intact 
and territories under control through European alignments. There was a convergence 
of national interests: a common interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire at 
least for the sake of the local European balance of power (equilibrium for the 
preservation of the European Great Power collective hegemony) and worldwide 
equilibrium.  
 
The bureaucratic reforms of the Tanzimat era led to a complete break from the ad 
hoc diplomacy of the earlier period. The Tanzimat diplomacy became reciprocal, 
continuous and westernized. The establishment of Ottoman embassies in major 
European cities enabled the Porte to be more actively involved in Europe. The 
developments in Europe were considered essential for the Empire’s future survival. 
The Ottoman ruling élite, however, did not desire to be a part of the European 
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pluralistic international society crystallized in the Concert of Europe for security and 
survival reasons alone. The centuries-long political, military, economic and socio-
cultural encounters and acculturation also led to an ideational change ‘from security 
through power to security through order’ at the intellectual level. They were aware of 
the fact that the European interstate relations had been fundamentally altered with the 
French Revolution and that in the post-Vienna international order; the Empire could 
only regain its great power status by the Great Powers’ recognition of it as a 
European power. As noted by Lewis, the Porte was aware of the fact that the Empire 
was no longer recognized as a great power, “but one state among several, among 
whom there might be allies as well as enemies.”863 War as an institution of statecraft 
was regarded as a waste of resources and power, while diplomacy and international 
law were regarded as safer and reliable institutions. To control the threat posed by 
European powers and to direct the Empire’s sources to reforms, the Porte 
interchangeably and simultaneously used the primary international institutions in 
Ottoman foreign policy. Throughout this adaptation and strategic learning period, the 
Empire formulated its foreign policy on the basis of a number of principles which 
were deemed to be essential for the Ottoman survival: preserving the sovereignty of 
the empire, securing the Great Powers’ guaranty and support of Ottoman integrity, 
achieving recognition as an equal member of the Concert of Europe, supporting 
legitimate governments and international law, and avoiding war through support of 
another power and strategic retreat.864 
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The utmost importance was placed on the preservation of the independence and 
integrity of the Empire. To this end, the Ottoman ruling élite tried to thwart wars and 
used every opportunity to achieve official declaration of the Great Powers’ guaranty 
of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman 
representatives abroad were instructed to uphold this principle above all. 865 
Prevention of foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Empire, recognition of 
its territorial unity with its population, and sovereign control over imperial territories 
determined the basis of Ottoman diplomacy. To quote Roderic H. Davison, “For the 
nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, diplomacy became more important than ever. 
To survive in a Europe ordered by five, then six, great powers, the empire needed all 
the diplomatic defence it could master.”866 The weakness of the Empire in 
comparison to European powers was unquestionable, neither on the side of the 
Europeans nor on the side of the Ottomans. However, to assume that it was only as a 
result of its weakening power that the Empire applied diplomacy or international law 
in its relations with the outside world would be an incomplete analysis, as it 
overlooks the change that had been going on within the Ottoman political thinking 
for quite a long time.  
 
6.1.3.3 The Connection between the Tanzimat Reforms and External Crises 
 
The major administrative and political trends of the Tanzimat included the 
abolishment of the patrimonial system of governance, which maintained the 
functional differentiation of governmental branches; an increasing division of 
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governmental powers, leading to the establishment of an Ottoman parliament and an 
Ottoman constitution; a differentiation of the means of physical force, according to 
the separate realms of internal and external security; and the introduction of a new 
system of provincial administration. All of those trends indicated a transformation 
from a traditional imperial system toward a legal nation-state.867  
 
From the 1830s onwards, Sultan Abdülmecit, who succeeded Mahmut II, embarked 
upon an extensive and intensive program of reforms known as the Tanzimat reforms. 
In the Tanzimat era, the center of power shifted from the palace to the Porte (i.e., the 
bureaucracy). Though carried out independently, these reforms had an important 
connection with the Empire’s foreign policy and international situation. Ottoman 
leaders acknowledged that it was vital for them to convince their European 
counterparts that the Empire could reform along Western lines, adapt to the modern 
world, and join the European civilization and system; that the Empire could be a 
valuable economic and commercial partner to Europe; and that the good treatment of 
its non-Muslim subjects, which was of utmost concern for Europeans, could be 
guaranteed. 
 
The beginning of the Tanzimat era coincided with the Ottomans’ attempts to solve a 
number of international crises, and the Empire needed the support of its European 
allies, who were great powers. An imperial edict was written by the leading reformer 
of the time, Foreign Minister Reşit Paşa, who promulgated reforms in the name of 
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the Sultan. This edict, called Gülhane Hatt-i Şerifi,868 promised four basic Ottoman 
reforms: “The establishment of guarantees of life, honor and property of the Sultan’s 
subjects; an orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax farming; a system 
of conscription for the army; and equality before the law of all subjects, whatever 
their religion.”869 Reforms were either reckoned necessary by the major Ottoman 
bureaucrats or enforced by the great European powers. This top-down character also 
applied to the reforms under Selim III and Mahmud II and to the reform edicts of the 
Tanzimat period. Both the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane and the subsequent Hatt-ı 
Hümayun of 1840 and 1856 aimed at the complete reconstruction of the Ottoman 
state along Western lines.  
 
However, it would be wrong to attribute the reforms to foreign pressure alone. These 
reforms and edicts were used to gain foreign support, but they were also the result of 
the Ottoman leaders’ valid belief that the only way to save the Empire was to 
introduce Westernization and European-style reforms. Yet, the Tanzimat edicts must 
be analyzed against the background of both the inter-state competition of the 
European states system and the power struggle within the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Ottoman statesmen dealt with a multiplicity of relatively autonomous actors on the 
inter-state and intra-state levels. As mentioned above, from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century onwards, the Empire gradually became a “zone of conflict.” 
                                               
868 Zücher, Turkey – A Modern History, 45–48; Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman 
Empire, 72-109. 
869 Zücher, Turkey – A Modern History, 52; Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 
72-109. 
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Numerous crises and wars erupted, one after another, in the Ottoman territories. 
Traditional Ottoman methods proved to be inadequate. Ottoman leaders recognized 
that the Empire could not win a war with a major European power unless one or 
more strong powers supported it. The Empire’s apparently weakening status in 
international politics, its ineffectiveness in resolving its problems with traditional 
methods, and its inability to prevent the internationalization of its internal crises led 
to a great change in the Ottoman approach to security. These problems revealed the 
need for fundamental changes in the political, administrative, military, diplomatic, 
and socio-economic structures of the Ottoman imperial rule. The Hatt-ı Serif of 
Gülhane belonged to an era in which the Empire’s territorial integrity was threatened 
by Serbian revolts, the Greek War of Independence, the rise of Muhammed Ali, and 
the Egyptian crisis. The Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 was designed to facilitate the 
admittance of the Empire to the “Concert of Europe” at the Paris Conference, which 
terminated the Crimean War.  
 
The Tanzimat era’s reforms (as foreseen in both edicts) were more radical and 
extensive in scope than earlier ones. However, all of these reforms enhanced state 
authority, undermined the role of the ulema and the janissary, and increased foreign 
interference in Ottoman affairs in all realms. The Ottomans needed greater 
independence and space, along with sufficient external stability and security. The 
reforms gave the Ottomans the time and space they needed. Eventually, however, the 
reforms’ failure to provide security and order gave rise to fundamentalist and 
nationalist opposition, providing an opportunity for the Young Turk Revolution. 
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6.2 Ottoman Perception of International Law  
 
The Ottoman conception of the law of nations was based on the Islamic and 
pragmatic nature of the state. As noted above, the Ottomans entered into alliances, 
concluded peace treaties, and established diplomatic, commercial and dynastic 
relations with the non-Muslim states. The Ottomans’ pragmatic interpretation and 
understanding of the world and Islam enabled interlocution and acculturation of the 
two worlds separated by religion. The Ottoman perception and practice of 
international law can be divided into two eras. The first era, from 1299 to 1839, was 
dominated by Islamic law. The second era, from 1839 to the demise of the Empire in 
1923, was characterized by the joint application and practice of Islamic and 
European-style secular and modern laws.  
 
6.2.1 The Euro-OttomanSymbiosis: Dâr-al Harb, Dâr-al Sulh and Dâr-al Islam 
 
The Siyar – the Islamic law of nations – is not a coherent system of laws separate 
from the law of Islam. Its main preoccupation is the conception and practice of Jihad 
and its raison d’être. Over time, it has broadened to include rules regulating relations 
with other states and nations like treaty-making. As noted by Majid Khadduri, “Just 
as the ius gentium, an extension of the jus civile, was designed by the Romans to 
regulate their relations with the non-Romans, so was the siyar, an extension of the 
sharî’a, designed to govern the relationship of Muslims with non-Muslims at a time 
when Islam came into contact with them.”870 The Islamic law was the law of all 
                                               
870Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations – Shaybānī’s Siyar, (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1966), 118; Yasuaki, “When was the Law of International Society Born?” 1822. 
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mankind. It was founded during the expansion of Islam after the Prophet 
Muhammad, and for that reason it was meant to be universal.  
 
Siyar’s binding force was not based on reciprocity or mutual consent. In other words, 
it was not binding on non-Muslims unless they so desired. It was binding on Muslim 
states. Nevertheless, certain rules required reciprocity, such as diplomatic immunity 
or exchange of prisoners. This is also related to the fact that at the initial stages of the 
Islamic expansion, it was believed that the whole world would convert to Islam. 
This, however, was not realized, and the Muslim states had established relations with 
non-Muslim states. As noted above, the Islamic law of nations centered on the 
concept of umma – meaning Islamic community – divides the world into mainly two 
realms: dâr al-Islam and dâr- al-harb.871 All those territories left beyond the borders 
of Islam were considered to be the “abode of war.” Dâr al-sulh, on the other hand, is 
a contribution of the Shafi school of law whereby the Muslims and non-Muslims can 
peacefully coexist.  Islamic states and rulers can enter into treaty relations with the 
non-Christians on the condition that these treatises will not be permanent. The 
alliances and the commercial relations between the Ottoman Empire and the 
European powers are examples of this rule. Permanent and long-lasting treaty 
relations with non-Muslims are not restricted to preclude integration of the non-
Muslims with the Islamic world. The major duty of all Islamic states is jihad.  Siyar, 
therefore, mainly dealt with jihad. 872  
 
                                               
871Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, 118; Yasuaki, “When was the Law of International Society 
Born?” 1822. 
872Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, 118.  
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The Ottoman sultan was considered to be above all. The sultan was the sole authority 
and ruler within the borders of the Empire. In the modern understanding, the sultan 
was the head of the executive and legislative branches. Still, his rule was not 
absolute. His legislative power was limited. In Shariah, the Sheikhuislam was the 
highest authority. Sultans’ statutes needed approval and ratification by the 
Sheikhuislam.873 Despite being defined as a state governed by religion (din-ü-devlet), 
the Ottoman administration separated religion and the state interest.874 As noted 
above in Chapters Three and Four, religion was subordinated to Otttoman 
pragmatism and raison d’étre. This enabled the Empire to act beyond the limitation 
of the Islamic law of nations.  
 
From the early days of the beylik, the Ottomans entered into alliances and treaty 
relations with non-Muslim states. Although the capitulations were unilateral non-
reciprocal grants made by the Ottoman sultans, they were in many respects contrary 
to the classical Islamic practice.  According to the Islamic law of nations, peaceful 
treaty relations with non-Muslim states could only be concluded for ten years. 
According to the Ottoman practice, capitulations were declared valid for the lifetime 
of the sultan. Consequently, the majority of the capitulations contradicted the siyar. 
Additionally, as noted above, Ottoman capitulations include reciprocal and equal 
rights. To give an example, the preamble of the 1535 treaty concluding the Ottoman-
French alliance treated the sultan and the king equally. It was considered valid during 
their lives. It also contained mutual reciprocal rights recognized as having been given 
                                               
873Berdal Aral, “The Idea of Human Rights as Perceived in the Ottoman Empire,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 26 (2004), 464.  
874Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi Makaleler 4 [Turkish Modernization Articles 4], (Istanbul: 
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311 
to the citizens of both states.875  As Khadduri argued, the Ottomans, by making long-
term peace with the dâr-al harb, changed the Islamic law of nations in a non-
alterable way. The idea of Jihad, which defined the basis of the relations between the 
Islamic and non-Islamic world as a continuous state of war, became thereafter 
inefficient.876 
 
It is also known that the empire had practiced and observed application of the two 
customary principles of international law: uti possidetis (as you possess) and pacta 
sunt servanda (agreements must be kept).877 In Article 1 of the Treaty of Passarowitz 
(1718) between the Ottoman Empire, Venice and the Holy Roman Empire, a 
reference was made to uti possidetis regarding the freedom of commerce.878 
 
References to common principles and norms of European international law can be 
found in the dealings of the Ottoman representatives with the Europeans. Particularly 
in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman ruling élite, in order to safeguard the 
territorial integrity and independence of the Empire, used the principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Ottoman diplomacy and 
international behavior were legitimized on the basis of European international law 
long before 1856.  
 
At times, the Ottomans’ applications of ‘European international laws and norms led 
to misunderstandings and friction in the relations of the Empire with European 
                                               
875For the text of the treaty, see de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane, 1521.  
876 Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations – Shaybānī’s Siyar,  6667. 
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powers. To give an example, during the French Revolution, Austria, Russia and 
Prussia diplomatically pressured the sultan to take a stance against the French 
officials and citizens residing in Ottoman lands with the claim that they were 
Jacobins, wearing the cockades symbolizing the revolution, and that this was an 
outright infringement of Ottoman neutrality.879 The Reis Efendi (Re’isül-kȗttab), 
referring to Ottoman neutrality (bîtaraflık) in his conversations with the ambassadors 
of these states, reminded them that France had long been an ally of the Empire and 
“the most favored European nation” in the Ottoman capitulations. He added that, in 
line with the European international law, the Ottoman Empire could not interfere 
with private dressings of the French citizens residing in Ottoman territories.880 To 
quote Rashid Efendi’s response to the chief dragoman of the Austrian Embassy on 
the issue: 
My friend we have told you several times that the Ottoman Empire is a 
Muslim state. No one among us pays any attention to these badges of 
theirs. We recognize the merchants of friendly states as guest. They 
wear what headgear they wish on their heads and attach what badges 
they please. And if they put baskets of grapes on their heads, it is not 
the business of the Sublime Porte to ask them why they do so. You are 
troubling yourself for nothing.881 
 
 
Reis Efendi’s reference to both the Islamic nature of the state and his legitimization 
of the Ottoman diplomatic behavior on the basis of common concepts of European 
international law, like the most favored nation – pacta sunt servanda – are 
remarkable.882 The Ottoman position with regard to the binding character of the 
French capitulations on both states and its careful observance of these under all 
                                               
879Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet [History of Cevdet], (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1966), 
15591560; Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi, 115116. 
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881Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, 52.  
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conditions clearly presents the change in Ottoman understanding of reciprocity and 
diplomacy. 
 
The other contentious issue between the Empire and the Allies was the status of the 
French ambassador at Istanbul. The French ambassador at the Porte, Choiseul-
Gouffier, resigned because of the revolution. Contrary to the general practice, upon 
the request of the Ottoman administration, he continued with his duties for awhile 
and waited for events in France to calm down. In 1793, he left for St. Petersburg.883 
When the new French ambassador arrived on July 17, 1792, Austria, Prussia, and 
Russia asked the sultan not to give accreditation to the revolutionary regime’s 
ambassador.884 Reis Efendi, on behalf of Selim III, refused all of these demands in 
line with diplomatic protocol and international conduct. Official Ottoman statements 
(hatt-ı hümayuns) and correspondence of this era emphasized the fact that the 
relationship of the Porte was with the State of France and its people, and that the 
changing form of government did not require any modification in Ottoman position. 
France was referred to as the State of France, regardless of its regime, until the Porte 
officially recognized the Republic in 1795. 885 The Ottoman insistence on protecting 
French rights strained its relations with the Allies.  
 
Another example that can be given of the Ottomans’ unorthodox legal practice is the 
declaration of wars. These required approval (fetva) of Şeyhülislam (Sheikh al-Islam 
 the highest Islamic religious authority). This practice continued until the 
dissolution of the Empire.  As noted in Chapter Four, the fundamental change in the 
                                               
883Mansel, Constantinople, 207. 
884Tarih-i Cevdet, 15581576. Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi, 115118. 
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Ottoman understanding of war led to its legitimization on the basis of European 
international law, but wars continued to be declared with the fetva of Şeyhülislam.  
 
The Tanzimat reforms led to the secularization and westernization of the Ottoman 
understanding of law. After the introduction of Western style laws between 1839 and 
1923, Islamic and secular laws were jointly applied within the Empire. Ottoman 
diplomats and statesmen continued to view European international law and its 
foundational principles – sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and pacta 
sunt servanda – as security providers. Particularly after the Treaty of Paris in 1856, 
the Empire had taken part in unions, congresses and conferences gathered for the 
codification of international law, like the Universal Telegraph Union of 1856, the 
Universal Postal Union of 1874 and The Hague conferences. The Porte carefully 
adhered to the principles of international law, but these did not prevent the 
dissolution of the Empire or European interventions.   
 
6.3 Ottoman Perception of Balance of Power and Great Powers (12991856) 
The Ottoman Empire was militarily and economically a strong power made it an 
active part of the European balance of power system. The European powers, despite 
religious and civilization differences, recognized the Empire as a great power and 
took the Ottoman factor into account in formulation of their intra- and extra-
European policies. Ottoman support to France and the Protestant powers led to the 
restructuring of European power politics.  
From the inception of the beylik, the Ottomans were an effective part of the 
Byzantine and later European balance of power system. Ever since the move of the 
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Turcoman beyliks to the region, this became a sort of tradition among the Byzantine 
rulers. Against their internal rivals, they did not hesitate to join forces with the Turks, 
who were good warriors. Ottomans were actively involved in the internal politics and 
conflicts of the decaying Byzantine Empire. They also used alliance politics among 
the Turcoman beylik of Anatolia in order to exert their power and used the rivalries 
to their advantage. Strategically and commercially, the Ottoman Empire was a very 
important part of Mediterranean political and socio-economic life. Ottomans played a 
major role in the first and second stages of the Italian Wars.886 The Ottomans were 
not newcomers to balance of power politics when they started to play a role in the 
Mediterranean and Italian system in the sixteenth century. During the powerful years 
of the Empire, the Ottomans pragmatically joined their forces with the enemies of 
their major enemies. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the major rivals of the 
Ottomans were the Austrian Habsburgs.  After the failure of Pope Leo X’s crusade 
against the Ottomans with the death of the German emperor, Francois I of France and 
Charles I of Spain and the Netherlands rivaled for the crown. The Ottomans used the 
succession wars to extend their influence and control over European affairs. The 
FrancoOttoman relations led to the Empire’s intervention into the European balance 
of power system. In this way, the Empire was able to disrupt the unity of the Catholic 
powers – the Papal States, France and the Holy Roman Empire.887   
 
Later, against Habsburg Catholicism, the Ottoman Empire supported Protestantism 
(basically Calvinists) in Europe. For example, Ottoman alliances were significant 
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aspects of the foreign policies of the Dutch and English monarchies in their struggle 
against the Habsburg supremacy in Europe.888 Ottoman power and diplomacy was 
significant in the preservation of the freedom of the system of states since it 
prevented the Habsburgs’ hegemony over Europe and enabled its safe and gradual 
transformation into a society of states.889 According to Watson, the FrancoOttoman 
alliance and Ottoman power not only prevented the establishment of a Habsburg 
hegemonial system in Europe, but also led to the formation of an anti-hegemonial 
(Westphalian) European international society. Even after its decline, the Empire 
continued to be an important factor in European affairs.890 
 
At different times, the Empire joined anti-hegemonic forces, concluded alliances 
with the European powers and consequently shaped the continental politics. 
Ottomans were not outside the European international system; they were actively 
involved in the European balance of power system and, hence, had an impact on the 
shaping of the European international system/society.891 To quote Watson, “The 
Ottomans played a major part in the European states system from its sixteenth 
century beginnings down to its merger into the present global system.”892 The 
Ottomans, also through alliances, supported the dissident groups within the Habsburg 
Empire. The Ottomans also supported the Moriscos community of Spain.893 
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In 1790, Selim III concluded an alliance with Prussia. This was a remarkable move 
because for the first time in Ottoman history, an Ottoman sultan officially signed an 
alliance treaty with a European great power. Other defensive treaties and alliances 
followed this. For example, in 1798, Ottoman forces joined the anti-French alliance 
of Russia and Britain against Napoleonic forces, and another defensive alliance was 
made with Britain and France in 1799. Contrary to its traditions, the Empire also 
sought great power (third-party) mediation in resolving several cases regarding its 
foreign affairs. In this period, unilateral ad hoc diplomacy practice in the Empire was 
replaced by resident embassies.894 Balance of power politics was an important aspect 
of OttomanEuropean relations.  
 
Starting from the partition of Poland by the Great Powers in the 1790s, Ottomans 
realized that the Empire could receive similar treatment. The French occupation of 
Egypt, the Serbian uprising, and the Greek revolution led to the Ottoman realization 
that the Empire had become an object of the European balance of power. For its 
security and survival, the Empire had to achieve recognition as a great power and an 
official guarantee of its territorial integrity by the Great Powers.  The Congress of 
Paris (1856) provided the Porte an opportunity to achieve these. The Paris 
Conference began on February 25, 1856. It took a month to settle all the major issues 
between parties. The Ottoman Empire was represented by the Grand Vizier, Âli Paşa, 
and Mehmet Cemil Bey, the Porte’s Ambassador in Paris and Turin. There were a 
number of critical issues for the Ottomans: the recognition of Ottoman territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence; its recognition as a member of the European 
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Concert; the position of the Christians and the foreign interference; the capitulations; 
the neutralization of the Black Sea; the passage through the Straits; the 
administration of the Danubian principalities and the navigation on the Danube; and 
the rectification of the OttomanRussian frontier in Asia, specifically the question of 
Kars. At times, the Ottoman interests conflicted with those of its allies. 895  
The protection and preservation of the territorial integrity and independence of the 
Sublime Porte was agreed and accepted by all.896 A guarantee of its independence 
meant nothing unless it was put as a guarantee of the existing borders of the Empire. 
Ali Paşa did not desire to leave any vague point in the treaty that could be used 
against the unity and order of the Porte or be a pretext for intervention. The Ottoman 
government was suspicious of all European powers.897 Accordingly, Article 7 of the 
Treaty of Paris was worded as follows: 
ART.VII. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, His 
Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Majesty the King of 
Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russia, and His 
Majesty the King of Sardinia, declare the Sublime Porte admitted 
to participate in the advantages of the public law and system 
(concert) of Europe. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to 
respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of 
that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act 
tending its violation as a question of general interest.898 
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This was a great achievement. Later, Âli Paşa in his political Testament to Sultan 
Abdülaziz stated that: 
Foreign affairs required immediate recognition. Our efforts were 
directed toward attaining the recognition of our right to exist and 
be admitted to the Concert of Europe. 
We become a member of the family of great nations who respect 
each other’s rights. 
We did succeed in having Europe recognize our borders and 
incontestable rights over the people of Your Empire.899 
 
On the Ottoman side, this article was interpreted as the Porte’s entry into the 
European Concert and recognition of its legal equality by great powers. Another 
concern of the Porte at the Peace Conference was the abrogation of the capitulations. 
Ali Paşa claimed that the capitulations became obstacles to the initiation of the 
reforms requested by Europe and demanded their abrogation. The French and British 
supported Ali Paşa, but Russia refused the Ottoman view.900 Accordingly, Article 32 
of the Final Treaty stipulated that: 
 
ART.XXXII Until the Treaties or Conventions which existed 
before the war between the belligerent Powers have been either 
renewed or replaced by new Acts, commerce of importation or of 
exportation shall take place reciprocally on the footing of the 
regulations in force before the war; and in all other matters their 
subjects shall be respectively treated upon the footing of the most 
favoured nation.901  
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Before commencement of the conference, Sultan Abdülmecid issued a new Hatt-ı 
Hümayun (February 18, 1856) on the rights and privileges of the Christians within 
the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. This document was written to prevent foreign 
pressures, specifically by Russia, during the conference.902 Despite Ottoman 
initiative, the issue of the rights and privileges of the Christians was brought forward 
by Russia, but Article 9 of the Final Treaty assured and relieved Ottoman worries 
with regard to foreign interference and Christian rights. 
ART. IX. His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, having, in his constant 
solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman which, 
while ameliorating their condition without distinction o religion or 
of race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian 
population of his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of 
his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the 
Contracting parties the said Firman emanating spontaneously form 
his sovereign will.  
The Contracting Powers recognise the high value of this 
communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, 
give the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or 
separately, in relation of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, 
nor in the internal administration of his Empire. 903 
 
In the years following the conference, European interference in the affairs of the 
Porte continued and increased. The Ottomans’ differentiated treatment by the Great 
Powers continued. The Treaty of Paris made the Porte just another unequal sovereign 
within the European international society.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The historical evidence and cases presented in this dissertation prove that from the 
fourteenth century onward, the Ottoman Empire engaged with European powers at 
various sectors and levels and was a part of the European international system and 
society. The Empire’s role in the shaping and later shoving of European international 
system and society is indisputable. Ottoman practice of the primary institutions, 
however, increased, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. War was 
regarded as a dangerous threat for the future stability and order of the Empire. There 
was greater reliance on the resolution of conflicts through diplomatic negotiations 
and/or international law. The Ottomans’ ruling elite interchangeably or 
simultaneously used the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law to 
prevent wars. Even if they were forced to enter into war, they did so after ensuring 
the official support of one or more of the great powers, either through military 
alliances or formal declarations of the neutrality of the states. Knowing that they 
needed to adapt themselves to the requirements of the age, the Sultans and ruling 
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elite embarked upon a deliberate and conscious modernization and reformation 
process.  
 
Starting from the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, which was considered the gravest 
strategic mistake on the part of the Turks, the Ottomans were defeated time and time 
again on the battlefield and at the negotiation table. The disadvantageous peace 
treaties and loss of important territories to Austria and Russia, led the Empire to 
more conciliatory and reciprocal diplomatic relations with European powers. 
Ottoman-European relations entered into a new phase of military retreat and political 
convergence. Between 1789 and 1856, the Empire and its reformist elite 
acknowledged the changes in Europe and in the status of the Empire and embarked 
upon a series of reforms that ranged from military to diplomacy and from center to 
periphery.  
 
Pressured by internal and external security threats, the Ottomans needed “peace and 
order,” both to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the imperial 
borders and to further their knowledge, adaptation, and strategic learning of 
European (i.e., international) society and its institutions. The ruling elite believed that 
only through modernization, i.e., Westernization or Europeanization, could the 
Empire regain its lost power and achieve stability and order. They were also aware of 
the specific status the great powers held within the newly established international 
order and knew that only through international recognition of their legal equality 
would they be regarded as a great power. The Empire had already been part of the 
European international system and a participant of its major institutions (diplomacy, 
international law, balance of power, war, and great power), albeit with some 
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misunderstandings and differences in application. The Ottomans had even 
cooperated with European powers in the development and institutionalization of 
diplomatic and consular practices, the balance of power, and extraterritoriality by 
allowing the presence of European resident missions, supporting them financially, 
and encouraging interactions and contact through unilateral grants and special rights. 
Unlike China or Japan, which were geographically distant and closed to European 
political, economic, and socio-cultural interaction and infiltration until the mid-
eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was interlocked with Europe. 
 
It should, however, be noted that Ottoman interpretational differences of the basic 
principles, norms, and practices of the European international system and society at 
times led to friction. Ottoman-European interests converged during two periods. 
First, in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries, the common enemy—the Habsburgs—
brought together the Ottomans, French, British, Dutch, and other Protestants. 
Second, in the nineteenth century, the threat posed by Russia to European 
international order and the Ottoman Empire once again brought the Empire closer to 
European states that shared a common interest in preserving the European great 
power equilibrium.  
 
Throughout this adaptation and strategic learning period, Ottoman attempts at 
socialization can be divided into two phases as both European and Ottoman 
perceptions of the other changed from marginal to liminal: early (1789–1832) and 
deepening (1832–1856). Between 1789 and 1832, Ottoman interests in European 
affairs rose. Beginning with the Polish question of 1795, the Ottomans realized that 
they could be subject to similar treatment by the great powers. They knew that they 
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would be an issue in the European balance of power. This led to a fundamental 
change in the Ottoman understanding of diplomacy from unconventional to a more 
conventional, European-style approach. The growing need to justify and legitimize 
international behavior resulted in incorporation of European international law and 
principles with the Islamic law of nations and thus a heterodox practice. Throughout 
this phase, the Empire combined its traditional policies with new ones. Old policies 
persisted, including the balance of power and war, as reforms in line with European 
standards began and Ottoman adaptation to European codes of conduct increased. 
From 1832 to 1856, the changing Ottoman understanding of war as an institution 
coupled with the ruling elite’s realization that the Empire had become a player in the 
European balance of power led the Ottomans to search for security by becoming a 
member of European international society and Concert. In this phase, Ottoman 
reformation and bureaucratization accelerated with the inclusion and adaptation of 
European ways of conduct into Ottoman practice. The Ottomans shared European 
concerns over the expansion of Russian power and the threat it posed to the 
European balance of power. This led to cooperation and concerted action with the 
great powers of Europe on issues of common concern. Ottoman demands for 
international guarantees of its sovereignty and recognition as a European great power 
gained momentum. In other words, Ottoman survival was dependent on cultivating a 
relationship with Europe.  
 
Based on these observations about Ottoman policy between 1789 and 1856, it can be 
concluded that the Porte, like other European great powers, used the primary 
institutions of European international society efficiently. For example, in situations 
in which an internal solution was not possible, as in the cases of the Egyptian crisis, 
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the Lebanon uprisings of 1840s, or the dispute over the Holy Places, the Empire 
asked the European great powers for unilateral, bilateral, or concerted intervention of 
a diplomatic, mediatory, or military nature. The Porte acted in concert with them, 
although, for the Empire, “non-interference in its internal affairs” remained utmost 
importance. On the other hand, there was also a changed in the European 
perspective. Since the end of the Greek War of Independence, the European powers 
had recognized the importance of the Ottoman Empire to European safety and 
stability; consequently, they started to view the Porte as a de facto member of 
European international society. The primary documents and historical evidence from 
the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries document the Empire’s unique position 
within the European international system and society.  
 
The Ottoman Empire had strong political, military, and economic relations with 
major European powers based on European international law and diplomacy. As 
noted above, contrary to the arguments of the ES, the Ottoman Empire was a part of 
both the thin and thick European international systems. It was also functionally a de 
facto member of the pluralist European international society. Ottomans and 
Europeans rivaled each other, but the Ottoman Empire contributed both directly and 
indirectly to the development of the European international system and society, and 
to the creation of the hybrid international society that existed beyond the borders of 
Europe.  
 
This necessitates a revision of the ES’s structural, functional, and historical study of 
the international society. The major structural and functional problem in the ES’s 
theoretical framework is the conception of the international system and society. The 
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link between the system and society is another point that needs clarification. On the 
historical side, the major complication is the ES’s hypothesis of the evolution and 
expansion of the international society from European international society, from the 
Middle Ages to the present. The ES’s assumption that the European states from 
Respublica Christiana to Vienna formed an international society based on common 
culture and society is factually misleading and thus ahistorical. The nascent existence 
of the primary international institutions and the sovereignty suggests that Europe was 
a regional international system in the making. Only after the French Revolution did 
the European states, under supervision of the Great Powers, start to construct a 
society of states.  
 
Related to this misconception, the ES’s perspective places all those states that are not 
deemed European on a cultural and civilization basis in the international system. 
Specifically, the placement of the Ottoman Empire within the international system 
despite the 500 years of relationship and encounters is an analytical failure. Taking 
the historical evolution of EuropeanOttoman relations into consideration, this 
dissertation suggested the development of a new concept of a “hybrid international 
society,” an amalgam of civilizations and a symbiosis of systemic and societal 
features. The concept can be elaborated to explain the relations between non-
European states and European states in general. To that end, further research is 
required, specifically in the cases of Japan and China.  
 
The international society has evolved empirically throughout the ages. At present, 
international society is still evolving and changing according to the necessities of our 
time and to the transformations within the states. The active participation of non-
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governmental organizations in internal and external relations requires states and 
international and regional organizations to take them into account. The internal 
changes within the units, the primary international institutions, and legitimacy also 
change the composition of the society of states. Neither the society of states nor its 
primary institutions are static. It is, therefore, essential to revise and reinterpret the 
basic concepts and premises of the English School of international relations theory, 
in line with new empirical and historical information and changes. This present 
dissertation sets out the basic facts and makes initial analysis, which, I would hope, 
would help lead to further research. 
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